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Preface
It is in the in terest of those who control the bureaucratic organizations in 
contem porary societies to have their employees, their clients, and the general 
public believe that such organizations are purely adm inistrative entities. The 
myth of adm inistration defines organizations as efficient and effective 
instrum ents for the realization of publicly proclaimed goals. All too often 
social scientists have accepted the idea of pure adm inistration and used it as 
the basis of their analyses of bureaucracies. Even when they have challenged 
claims of efficiency and effectiveness, they have not attended to phenomena 
tha t contradict the very possibility of an adm inistrative entity. Most of the 
neglected phenomena involve political processes such as conflict, domination, 
abuse of power, and deception, which are ubiquitous in organizations. 
Although disputes over goals, policies, and their im plem entation are not 
supposed to occur outside of proper "channels" they arise continually in daily 
bureaucratic life. Their neglect by social scientists shows a bias, often 
unintentional, in favor of elite  perspectives, and this has perpetuated a 
distorted and one-dimensional image of organizations. A critical 
in terpretation , which is the aim of this study, does not take official 
definitions at their face value and does not merely argue in favor of a 
"conflict approach," but dem onstrates concretely the political dimension of 
activ ity  within bureaucracies.
This book is an attem pt to show that contemporary bureaucratic 
organizations are not only adm inistrative entities but are also political 
structures in the sense that power, conflict, and domination are normal within 
them. The specific means used to dem onstrate this general thesis is the study 
of oppositions to adm inistrative authority by subordinates whose activity  is 
not officially legitim ate. Bureaucratic opposition is unequivocally political 
and its occurrence refutes the myth tha t organizations are merely 
instrum ents to achieve externally prescribed goals efficiently and effectively. 
The study of such oppositions shows how organizations "go wrong" according 
to their own criteria  and how employees become political actors, and so 
transcend their roles.
Making bureaucratic oppositions a focus for inquiry can be viewed as an
ix
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extension of the current research in organizational analysis, which began 
more than 40 years ago, directed to revealing the ’’inform al11 dimensions of 
behavior within bureaucracies. The studies of informal groups and networks 
of rules have, for the most part however, stressed adaptive mechanisms and 
have kept the officially defined context in tact. Informal mechanisms are not 
direct challenges to authority, although they often serve to make authority 
bearable. Bureaucratic oppositions do, in part, challenge the authority 
structure  and show that the myth of adm inistration cannot be upheld. 
Reactions to them by officials clearly dem onstrate that the organization is, 
among other things, a power system.
This study not only has links to a tradition in organizational analysis, but 
is also part of a wider project aimed a t revealing the ubiquity of political 
processes in contemporary complex societies. Hence, it should be interpreted 
in conjunction with the author's work on the political dimensions of the 
sociology of knowledge, the critique of the myth of the ’’scientific 
community," and the general critique of functionalism. (1) The basic intent 
of this body of work is to show tha t underneath the claims of value neutrality, 
public service, disinterestedness, and good intentions made by apologists for 
institutional elites lies a world of political conflict and com petition. Bringing 
this world to view is one of the tasks of criticism , which is an intellectual 
preparation for freedom.
The method implicit in this study might best be called ’’ethico-em pirical.” 
The assumption is made th a t social existence is an uneasy synthesis of the 
conflict among in terests and the appeal to principles or moral grounds 
(ideals). Ideals cannot be reduced to in terests , as the positivists claim, nor 
can in terests be reduced to ideals, as the idealists contend. No conceptual 
synthesis of the "m aterial” and "ideal," is possible whether on Marxism, 
Hegelian, or even Parsonian (dualistic) grounds. The best that can be done is 
to try  to detect the interplay of the two dimensions in actual cases, in much 
the way tha t Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and C. Wright Mills a ttem pted to do. 
The results of such an investigation will not fit a systems model or a "flow 
chart," but they will not lack coherence. That coherence, however, will not 
be linear, but will reveal a dialectic between transcendence of partial 
in terest and subservience to such in te rest. It will not suggest any middle 
term  or mediation between what Kant called "inclination" and "duty." 
Keeping this distinction clear is the essence of what Kant meant by criticism  
applied to social life. This study, then, draws upon many cases of opposition 
which illustrate  concretely the tension between principle and in terest, and 
show the paradoxes and ambiguities of political struggle.
The plan of this work follows its critical aim and its ethico-em pirical 
method. The first chapter outlines the myth of neutral adm inistration and 
proposes the alternative political in terpretation  of organizations, drawing 
upon contem porary thought and research on oppositions in the polity. 
Chapter 2 system atically details the grounds or "good reasons" for oppos­
itions, their normative justifications. The third and fourth chapters add the 
"empirical" dimension, detailing the barriers tha t oppositions confront in 
getting underway and the strateg ies th a t they employ once they have been 
in itiated . Chapter 5 analyzes some of the responses to oppositions by the 
official hierarchy and discusses some of the policies th a t have been proposed
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to elim inate the abuses uncovered by dissidents or to "institutionalize" 
dissent. Hence, the design of the work defines a "process" of opposition, 
beginning with the circum stantial and normative bases for politics in 
bureaucracies, and then considering the initiation, methods, and consequences 
of oppositions. The identification of a process, with various phases, d ictated 
the decision to draw upon case m aterial to illustrate general statem ents 
rather than to draw general statem ents from exhaustive case descriptions. 
This does not mean, however, th a t the method is "deductive" rather than 
"inductive." Whether case m aterial is used illustratively or exhaustively 
there is always a reciprocity in actual research between general statem ents 
and particular data.Many people have helped to bring this project to completion, whether or 
not they were aware of giving such assistance. I am grateful to my students 
a t De Paul University, graduates and undergraduates, who informed me about 
the particulars of the bureaucratic oppositions in which they or those close to 
them took part. Long after courses were completed some of these students, 
especially Ms. Edie Zukauskas, continued their in terest in my project, 
discussing it and doing further research in the area. Many of my colleagues in 
the social science disciplines have been kind enough to speak with me about 
the general issue of politics within organizations and about bureaucratic 
oppositions. It was in discussions with Fred Homer th a t the idea of 
bureaucratic opposition first arose. I am indebted to him and to Larry 
Spence, Marie Haug, Jam es Stever, Arthur Kroker, and Robert Perrucci. 
Finally, this book could not have been w ritten were it not for the active, 
sym pathetic, and intelligent collaboration of my colleague Dr. Michael 
Weinstein. I cannot thank him enough, and fortunately he does not demand 
such gratitude.
NOTE
(1) See, for example: Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, Living 
Sociology: A C ritical Introduction, New York: David McKay, 1974; Deena 
Weinstein, ^Determinants of Problem Choice in Scientific Research," Sociolo-
tical Symposium #16 (Summer 1976): 13-23; Deena Weinstein and Michael A. fe Instein, "Sociologies of Knowledge as Rhetorical S trategies," Free Inquiry 
16, //I (May 1978): 1-14; and Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, f,The 
Sociology of Non-knowledge: A Paradigm," in R.A. Jones, ed., Research in 
Sociology of Knowledge, Sciences and Art: An Annual Compilation, 
Greenwich,"Connecticut: i.A .I. Press, 1978, pp. 151-166.
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i  Bureaucratic Oppositions: 
The Phenomenon
As long as the world shall last there will be wrongs, and if no 
man objected and no man rebelled, those wrongs would last 
forever. C larence S. Darrow in an address to 
the jury a t a Communist Trial, 
Chicago, 1920 (quoted by Arthur 
Weinberg, Attorney for the 
Damned, New York: Simon and 
Schuster)
What do the following accounts have in common?
The regional sales manager of a prominent book publisher advocated 
various forms of bribery to get professors to adopt his company's textbooks. 
To dem onstrate one of his techniques, he and a subordinate entered a 
professor's office and asked his judgment of their introductory tex t. The 
professor unceremoniously told them tha t he thought the book was terrible. 
This professor, however, was in charge of mass sections of the introductory 
course in his discipline, so, without missing a beat, the sales manager offered 
him a deal. If he adopted the tex t for the fall, the manager would send him 
400 free copies which could be sold to students at a profit of over $2,000. 
The professor decided to assign the book to  his students.
At sales meetings the manager asked each of his staff members to discuss 
their "creative" means of selling, that is, the kinds of bribes that they offered 
and how they proffered them. All of the salesmen were opposed to such 
methods and preferred to seek adoptions by appealing to  the m erits of their 
books. When the manager continued to insist on his methods, five of the six 
salesmen sent a le tte r  to the main office of the corporation, threatening to 
resign collectively if their supervisor was not dismissed. The manager was 
not fired, however, but merely admonished. For several months he kept a low 
profile and then vigorously renewed his efforts to have his subordinates use 
his sales techniques. Within the ensuing half year all of the salesmen 
resigned. Shortly afterw ards their supervisor was dismissed.
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2 BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION
In a large m etropolitan school d istric t in which the students scored below 
average on standardized examinations, a principal of one of the elem entary 
schools directed his teachers specifically to  teach the contents of the exams 
and to increase each pupil's tes t grade by several points. The teachers feared 
informing the adm inistrators in the Board of Education because of two 
possible reprisals: they might be transferred  to a school in a "bad" 
neighborhood or such formal rules as having to turn in a lesson plan book each 
week might be enforced against them. They did, however, secretly  inform 
the local P.T.A. and helped the parent's group draft a le tte r  to the Board of 
Education exposing the principal. The Superintendent sent an investigating 
team , composed of six other principals, to the school. The principal was not fired and continued to try to implement his policies.
Frank Serpico's story, which was made into an interesting movie and an 
uninspired television series, is widely known. Serpico, a police officer in New 
York City, wanted to put an end to the rampant corruption in the 
D epartm ent. First he attem pted to speak to high-level adm inistrators, but 
discovered that some of them were involved in the very activities tha t he was 
trying to curb. The other adm inistrators took no action. When he broadened 
his campaign by seeking aid from politicians he was similarly frustrated:
...he was repeatedly rebuffed in his effo rts  to get action from high 
police and political officials, continually risking discovery a t any 
moment by the crooked cops he rubbed shoulders with every day, and 
finally out of desperation... he went to a newspaper with his story. (1)
What do these th ree accounts or the numerous others tha t could have been 
cited in their stead have in common? They all re la te  attem pts to change a 
bureaucracy by those who work within the organization but who do not have 
any authority. These attem pts, which will be called "bureaucratic oppo­
sitions," are probably ubiquitous, but are not frequently discussed in social 
science litera tu re  for reasons th a t will be elaborated. Most people who have 
worked in a large organization for several years are fam iliar with a t least one 
instance similar to the ones described above, and every so often the press will make such a case public.
It is significant tha t there has previously been no term  in the lite ra tu re  of 
social science tha t identified bureaucratic oppositions. This phenomenon has 
occurred frequently in both private and public organizations, and has been 
perpetrated  by one person or small groups, utilizing any of a number of 
tac tics  and meeting with a wide range of outcomes. These attem pts a t 
change from below, which em anate from those who lack authority, are 
labeled bureaucratic oppositions because they occur outside the normal 
adm inistrative routine and are challenges to authority. However, their aim is 
not to usurp the machinery of power but to alter practices and personnel. 
Why has bureaucratic opposition, a common phenomenon in organizations, 
been ignored by students of the organization? In essence, contem porary 
organization theories screen out this phenomenon by the lim itations of their guiding concepts.
The idea of theory in social science tha t guides the present discussion is a t 
variance with the common-sense notion th a t facts are im m ediate perceptions
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of an objective world which spontaneously generate theories when they are 
properly related. The actual process of theorizing is the reverse of common 
sense: the concepts th a t make up our theories direct us to some phenomena 
and exclude our a ttention  to others. Metaphorically, theories are beams of 
light forming an intellectual spectrum that allows us to "see" certain  things 
while leaving others im perceptible. (2) Other beams bring a different 
selection of facts to light and do not make apparent another, residual, set. 
The assumption is that no beam covers the entire spectrum; indeed, tha t 
different beams have varying band widths which cover distinct portions of the 
full spectrum. The phenomenon of bureaucratic opposition, then, is identified 
by a particular theoretical perspective which is quite different from the 
dominant perspective in contemporary organization studies, for which this 
phenomenon is all but invisible. A brief description of the currently dominant 
perspective and its lim itations will precede an analysis of the alternative 
view, within which bureaucratic opposition can be understood.
Although there are many variations on the them e, prevailing theories of 
organizations are essentially based on a "rational model" which explains 
"organizational patterns - social structures, m otivational strategies, coordi­
nating mechanisms, e tc . as outcomes of a goal-seeking or need-fulfilling 
tendency of the organization." (3) One of the ways in which theories 
"discover" facts is by directing inquiry to a specific problem. In the case of 
the prevailing organizational analyses, the problems explored are those of top 
management and the perspective generated is the manager’s.
That is, research questions have been posed from the standpoint of a 
powerful actor concerned with the essentially technical adjustm ents 
necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the organization. (4)
The bias of most organization theory towards the cares and concerns of 
particular actors within the object of study has often resulted in descriptions 
of bureaucracies that do not so much reflect the complexity of the to tal 
situation as they express the managerial vision of what "ought" to exist. 
Supporting this contention, Randall Collins claims tha t spanning a 30 year 
period the "neo-rationalist line of managerial theory from Chester Barnard 
(1938) to Jam es D. Thompson (1967) ... is designed as a practical guide for 
managers as well as a general theory." (5)Max Weber's ideal-typical description of the bureaucratic organization has 
been the model im itated by contemporary organization theory. The features 
of Weber's construct, such as a hierarchy of authority, hiring and promotion 
based on com petence, and specific and w ritten duties for each organizational 
role, can be summed up by the term  rationalization. This concept identifies 
the process by which instrum ental rationality, in which the means to an end 
are related according to the criterion of efficiency in a predictable pattern of 
cause and effect, becomes the overriding principle of social activity . In the 
ideal of a rationalized organization, decisions are made by those at the peak 
of the hierarchy of authority in the name and in terests of constituencies such 
as citizens or stockholders. These decisions are then implemented efficiently 
by subordinates. Organizations are in terpreted as tools for accomplishing 
ends, and so the human beings composing them  are primarily in terpreted as
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means and not as ends-in-themselves.
Much of the theory and research concerning organizations concentrates on 
the impediments to maximum efficiency and centers on how management 
might overcome the irrationality of workers, whose informal groups may 
re in terp ret the rules, and their own misunderstandings of workers. C. Wright 
Mills concludes that the managerial perspective assumes "the classic 
formulae of a natural harmony of in terests," efficient coordination which, 
from tim e to tim e, is "interfered with by the fra ilty  of human relations, as 
revealed by the unintelligence of managers and the unhappy irrationality  of 
workmen." (6) Conflict, when acknowledged at all, is usually subsumed under 
the concept of disorganization. As such it is in terpreted as being irrationally 
m otivated and inimical to the ends of the organization, both substantive and technical.
The bias of conventional organization theory, which excludes phenomena 
evincing conflict, is paralleled by the effo rts  of organizational elites to 
elim inate conflict. For both organization theory and managerial ideology, 
action is divided into two categories. Rational action corresponds to the 
bureaucratic ideal in which orders flow down the hierarchy of authority and 
obedience follows, enhancing efficiency. As Weber puts it: "The official is 
entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be put 
into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top." (7) The second 
category of action, which is really residual, is labeled irrational and is 
defined as all behavior inimical to the efficient attainm ent of organizational 
goals. Maintaining this false dichotomy, organization theorists fail to 
recognize as rational activ ity  whatever does not em anate from the hierarchy of authority.
In a broader sense than the organization theorists use it, rationality may 
refer to the use of appropriate means to solve a problem, to reach a goal. In 
this sense the rationality of an action is evaluated according to its adequacy 
to the actor's goal. The fallacy underlying the false dichotomy in managerial 
theories of organization is that of referring all action to the goals of upper- 
level management, and thereby taking an ideological or partial perspective as 
the basis of scientific theory. Thus, when subordinates disobey orders or 
a ttem pt to change policies, the m anagerial theorists view their actions as 
irrational because of assumptions that 1) those in authority know and order 
appropriate means to reach universally shared goals and 2) there is agreem ent 
on the goals themselves, whether they be efficiency, profit or, more usually, 
subgoals which are simply means to other ends. Both these assumptions of m anagerial theory are utterly unwarranted.
It is little  wonder, then, th a t those holding the assumptions of managerial 
theory would fail to recognize bureaucratic oppositions, which are essentially 
rational activities that challenge the validity of one or both these 
assumptions. Belief in shared goals and rational m anagement perpetuates a 
myth of organizations as systems of purely adm inistrative activity. Criticism  
of these assumptions discloses another view of organizations in which they 
appear as semi-congeries of adm inistrative activity  interlarded with political 
processes. Those perspectives which do not acknowledge political activity , 
then, can neither observe nor name the phenomenon of bureaucratic opposition.
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The perspective guiding the present discussion includes the adm inistrative 
or managerial interpretation of the organization within it, defining adminis­
tration as a special case of political processes. Where there is complete 
agreem ent on or acceptance of goals and procedures and their im plem enta­
tion, organizations are merely adm inistrative entities in which there are no 
grounds for opposition or dissent but subjective will or emotion (irrationality). 
Of course, such agreem ent is hardly ever present in an organization, and so if 
there is no overt opposition one may assume that it is suppressed by fear, 
resignation, or prudence, the grounds for reluctant obedience to authoritarian 
regimes. Only in the case of perfect agreem ent is Lenin’s dictum that 
politics be reduced to administration realized. Curent organization theory 
rests on the myth of adm inistration, and system atically ignores phenomena 
contradictory to that myth.
The adm inistrative myth contains its own interpretation of the human 
condition or what Alvin Gouldner has called domain assumptions. Talcott 
Parsons, who applied the managerial viewpoint to contemporary society, 
makes these domain assumptions. He "defines the human being as an 
organism seeking short-range pleasures, which must be controlled and 
directed to sacrifice these desires for the m aintenance of collective projects. 
These collective projects, m ediated through organizations, result in providing 
the conditions for the survival of the organism. The person who holds such a 
conception of human nature believes that human beings need religion, the 
nation, the family, the sta te , and corporate economic enterprises to save 
them from their own tendencies toward self-indulgence, self-destruction, and 
the destruction of others." (8)
In contrast to managerial theory, the domain assumptions of the present 
discussion, which support the idea that organizations are political systems, 
in terpret human beings as purposive actors who have the potential to act on 
motives th a t are not rooted in fear, resentm ent, or selfish enjoyment, and 
who are sometimes able to question the prevailing "definition of the 
situation" and to act on their critical insight. The dominant value of this 
perspective is neither control nor instrumental rationality, but the freedom of 
the person as a moral actor, which is not factual but must be achieved 
through struggle. Bureaucratic oppositions, whether they are successful or 
not, are consistent with the motive of freedom, if only the negative freedom 
of eliminating some perceived abuse. The perspective guiding this discussion 
does not deny the existence of the motivations identified by Parsons, but 
balances them with the freedom of the autonomous moral person.
In summary, the basic contention of the political perspective on 
organizations is tha t adm inistrative action is not capable of encompassing all 
of the activities within an organization because 1) all goals and sub-goals are 
not shared (that is, there is disagreement about whether certain  goals should 
be pursued) and 2) adm inistrators do not always act "rationally" (that is, those 
in managerial roles do not always conduct them selves in accordance with 
universal criteria). (9) Organizations, then, are not fully rationalized: instru­
mental rationality, in which the means to an end are related as steps in a 
predictable pattern of cause and effect, is limited by other human processes. 
Where work is not totally machine-like and so routine that the laborers are 
merely extensions of the tools that they use, there are possibilities for
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different in terpretations of what should be done, what aspects of the 
occupational role should be emphasized, what constitutes justice with regard 
to rewards and punishments, and when decisions about work become 
com m entaries on the worth and dignity of the worker.
The political perspective on organizations developed here draws upon Karl 
Mannheim's distinction between routine and political activity . According to 
Mannheim there are two aspects of any social situation: "first, a series of 
social events which have acquired a set pattern  and recur regularly; and, 
second, those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which, in 
individual cases, decisions have to be made th a t give rise to new and unique 
situations." (10) The advantage of Mannheim's distinction is that political 
activ ity  is not identified with coercion or with any other technique of social 
control but, instead, with uncertainty, diversity, and dispute. Mannheim was 
mistaken, however, when he identified routinization with rationality and 
politics with irrationality, arguing approvingly th a t the "chief characteristic  
of modern culture is the tendency to include as much as possible in the realm 
of the rational and to bring it under adm inistrative control - and, on the other 
hand, to reduce the  'irrational' elem ent to  the vanishing point." (11) In 
contrast to Mannheim's position, the present discussion is based on the notion 
th a t political disputes are not "irrational" a t all, but re flect, primarily, 
disagreement on the criteria  for evaluating goals. To say tha t political 
activ ity  is "irrational" is to imply that it is possible to achieve a universal 
agreem ent on goals merely by perfecting means.
Except for those parts of production organizations in which the role 
definition of the blue-collar worker is relatively unambiguous and program ­
med by machinery and other tools, and in which opposition to the possibly 
immoral consequences of production is excluded by the term s of the 
"contract," organizations are pervious to political processes. For example, 
much activ ity  within organizations relates to people as clients, subordinates, 
or the public. In the modern cultures of the West there has been a tendency 
to distinguish between the realms of things and persons (Kant's differentiation 
of the phenomenal world from the "kingdom of ends" is perhaps the most 
lucid example), each realm having its distinctive standards. Organizations 
which, for the most part, in terpret human beings as means rather than as 
ends-in-themselves provide many occasions for their morally sensitive 
employees to dispute policies, and even overall goals. Further, even where 
there is agreem ent on principles, those who handle "claims" or "cases" are 
in terpreting systems of rules and are likely to have their own "judicial 
ideologies" which may clash with those of their superiors. Finally, above the 
middle-level of organizational hierarchies, politics is inevitable because at 
these upper levels decisions are made concerning routines. Logically, such 
decisions cannot themselves be routine and there may be conflict over 
alternative policies and disagreement about whether a particular decision was 
"right" or "in the best in terests" of the agency or sub-unit.
Political activity  in organizations is also precipitated when promotion and 
firing, as well as working conditions (for example, scheduling in hospitals or 
academic institutions), are not routinized according to specific procedures. 
Competition for preferm ent, a ttem pts at undermining rivals, and resentm ent 
at being passed over are not bureaucratic oppositions, but may encourage,
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lead to, or deepen them. A ttem pts to make things seem as though they are 
routine or that they are determined by ’’objective" standards of efficiency or 
productivity are essentially rhetorical strategies which, like the managerial 
viewpoint, have the political import of minimizing challenges to authority.
Traditionally, politics has been interpreted as the aspect of human 
activ ity  in which decisions are made about such issues as the proper definition 
of function, policy, and justice. Politics has meant the possibility of choosing 
among alternatives within a public situation; hence, discretion and the 
possibility for varying interpretations are essential aspects of political 
relations. Economic or instrum ental activity  can be programmed; this is not 
the case for political activ ity  in which contradictory values may be at stake. 
We are concerned here with bureaucratic oppositions, which have been 
defined as a ttem pts to change organizations from within by those who lack 
the authority to  make such changes. Organizational policy and personnel can 
also be opposed by those who are outside the organization, such as clients, 
consumers, or anyone affected by the organization including the public at 
large, as evidenced by environmentalist groups. The study of opposition to 
organizations from the outside is an im portant part of the study of 
bureaucracies as political systems, but it is the subject of another 
investigation than the one undertaken here.
The political process, whether it occurs in the s ta te  or in a bureaucratic 
organization, involves opposition when some members of an authority system 
do not acquiesce in decisions that have been made, in the procedures for 
making them , or in their im plem entation. With regard to opposition, the 
essential structural difference between authority systems is whether they 
have institutionalized procedures for dissent or have not recognized the 
legitim acy of dissent. Representative systems, in the contemporary world 
dem ocratic sta tes, institutionalize dissent by allowing for "loyal" oppositions 
which do not violate constitutional procedures, while authoritarian systems do 
not make such provisions. Most complex organizations have an authoritarian 
structure, or at least severely limit representative decision making, and so 
oppositions within them will be more similar to those in authoritarian states 
than to those in democracies.
There is a good case, then, for drawing analogies between bureaucratic 
oppositions and oppositions to authoritarian states. Although a corporation 
does not have absolute authority over a given geographical area as does a 
sta te , both are systems of authoritative decision making which do not 
officially acknowledge opposition. Employees, like citizens of authoritarian 
regimes, lack freedoms:
... no freedom of speech - if they gave their subordinates or the press 
details on the incompetence of their board they would be liable to be 
fired, and if this is not the death penalty, it can still shatter (one's) life 
as much as banishment; no right of tria l, and no judiciary which is 
independent of the executive - their career can be blighted and 
promotion stopped for utterly  unjust reasons ... and they have no sort 
of representation in the councils which decide how the firm shall be 
run, no say in its government, however much the decisions may affec t 
their lives. (12)
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The Chairman of the Board of Sears, Roebuck, and Company concurs:
... we complain about the to ta lita rian  sta te , but in our individual 
organizations ... we have created  more or less of a to ta lita rian  system 
in industry, particularly in large industry. (13)
The strategies and tactics of oppositions, both against sta tes  and 
organizations, vary according to circum stances and are not definitive of the 
phenomenon of opposition itself. Contem porary political scientists, for 
example, often d ifferen tia te  between violent and nonviolent oppositions. At 
the violent end of the continuum are internal wars. An internal war is 
defined by Eckstein as "any resort to violence within a political order to 
change its constitution, rulers, or policies." (14) Under this concept he 
subsumes revolution, civil war, revolt, rebellion, uprising, guerilla w arfare, 
mutiny, jacquerie, coup d 'e ta t, terrorism , and insurrection. According to 
Kornhauser, who is specifically concerned with rebellion, such processes are 
"alternatives to established ways of making demands on authority  in an 
orderly manner ... ways of performing political functions in the absence of 
political structures capable of accomm odating political demands." (15) Such 
alternatives, of course, need not be violent, and there are many types of 
nonviolent opposition to both authoritarian and formally dem ocratic states, 
ranging from clandestine disobedience to public and principled "civil 
disobedience" such as that advocated by Thoreau.
Bureaucratic oppositions are usually nonviolent because of the sta te 's  
monopoly of force, although where the organization is a repository of this 
force (for example, a police departm ent) conflict may become violent. Most 
bureaucratic oppositions use the tactics of dissenting groups in entrenched 
authoritarian s ta tes , such as clandestine informal organization, symbolic 
protest, publicity, appeal to higher authority, and, when possible, manipu­
lation of procedures. In many respects, bureaucratic oppositions are similar 
to the nonviolent protests of dissidents in contem porary Eastern European 
s ta tes .
A political perspective on organizations not only directs atten tion  to the 
previously neglected phenomenon of bureaucratic oppositions but also opens 
up the resources of political science for organizational studies. Oppositions 
within the polity, particularly revolutions but also rebellions, other internal 
wars, and protest movements, have been extensively studied. A review of 
some of the pertinent categories and conclusions of the political science 
lite ra tu re  is useful for providing analogies, parallels, and contrasts between 
oppositions in the polity and those in bureaucracies. Such comparison also is 
an aid to understanding the nature of political processes in a more general 
sense than that attainable when in terest is focused exclusively on the institution of the sta te .
The host of oppositional movements within the polity have been 
distinguished from one another on the basis of purpose and strategy. 
Revolutions aspire to a to ta l a ltera tion  in the socio-political system.
Revolutionary change is aimed initially a t the political/governm ental 
machinery. In this sense political revolution involves a power transfer, 
a change in the distribution of political power, a transform ation of the
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ruling class. ... This power transform ation aims a t, seeks, or sets the 
stage for broader social change. Political revolution entails an array 
of disruptions on all fronts: political, economic, psychological, 
social. (16)
Less drastic and to tal forms of opposition than revolution are aimed a t 
changing certain  policies and/or replacing particular personalities. Thus, 
rebellions, coups, and civil disobedience, for example, are reform ist rather 
than revolutionary. Bureaucratic oppositions are necessarily reform ist, 
because a revolutionary opposition in an organization would presuppose 
transform ing the social structure in which the organization was embedded or 
using the organization to transform that structure. While opposition intended 
to use the organization as a revolutionary weapon is not only possible but 
occurs in cases of "infiltration ,” such opposition does not seek to  transform  
the organization in order to improve it but merely to use it. Bureaucratic 
oppositions, then are generally both nonviolent and reform ist, and are parallel 
to similar oppositions within authoritarian states.
A subsidiary distinction refers to the scope of opposition. Some 
oppositions are pursued within the boundaries of the organization or the 
polity, and others attem pt to draw aid from outside. The "human rights" 
policy of President C arter, which arose partly in response to the appeals of 
dissidents in various authoritarian sta tes, is an instance of nonviolent 
oppositions in some polities gaining support from another political system. 
"Whistle blowing," in which a dissident member of an organization seeks the 
aid of communications media or governmental institutions, is a case of 
bureaucratic oppositions going "outside," widening the scope of conflict.
The preceding distinctions among the strateg ies, aims, and scopes of 
oppositional activity  both in the polity and the organization will provide the 
general categorical framework for the chapters to follow. Other distinctions 
from the political science literature, such as those referring to leadership, 
the conditions for opposition, and the stages of oppositional activ ity  will be 
introduced, clarified, critic ized , and adapted where they are appropriate. 
Further elucidation of the practice and problems of bureaucratic opposition 
will be provided by many examples. These examples have been collected in 
various ways and should not be viewed as necessarily representative of all 
such cases. The "universe," as statisticians call it, of all bureaucratic 
oppositions is unknown, and possibly unknowable. Many of the examples have 
been gleaned from the mass media, while others originated from non-random 
interviews with people who work within organizations, including my students. 
Interestingly enough, no one who had be^en employed in a large bureaucracy 
for more than a year was unaware of a t least one bureaucratic opposition and 
many had participated in one or more struggles. Rather than proceeding 
inductively, the examples will be used to illustrate generalizations derived 
from theory about bureaucratic oppositions. A ttention will first be directed 
to the causes, conditions, and settings within which bureaucratic oppositions 
arise. Second, the processes and problems of opposition group form ation - 
from the overcoming of "habits of obedience" to risk, tru st, and leadership - 
will be examined. An exploration of the various strateg ies and tac tics of op­
positions will precede an evaluation of their prospects, outcomes, and 
significance.
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Grounds for 
Bureaucratic Opposition
The greatest of faults, I should say, is to be conscious of none.Thomas Carlyle, Heroes and 
Hero Worship
Organizations are fields for political activity , not the purely adm inistra­
tive entities that are described by their apologists and elites. They differ 
from dem ocratic political structures, however, because, like authoritarian 
s ta tes , they do not have institutionalized oppositions. Organizations do not 
have routine procedures for the expression and im plem entation of the 
demands, or proposals for change, issuing from those who are intim ately 
affected  by them but do not have formal authority. A ttem pts to effectuate  
change from below, to influence the circum stances within the organization in 
which one is employed, necessitate initiative, energy, and risk-taking beyond 
the voting and le tte r  writing tha t characterize most participation in mass 
dem ocracies. In subsequent chapters the kinds of initiative, risk taking, and 
strategy guiding bureaucratic opposition will be discussed. In the present 
chapter the preliminary issue of why people take such extraordinary measures 
within their organizations will be addressed. Why are bureaucratic 
oppositions undertaken? What are the reasons why people overcome inertia, 
which is supported by the managerial myth, and come to believe th a t they 
might and should struggle for change?The question of why bureaucratic oppositions are undertaken is ambiguous. 
In the contemporary social sciences the reasons for a phenomenon are 
normally in terpreted to be efficient causes, the observable conditions 
antecedent to the appearance of the phenomenon. However, there is another 
meaning of ’’why" in accounts of human activity  which refers to final causes, 
the legitim ate grounds or justifications for a certain  kind of conduct. The 
distinction between causes and grounds is central to the analysis of social 
action, but it is often blurred in everyday life and even in the social sciences. 
The efficient causes or antecedent conditions sought in empirical science are
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observable phenomena of the same type as the effects to be explained. For 
example, when Pareto explains opposition he correlates successful dissent 
with elite incapacity for effective violence and/or effective manipulation. (1) 
Similarly Gurr associates opposition with relative deprivation, the "perceived 
discrepency between men's value expectations and their value capa­
bilities." (2) Both e lite  incapacity and relative deprivation are empirical 
conditions, not grounds or justifications. The facts of elite  incapacity or 
relative deprivation become related to grounds only when they are compared 
to an ideal normative standard, which is not an Empirical phenomenon. For 
example, if one believes that government should be strong enough to enforce 
its directives, elite incapacity would be a ground for opposition, as it was for 
Hobbes. That Hobbes also believed th a t elite  Incapacity was a condition for 
opposition does not destroy the distinction between cause and ground. 
Similarly, if one believes that one's value expectations should be realized, 
then relative deprivation would be a ground for opposition^ Grounds, then, 
are associated with "ought" statem ents while causes are associated with "is" statem ents.
The confusion between grounds and causes in ordinary discourse and in 
social science arises most frequently from in terpreting grounds as causes. 
Brinton, for example, in his discussion of revolutions, s ta tes  that "men may 
revolt partly or even mainly because they are hindered," but th a t "also to 
themselves - they must appear wronged": (3) "'Cramp' must undergo moral 
transfiguration before men will revolt." (4) In the term s of the present 
discussion, "moral transfiguration" means giving grounds for opposition by 
reference to an ideal. The ideal itself, however, is not a cause, although 
commitment to the ideal or the desire to realize it may function as causes. It 
may even be a necessary condition for oppositions th a t grounds be given for 
them, that at least some participants are com m itted to grounds, or that 
grounds be used as rationalizations for in terests. Regardless of how grounds 
become m otivated, however, they make the phenomenon of opposition public 
and intelligible by offering putative justification for it. Every social 
organization has a normative or ideal dimension in term s of which its 
perform ance may be judged. Often there are competing or complementary 
sets of c rite ria  by which perform ance may be judged. Criticism  in term s of 
such ideal crite ria  takes the form of offering grounds.
The distinction between grounds and causes is rooted in Kant's distinction 
between practical anthropology and ethics. For Kant, practical anthropology 
was the study of the causes of human conduct, the laws of inclination or 
in terest, while ethics was the study of the principles by which conduct is 
justified. (5) Kant believed tha t the ideal of right conduct had to be 
m otivated by a good will to be effective, but th a t it made such good will 
intelligible by defining its form. The present discussion does not depend upon 
a single ethical ideal, but follows Kant by differen tia ting the ideal from the 
empirical dimension of conduct. Were grounds irrelevant to oppositions, then 
oppositions would merely be clashes of in terest. The use of grounds, even if 
only as rationalizations for in terest, give oppositions an ideal dimension. 
Whether com m itm ent to grounds is in good faith or not is an empirical 
question, the answer to which will vary in different cases. The ideal 
dimension, however, gives oppositions their public meaning and purpose.
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The analysis of the grounds for bureaucratic opposition has both psychological 
and social dimensions. Although most of the motives for opposition are 
grounded in the organization’s structure or in wider social norms there is a 
category of motives which are purely personal and subjective, or "un­
grounded.” For example, members of an opposition may be m otivated by 
idiosyncratic whim ("my boss has a certain je ne sais quoi which makes me 
hate him and want to do him in”), personal ambition r i i  this policy can be 
changed I will have a better chance of being promoted”), and psychiatric 
malaise (the person is just disruptive for one reason or another). The 
presence of subjective motives for oppositional activity is used by 
adm inistrators to brand all such activity as arbitrary, pathological, irrelevant, 
and ill-advised. Hence, in any extended oppositions such motives must be 
concealed and publicly replaced by references to grounded abuses. Those 
with subjective motives for opposition, then, usually join or recruit others 
who are com m itted to more ’’noble” aims.Although the evidence is not as complete as one might wish, it appears that 
at least one member of any bureaucratic opposition is impelled by ungrounded 
motives, which may or may not be supplemented by concern to eliminate
perceived abuses. . .An example of the interplay between grounds and motives in an opposition 
is reported by a minor executive at a small but very successful manufacturing 
firm which was incorporated into a large conglomerate. (6) According to  this 
executive, an incom petent superior, who was afraid to  make any decisions, 
stymied the effectiveness of the small group under his authority. Although 
all of the  four subordinates were frustrated, my informant indicated that he 
did not think th a t any action would have been taken had it not been for the 
overweening ambition of one member of the group. In this case, the efficient 
cause for the opposition was ambition while the ground was deviation from 
the ideal of efficiency. In other oppositions the efficient cause can be
com m itment to an ideal.The grounds for oppositions are relative to the ideals brought to bear on 
concrete situations. Many bureaucratic oppositions are grounded in r^s^~ 
tance to violations of purely bureaucratic norms, such as those defined by 
Max Weber in his ideal-typical bureaucracy. (7) Such conditions as injustice, 
dishonor, and incompetence are infractions of adm inistrative rules and 
provide justification for opposition. Similarly, inefficient or ineffective 
policies violate the principle of instrumental rationality, the regulative i ea 
of adm inistration. However, bureaucratic oppositions may also be groun e 
in wider moral norms such as fairness or some such ultim ate ethical princip e 
as the categorical im perative to trea t others as ends, never as means °™y* 
Despite the various criteria , however, all grounds have in common their 
appeal to ideal standards and their aim a t justification.
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ABUSES GROUNDED IN DEVIATIONS FROM 
THE BUREAUCRATIC IDEAL
Abuses related to deviations from the adm inistrative ideal involve issues 
of justice, efficiency, or honor. In Weber's discussion of the bureaucracy, 
workers are in terpreted as m ere functionaries who perform only their 
prescribed tasks and who trea t every problem in accordance with the w ritten 
rules, which refer to the proper handling of cases, not of people. One is to 
conduct one's office "without regard for person." Rules, rather than passions, 
are supposed to govern the bureaucrat's activities. Of course, rule 
compliance has just as much of an emotional basis as has rule violation, if the 
im pact of habit is eliminated. According to  the bureaucratic ideal, however, 
only those emotions which support rule compliance are adm itted. Failure to 
perform according to the rules, either because of to tal disregard for them 
(arbitrary despotism) or because of subjective considerations such as racial 
prejudice, greed, or sexual a ttrac tion , constitu tes bureaucratic m alfeasance. 
M alfeasance is defined here as the inconsistent application or disregard of 
"the rules." The charge of m alfeasance as a ground for bureaucratic 
opposition implies th a t all parties agree on the way in which the rule should 
be applied. When there is disagreement on the in terpretation  of the rules 
(which rules should apply to given cases and what a rule means) the grounds 
for opposition concern policy differences and not m alfeasance. Although the 
distinction between policy differences and m alfeasance is conceptually clear, 
the lines are blurred in practice because accused m alfeasants often claim 
that oppositions against them are based on substantive disputes.
Charges of m alfeasance can focus on the formal equality of rule 
application or on substantive e ffects of rule violation. Justice within 
organizations refers to the consistent, fa ir, and universalistic application of 
the rules. Injustice can be directed against subordinates or against relevant 
publics. In the la tte r  instance, the groups, such as taxpayers, welfare 
recipients, or custom ers, may organize in opposition to the organization, but 
such activ ity  is not a bureaucratic opposition. Subordinates who witness or 
experience injustice or unfairness often feel a sense of moral outrage, 
particularly if they have little  authority. A worker in the cost accounting 
departm ent of a large industrial corporation communicates such outrage in less than impeccable grammar:
My clim atic opposition with Mr. V began when Gloria and I implored 
him to show us where it is a w ritten  policy of the company that allows 
him to deviate so far from the normal practices of the company. We 
wanted to know how he was personally perm itted to se t double 
standards (where only the male accountants could go on paid trips to 
various plants) for his employees, when he knew some of the rules he 
enforced were based on convention. N.C.'s corporate office has a 
reputation of being very liberal in regards to its employees as far as 
benefits, promotions, e tc . for both sexes. That is why it was so 
difficult to accept or conform to the  stringent rules of this one maniac. (8)
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In another case, the supervisor of the research staff in a production 
departm ent regularly issued "discriminatory task assignments." A bureau­
cratic  opposition began when
... only those members of the Staff who fe lt that they had been dis­
crim inated against because of race or sex, took the initiative to m eet 
with the Office Manager (supervisor’s superior) ... The complaints were 
never investigated and the Office Manager reported the visits to the 
Supervisor. ... In an effort to discourage and prevent future contacts, 
he scrutinized the work of these employees who visited the Office 
Manager. When mistakes were found, no m atter how insignificant, the 
employees were told that they were fired. (9)
In both these instances the bureaucratic opposition did not m eet with initial 
success. The eventual achievement of their goals, the removal of the mal­
feasants, was secured by informing higher adm inistrators of the dysfunctional 
consequences of norm violation. Administrators' awareness of the violations 
themselves was not sufficient to secure remedial action. These cases are 
indicative of a general pattern in which injustice, in itself, is insufficient to 
cause removal.Fortunately, from the viewpoint of oppositionists, injustice, including the 
use of arbitrary power, rarely fails to violate the norms of efficiency and/or 
honor. Further, many instances of injustice also fall under the category of 
corruption, and thus are viewed by higher authorities as serious infractions, so 
long as these authorities are not themselves involved in the corrupt practices. 
David H. Bayley, a political scientist, states tha t corruption, "while being tied 
particularly to  the ac t of bribery, is a general term  covering misuse of 
authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be 
monetary." (10) This definition can encompass activities within both public 
agencies and "private" profit-making corporations. Yet the literature on 
corruption has been confined for the most part to the polity and its 
organizations. (11) This lopsided emphasis on corruption in the public sector 
is due, perhaps, to the widespread idea that business organizations are subject 
to the discipline of the m arketplace and will simply go bankrupt at no one's 
loss but their own if they are too corrupt. Government, on the other hand, is 
supported by the taxpayer's money and, according to  the conventional 
wisdom, has no institutional check on its inefficiency. Business corruption, 
then, is widely interpreted as being harmful only to the business, while 
governmental corruption is in terpreted as being harmful to the public. In an 
economy ruled by oligopolies which are bailed out by government when they 
are on the verge of bankruptcy, the distinction between business and 
governmental corruption has little  practical meaning. However, persistence 
of the myth of m arket discipline influences the relative importance of 
charges of corruption in different organizations and, therefore, the strategies
pursued by bureaucratic opposition groups.As implied in the definition, the motive for corruption is to obtain 
personal benefits beyond those stipulated in the con tract of employment. 
One major characteristic  of all modern bureaucracies is that an incumbent 
does not own his or her office. A salary is paid and perhaps other clearly
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specified perquisites are provided, but there is a prohibition on exchanging 
the power of one’s office for additional benefits. In some organizations the 
separation of office from personal benefit is widely honored, while in others 
it is barely existent. The distinction between corruption com m itted by an 
isolated individual and corruption endemic to an organization is crucial for 
understanding bureaucratic oppositions. Confronting and attem pting to 
remove or change the behavior of a lone m alfeasant is quite different from 
being embedded in an organization in which corrupt activ ity  is a common 
practice. Corrupt organizations often respond to opposition by trying to 
make it appear th a t infractions were not condoned and th a t isolated violators 
will be punished. In his efforts to clean up the New York City police force 
Serpico’s initial failures were largely due to his naive judgment th a t the 
corruption was an individual and not an organizational phenomenon. When the 
tru th  finally got through to him, rather painfully, he changed his oppositional 
tac tics . Of course, as will be indicated in subsequent chapters, the most 
appropriate tac tics do not guarantee the success of a bureaucratic opposition.
When corruption is widespread within an organization it is often 
in terpreted as normal behavior and scarcely perceived to be a norm violation. 
In speaking with numerous policemen in the service of a large midwestern 
city, only one complained, and did so b itterly , about the ubiquitous 
corruption. He was clearly pained by the disregard of his colleagues for "the 
rules." He himself accepted no bribes, either in goods or cash, from drug 
dealers trying to avoid arrest. He claimed th a t he knew of only one other 
officer with such scruples. His inability to ac t in ways tha t he thought proper 
led him finally to resign from the force. His crise de conscience aroused mv 
in terest. Why had none of the others complained? When I asked them how 
they handled corruption a pattern  emerged. All of those to whom I spoke, 
with the  exception of the officer discussed above, had relatives who were 
policemen. It was through them th a t they had learned what to expect. They 
were convinced, before personally confronting the corruption, th a t things 
were as they should or "had to" be and, thus, th a t there was no need to change them .
Another consideration with regard to bureaucratic opposition to corrup­
tion is who benefits when there is pervasive corruption. That is, when the 
rules are broken do the gains devolve directly to  the individuals involved or 
does the organization as a whole stand to benefit from the practices? (12) 
When the primary beneficiary is the organization itself, the ground of 
opposition ought not to be classified as rule violation. Whether the instance 
is bribes paid to foreign officials by American m ultinational corporations, or 
surveillance of civilians by the m ilitary, or a company’s keeping two sets of 
quality-control books to deceive health inspectors, such cases have more in 
common with disputes over policies and their im plem entation.
When incumbents of bureaucratic roles break the organization's rules, 
however, whether by applying the rules with partiality  or by ignoring the rules 
a ltogether, their actions constitute formal breaches of justice. As noted, 
such infractions may and do, by them selves, constitu te  grounds for some 
bureaucratic oppositions. Structurally, rule infraction may be considered as 
an abuse or misuse of authority, while m otivationally it is a spur to moral 
outrage over inequity, unfairness or dishonesty.
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The consequences of deviations from organizational norms may, inde­
pendently or in conjunction with injustice, constitu te grounds for bureaucratic 
oppositions. Perhaps the most important possible e ffec t of rule infraction is 
the reduction in or elimination of the organization's efficiency. One of the 
common justifications for bureaucracy is its supposed greater efficiency than 
preceding organizational forms. Efficiency refers to the effective achieve­
ment of the organizational goal, whatever it may be. Explicit division of 
labor, hierarchy of authority, conduct of office without regard for persons, 
and appointment and promotion of individuals to positions on the sole basis of 
their competency are defining characteristics of a bureaucracy, all of which 
are designed to augment efficiency. Specific sets of rules cover each of 
these general norms and when such rules are violated the organization is 
likely to become inefficient. Of course, inefficiency does not always result 
from rule infraction. For example, violation of the division of labor, as when 
colleagues in different departm ents give unauthorized aid to one another, 
may even make the organization more efficient, a t least in the short run. 
However, despite the debate in the organizational literature over the effects 
of some of the bureaucratic norms on efficiency, there is general agreem ent 
th a t application of the norm of com petence is essential for maximum 
efficiency.In a literal and formal sense the superiors of an incompetent employee are 
the ones who have violated the norm of com petence. However, bureaucratic 
oppositions directed against incompetence usually focus on the incompetent 
officials, not on those responsible for their appointm ent. Cases in which 
oppositions are aimed at those who made hiring and promotion decisions are 
usually grounded in charges of discrimination; tha t is, someone has not been 
hired or promoted because of prejudice against an ascriptive characteristic 
such as sex, age, race, or religion. The proliferation of national voluntary 
groups to counteract discrimination (for example, for blacks, women, and 
gays) has provided support to bureaucratic oppositions against discrimination. 
Such oppositions are usually fought on the grounds of injustice, although 
incompetence and, perhaps, dishonor may also be reasons.
The structural ground for an opposition against incompetence is that the 
role incumbent is not discharging assigned duties. Subordinates who must 
follow inappropriate orders are usually aware that their own performance is 
impaired. Thus, opposition to incompetence is often bound up with concern 
for career advancem ent, the desire to do meaningful and high-quality work, 
com m itment to the norms of just rewards and equal opportunity, and concern 
for the deleterious effects of inappropriate or self-defeating action. The 
crew on Captain Arnheiter's Naval vessel judged their superior to be 
incapable of giving orders and mutinied. Mutiny is a special case of 
bureaucratic opposition because there is no higher authority to whom to 
appeal, it requires direct action, and, most im portantly, it involves a 
usurpation of authority. 3ust as in the fictional "Caine Mutiny," the 
"Arnheiter Affair" led to a court-m artial of the m utineers. In the la tte r case 
the court did not agree with the mutineers' assessment of their superior's 
com petence.Many issues are involved in understanding bureaucratic incompetence. Is 
it based on in tellectual incapacity to perform role requirem ents or is it
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rooted in psychological factors? Are incom petent officials appointed because 
the norms have not been applied correctly or does incom petence only become 
m anifest a fte r the official has taken the position? Is there, perhaps, 
something about the structure of bureaucracies themselves or about positions 
of authority tha t fosters incom petence? Another set of issues relates to the 
perception of incompetence. Superiors often seem to suffer from what Josiah 
Royce called "viciously acquired naivete" about the excellence of their 
appointees or immediate subordinates. Is it merely tha t superiors do not want 
to admit to incorrect hiring and promotion procedures or to mistakes in 
applying good procedures? Or are  subordinates more likely to perceive 
incom petent adm inistration because they are directly involved in its effects? 
Although some people are fired or, more rarely , dem oted, does a criterion 
such as "their a ttitude" play a g reater part in their removal than does 
incom petence? In summary, if bureaucracies a ttem p t to pursue goals 
efficiently , why are so many incom petents found in modern organizations?
One way of responding to the issues involved in bureaucratic incom­
petence is to investigate why incom petents are not removed. Most 
bureaucracies make little  provision for dismissing employees and, as Weber 
noted, "Normally, the position of the official is held for life, a t least in public 
bureaucracies; and this is increasingly the case for all similar structures." (13) 
In a discussion of public bureaucracies Blanche Blank rem arks,
If getting good people in has its frustrations, getting poor ones out is 
even worse. Dismissals in the New York City civil service run to less 
than 1.5 per cent a year. The required proceedings are highly formal, 
almost like a trial - and generally suggestive tha t it is the supervisor 
rather than the employee who is being tried . ... Considering, therefore, 
the risk of the unsettling effects on various segments of personnel, the 
tremendous consumption of agency tim e, the heavy cost and the 
ordinary human reluctance to do unpleasant things, it is remarkable tha t any dismissals are achieved under present conditions. (14)
Lawrence Peter (15) explains endemic incom petence in organizations by 
arguing th a t people are rewarded for doing their jobs well by promotion to 
other jobs which usually have more status, higher income, and greater power. 
Com petent perform ance of a new task will even tuate in still another 
promotion. However, when an employee no longer performs adequately the 
promotion process will end. Over tim e, then, positions tend to be filled by 
incom petents. For example, excellent teachers may become bad principals, 
superb craftsm en may become grouchy and ineffective foremen, and hot-shot 
salespeople may become unproductive sales managers. Peter traces the 
problem of incom petence to the evaluation of candidates for a position on the 
basis of past perform ance at tasks th a t are not related to the functions of the 
new job. Hence, bureaucracies c rea te  incom petents.
Despite its great popularity among employees of large organizations, who 
assume th a t it applies to their bosses and not to them selves, "Peter's 
Principle" is a bit too glib to  be accepted a t face value. Why do many 
observations seem to support the "principle"? One possibility is that the new 
job differs in essential respects from the old one. One may perform a task
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well not only because one has been trained adequately for it but because it 
affords intrinsic value, regardless of its financial, status, and/or power 
rewards. People promoted to adm inistrative positions are often judged to be 
incom petent. They have been removed from performing activities that they 
may have enjoyed and for which they were well suited, and they have been 
given the task of controlling others. Unless one enjoys exercising power over 
others or is satisfied fully by extrinsic financial and status gains, promotion 
into adm inistration may be, a t best, a mixed blessing. Perceived incompe­
tence may stem  not only from a deficiency in control skills and other 
adm inistrative talents, but from resentm ent at being deprived of satisfying 
work. Administration is the "art" of getting others to do a task efficiently. 
Managers may miss the direct satisfaction of doing something concrete, be it 
making a sale, teaching a course, or handling a welfare client's problem. 
Since Marx's writings appeared, those concerned with worker alienation have 
considered control over one's work and its conditions to  be the most 
im portant occupational value. They have failed to note, probably for 
ideological reasons, tha t form of alienation related to lack of direct control 
which is inherent in adm inistrative roles.In more general term s, of course, any or all aspects of a bureaucrat's job 
may be alienating. In the syndrome of alienation the person cannot identify 
with his or her work, therefore, the work loses its subjective meaning. The 
worker becomes less devoted and less efficient, and often tries to avoid 
making decisions. Marx's notion of alienation, although it was meant to apply 
to blue-collar work, is just as applicable, if not more so, to the jobs of white- 
collar bureaucrats:
What do we mean by the alienation of labor? F irst, th a t the work he 
performs is extraneous to the worker, that is, it is not personal to him, 
is not part of his nature; therefore he does not fulfill himself in work, 
but actually denies himself; feels miserable rather than content, 
cannot freely develop his physical and mental powers, but instead 
becomes physically exhausted and mentally debased. Only while not 
working can the worker be himself; for while at work he experiences 
himself as a stranger. (16)
People who experience themselves as "other-than-them selves" are not only 
capable of inefficiency but of outright cruelty. Controls such as guilt and 
ideals of humaneness function in the autonomous person, not in those who are
strangers to themselves.From Here to Eternity (17) can be in terpreted as the novelist James 
3ones*s a ttem p t to illustrate the tyranny and abuse leveled at subordinates by 
a compulsive and m erciless individual who is alienated from his meaningless 
job. Less vicious, but perhaps more insidious, is the behavior of Bob Slocum, 
the anti-hero of Joseph Heller's Something Happened. (18) Employed as a 
middle-level adm inistrator in a large and nameless business organization, 
Slocum is the epitome of the alienated bureaucrat. His treatm ent of his 
subordinates, colleagues, and family is often cruel and arbitrary. From is 
interior monologue we learn that he is as confused by his Kafkaesque actions 
as are those around him. (19)
20 BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION
The incompetence that results from resentm ent and alienation may have 
consequences beyond the inadequate perform ance of specialized tasks. It 
may also be the underlying reason for acts tha t form the basis of other 
grounds for bureaucratic opposition, such as injustice and dishonor. In the 
managerial ideology adm inistration is the highest form of work and is judged 
to be universally desirable. Challenging this pervasive assumption reveals the 
possibility th a t the adm inistrative myth is a subtle form of ressentim ent and 
th a t hierarchical organization may have built-in psychological strains tha t engender inefficiency. (20).
In addition to the structural determ inants of incompetence there are many 
psychological and social-psychological explanations for it. Some analysts of 
society have argued that the exercise of power itself has deleterious effects 
on those who employ it. When political scientists assess opposition to 
authoritarian regimes they often quote Lord Acton's dictum that "Power 
tends to corrupt: absolute power corrupts absolutely." (21) More to  the 
point, perhaps, is a statem ent made by a black sheep of the American 
Revolution, Sam Adams: "Power is intoxicating. There have been few men 
who, when possessed of unrestrained power, have not made a very bad use of 
it." (22) Administrators do not, as a rule^have absolute or unrestrained power. 
However, due to the difficulty of removing officials as noted above and other 
considerations to be discussed la ter, the supposed checks on managerial 
power, such as the observations of superiors and the perform ance of subordinates, are ineffective restraints.
A psychiatrist, Dr. H. Waldo Bird, identifies a set of personality charac­
teristics which he claims are responsible both for propelling his male subjects 
to the top of organizations and for their incom petence and subsequent failure. 
In the successful men he observed, including those "whose corrupt behavior, 
sexual misadventures, incom petence or breakdowns have made news headlines* 
recently, ... (the) drive for authority, control, and domination assumes over­
whelming proportions as does the sex drive ...." (23) Other observers identify 
what may be called "male menopause" or "mid-life crisis" as a cause of in­
com petence. A journalistic account of such a crisis c ites the example of "a 
¿ ' : year"old production manager (who) began dumping all his office responsi­
bilities on subordinates, some of them untrained to handle them, and filling 
his own day with unimportant work." (24) The so-called male menopause is 
not, according to the proponents of this explanation, a physiological 
phenomenon, but the result of highly career-conscious people recognizing th a t 
they are not going to "make it to the top" or that the position they had 
struggled for and finally achieved is not rewarding after all.
In attem pting to account for incom petence one should not overlook the 
e ffec ts  of alcoholism and the various types of mental illness which are 
widespread in the public a t large. The Catholic Church and some unions and 
corporations have acknowledged the frequent incidence of alcoholism and 
have begun clinics for those who voluntarily undergo treatm ent or who are 
persuaded to do so. The medical profession classifies alcoholism and mental 
disorders as illnesses, attem pting to  remove the stigma of personal 
responsibility from them . However, many individuals are reluctant to adm it, 
either to others or to themselves, th a t they suffer from such afflictions, 
borne bureaucratic oppositions are, of course, struggles against adm inistrators
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who are mentally ill or alcoholics. Even if the oppositionist is sym pathetic to 
the superior’s plight such benevolent emotions must be overcome by an 
a ttitude of ruthless compassion which focuses upon objectionable actions. A 
male nurse who participated in a bureaucratic opposition to remove the 
Director of Nursing Services at a suburban community hospital a t which he 
was employed reported,
Most significant was the inflexibility of the D irector, partially based 
on false information given her, and her own personal problems which 
clouded her judgment. She was rumored to drink heavily to  the point 
tha t she was home ’ill’ many times and when a t work acted  ’peculiar’ 
and used mouth deodorants excessively. (25)
Inflexibility, such as that exemplified by the Director of Nursing Services, 
constitutes the basis of a number of related theories of organizational in­
com petence. Victor Thompson coined the term  "bureaupathology” to identify 
the various m anifestations of inflexibility, which run the gamut from personal 
problems to what Thorstein Veblen called ’’trained incapacity” (over­
specialization). (26) Overspecialized bureaucrats cannot adapt to changes 
within the organization or the society at large and, thus, evince incompe­
tence. For example, the introduction of computer technology or the rise of 
the black liberation movement probably caused many adm inistrators to 
become incom petent because they were not flexible enough to cope with and 
adapt to new demands and requirem ents.Robert K. Merton has investigated the structural factors that lead to the 
formation of the inflexible ’’bureaucratic personality.” Merton asserts that 
conformity to the rules, the reliability of behavior, is essential to an efficient 
bureaucracy. Such conformity can best be achieved ”if the ideal patterns are 
buttressed by strong sentim ents which entail devotion to one's duties, a keen 
sense of the lim itations of one's authority and com petence, and methodical 
perform ance of routine activ ities.” (27) Often such sentim ents are 
overstressed in order to insure compliance and there occurs a "transference 
of the sentim ents from the aims of the organizaiton onto the particular 
details of behavior required by the rules. Adherence to the rules, originally 
conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself." (28) Thus, 
Merton suggests th a t inflexible, and therefore potentially incom petent 
people, are trained to be so by the bureaucracy itself. Others have suggested 
that the inflexible bureaucrat manifests a particular personality type which 
was nurtured and developed in early childhood (for example, the "anal- 
retentive" personality). The presence of such people in organizations would 
be attributed  to self-selection.That rigid adherence to rules is often incom petent behavior which affects 
the organization adversely shows th a t the rules do not always promote 
efficiency and that incompetence can result from following them. This 
judgment is illustrated by the well-known protest ta c tic  of "work-by-rule." 
T raffic controllers at airports have effectively stopped all plane tra ffic  by 
this procedure and it is sometimes one of the tac tics  of bureaucratic 
opposition.The inflexibility of a superior becomes a barrier to efficiency when there
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is a breach between the formal rules of an organization and the informal, 
everyday procedures that often grow up in efforts to adapt the rules to 
concrete situations. (29) An FBI agent considered the excessive phone calls 
and the "insipid and insistent suggestions" of his headquarters supervisor to be 
an attem pt at "trying to look com petent rather than be com petent." (30) 
When the agent was disciplined for failing to w rite up a report on a tip 
provided by an informant who was known for his unreliability, his colleagues 
supported him in a bureaucratic opposition. They dem onstrated to the higher 
echelon th a t the supervisor's over-rigid adherence to details constituted 
interference with the agency's mission and that the agent had been unfairly punished.
Inflexible adherence to rules may be due neither to personality nor to 
bureaucratic training, but may result from a feeling of "having" to prove to 
others that one is com petent. Such overcompensation is especially prevalent 
among those whose ascriptive characteristics differ from the qualities of the 
"normal" role incumbent (for example, women, non-whites, and the very young).
The first female supervisor a t a nationwide shipping company, N. was put 
in charge of a highly effective loading dock. According to one of her 
subordinates, high morale had resulted in a system of mutual aid which was at 
variance with the rules. N. recognized the efficiency of this informal system 
and fe lt at ease with it until she attended a meeting with other supervisors 
and managers. One can only speculate about what went on at the meeting, 
but when N. returned she "began to raise hell. She said tha t we (the workers) 
didn't run the area and she did." (31) Exercising her authority, she perm itted 
no talking on the job, transferred workers to different positions arbitrarily , 
and prohibited the mutual assistance activ ities. The group's efficiency 
dropped precipitously and then decreased still further as the workers 
re taliated  in a greve du zele. N. eventually quit. Because N. was a female in 
a previously all-male position, she was judged by special standards; her peers 
and superiors were concerned with her style, not with her achievement. A 
male, especially a white middle-aged male, would probably not have been 
singled out as being too easy. Due to the pressures on women to overstress 
the masculine stereotype of management it is a wonder th a t many more are not s tric t and "bitchy."
Rigid rule enforcem ent becomes incom petence in several ways. In 
addition to the possibility tha t the rules them selves generate inefficiency, 
subordinates may, like Dostoevsky's underground man, resist being "piano 
keys" or being trea ted  as machines which are turned on a t a specific hour, 
programmed to perform certain  motions, and then turned off a t another 
specific tim e. Informal systems may grow up as a response to the 
m echanization of the individual and may indicate an assertion of individual 
will. The desire to exert one's will for its own sake (Dostoevsky's "freedom to 
be free") sabotages many adm inistrative plans to increase efficiency by 
changing the rules. The hope th a t "rational" changes will increase compliance 
is frequently dashed by the creation of ever-new informal networks. 
Administrators tend to rationalize their failures by accusing their employees 
of laziness or irresponsibility, because their perspective does not allow them 
to acknowledge mere willfulness. A common example of such adm inistrative
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tunnel vision involves tim e regulations. Employees may take 40 minutes for 
lunch when the rules allow them only half an hour. The "enlightened” 
manager, who does not want to punish but who does want to maintain control, 
revises the rules to read "40 minutes for lunch." Shortly afterw ards the 
employees begin to take 45 or 50 minutes for their mid-day meal. Rigid rule 
enforcem ent, then, is often perceived as an a ttack  on one's dignity, a denial 
of one's volition. A common response to the perceived denial of dignity is to 
assert one's will, which within organizations usually can only be done by rule 
violation. If the rules are so engineered that they produce efficiency when 
they are obeyed, the assertion of will as a reaction to rigid enforcem ent leads 
to a reduction of organizational efficiency.
In addition to the various structural, psychological, and social-psychologi­
cal explanations of incompetence, there is another determ inant which might 
be term ed rational or purposive. In this case people do not perform their role 
requirem ents com petently because they find that the requirements are not in 
their own best in terest. Most instances of incompetence grounded in rational 
self-in terest are classified under corruption, but one may imagine examples in 
which people are purposefully inefficient so that they can hold on to jobs that 
would disappear if they were done effectively. For example, corruption, 
whether it is in terpreted as injustice or incompetence or both by those who 
oppose it, has consequences for the character of opposition. In publicly 
exposing the considerable cost overruns of the C5A cargo jet project, Ernie 
F itzgerald stressed the resultant inefficiency rather than the possible kick­
backs, post-retirem ent job offers, e tc ., that led officials of the Defense 
Departm ent to award and oversee contracts so ineffectively. A study of the 
former Air Force engineer's case suggests th a t, whatever the motive for 
Fitzgerald's "whistle-blowing" bureaucratic opposition, he believed th a t an 
appeal to the ground of incompetence rather than to that of injustice would 
be more prudent. (32)In addition to incompetence, a second possible e ffect of norm violation is 
the denial of respect or of honor to other persons, whether subordinate 
employees or members of the organization's clientele. As a ground for op­
position, disrespect is specifically the subjection of persons to demands tha t 
are beyond their role requirem ents. These requirements are defined by the 
organization's rules, although they tend to be less explicit for clients than for 
employees. For example, a chairperson may require tha t faculty attend 
departm ental meetings, m eet their assigned classes, and turn in grades on 
tim e. These demands are within the chairperson's rights, because they match 
the explicit duties of each faculty member. However, a chairperson who uses 
departm ental funds to purchase equipment for private use, indulgently forces 
secretaries to witness abusive tem per tantrum s, or insists tha t faculty host 
departm ental social events at their own expense abuses authority and violates 
the rules. Such actions as displays of tem per and extra demands on 
employees are not only instances of injustice, but of dishonor. They require 
subordinates to act in ways that are undefined by, if not irrelevant to, their 
role descriptions.A Chicago legal secretary was fired because she refused, even after 
receiving a w ritten directive, to make coffee for the lawyers for whom she 
worked. With the aid of other secretaries in the office, who came to work in
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w aitress’ uniforms to protest her dismissal, and the news media, a successful 
bureaucratic opposition of two week’s duration resulted in her reinstatem ent. 
Since the expectation that secretaries make coffee for their superiors is 
general in organizations one might inquire why there have not been many 
more of such oppositions. Only recently have secretaries begun to define 
their role as excluding the ’’traditional" functions of women, a change 
associated with the Women’s Liberation Movement. Under the new definition, 
only stric tly  secretarial tasks, such as taking dictation and typing, are 
perceived to be legitim ate demands, while the performance of "wifely" or 
"motherly" functions is interpreted as degrading. That the perform ance of 
duties extrinsic to the secretarial role is not yet widely perceived to be 
dishonorable, and may even be regarded as an honor, is related to the lack of 
self-respect of many women. Without self-respect the experience of dishonorable treatm ent is impossible.
One source of dishonor, then, is the merging of ascriptive characteristics 
and the behavioral expectations based on them with occupational role expec­
tations. The more that a single ascriptive group dominates an occupation or 
clientele, the more likely it is th a t there  will be dishonorable treatm ent. The 
cultural ground of violation of the bureaucratic norm of treatm ent "without 
regard for person" is often supplemented, or supplanted, by idiosyncratic 
prejudice. An assistant to a bank branch manager in the Southeast was 
infuriated by her superior's disrespect for her. He called her one of the 
’’girls," frequently asked her to bring him coffee, and made cracks about 
"libbers." Believing th a t virtue would triumph, th a t her superiors would 
acknowledge her excellence and punish the incompetence of her immediate boss, she refused to object to the degrading trea tm en t. (33)
Social movement organizations, such as the National Organization for 
Women, the Grey Panthers, the NAACP, and gay rights groups, a ttem pt to 
combat dishonor and disrespect. One of their basic tactics is consciousness 
raising, which is intended to give their constituents a sense of pride in 
them selves. Such pride, however, has the effec t of making people more 
aware of and vulnerable to the experience of dishonor. These movement 
organizations have lobbied for laws and enforcem ent mechanisms to end 
dishonorable treatm ent, but for political reasons they have often phrased 
their objectives exclusively in term s of justice. The results of their efforts, 
such as the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have 
aided some bureaucratic oppositions. The rights movements also attem pt to 
educate the public, which includes organizational authorities, about the 
invalidity and inhumane consequences of the stereotyping which is the basis of much disrespective treatm ent.
Violation of rules specifying the rights of employees or clients can be 
opposed on the grounds of both injustice and disrespect. However, the 
motivational ground for members of a bureaucratic opposition is usually 
dishonor. When the clients are dishonored, bureaucratic oppositions in their 
favor usually occur when they are in a relatively weak position with regard to 
the organization and have few resources to mount a defense on their own 
behalf. Action in behalf of clients is also more likely where the employees 
are professionals or semi-professionals whose occupational ideology stresses 
service to others. An example of concern for clients' rights (and of the
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preconditions for a bureaucratic opposition) is the following le tte r to an 
"action" column of a daily newspaper:
We've seen the movie "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest": now what do 
we do about it?  Both of us have been working in a private mental 
hospital ward in Chicago and have seen gross abuses in the use of 
electroshock here, and we want to know what we can do about it. 
Patients or their guardians are supposed to sign consent forms, but the 
form ality is abused. Others sign for them or they simply are told to 
sign. We ... see no benefits and only pain from this often vindictive 
trea tm ent. (34)
This le tte r also illustrates another feature of the grounds for bureaucratic 
opposition. The focus of the opposition may be on the rule violations 
them selves, whether formal (injustice) or substantive (incompetence or 
dishonor). However, the concern may also be with the violation of universal 
moral principles: the human consequences of rule violations. Victimization 
or empathy with it are frequent grounds for participating in a bureaucratic 
opposition. The indignity of dishonor, the frustration resulting from being 
subordinate to an incom petent, and the unwilling involvement in cruelty are 
all denials of a person's autonomy and provide much of the moral stimulus for 
risk taking. However, it is necessary to re ite ra te  th a t there are usually 
multiple grounds for any bureaucratic opposition.
The preceding discussion has been an a ttem pt to analyze a fundamental 
ground for bureaucratic opposition: organizational abuse resulting from norm 
violations. The following section will examine the second basic ground for 
opposition: abuses reflecting differences in values and in the interpretation 
of the policies intended to achieve goals. The major concern of the analysis 
of norm violation was to define the relevant norms and to illustrate briefly 
some of the consequences of their infraction. The issue of why the rules of 
bureaucracy are broken has not been considered extensively, because the 
focus has been on principles, not proclivities.
An adequate analysis of the reasons for norm infraction would require a 
typology distinguishing organizational from personal causes of rule violation. 
Among the organizational influences would be sets of contradictory 
expectations (for example, the strain between tenure and competency in 
academic institutions) which have been studied by organizational researchers. 
With regard to personal influences on rule infraction, there are th ree  major 
classes. The first is the classical Greek understanding th a t norm violation is 
the result of some diminished intellectual capacity. The second is the 
Christian category of sin. The seven cardinal sins - avarice, lust, envy, 
wrath, pride, sloth, and gluttony - account for much of the behavior th a t we 
wish to understand. Finally, disobedience may be principled and purposive, an 
ac t of protest or opposition against the organization on moral grounds.
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ABUSES GROUNDED IN DISPUTES OVER POLICIES
The m ajority of bureaucratic oppositions appear to be grounded in one or 
more violations of the norms that constitu te the bureaucratic ideal. The 
abuses classed under the heading of norm infraction include such conditions as 
injustice, incompetence, and dishonor, each of which presupposes that all 
participants in the situation share a normative consensus but, for one reason 
or another, one or more individuals misbehave or deviate. In the society a t 
large analogous behavior would be labeled crim inal, im m oral, or abnormal, 
and would be controlled by such methods as incarceration, psychotherapy, or 
ostracism . Those who have the authority to  punish rule violators often fail to 
do so, both in the organization and society. A later chapter of this study will 
examine some of the reasons for the failure of adm inistrators to m ete out 
negative sanctions, but for the present it is sufficient to note tha t many bureaucratic oppositions stem from such inaction.
There are other grounds than norm infraction on which bureaucratic 
oppositions are based. These grounds can be grouped together under the 
heading of disputes over organizational policy and focus on abusive rules 
rather than abusive persons. Of course, the distinction between rules and 
persons is relative, because particular individuals are often so closely as­
sociated with a policy tha t an opposition may aim a t their removal in 
conjunction with policy changes. In addition, oppositionists may believe that 
some rule violations are rooted in policies tha t are vague, inapplicable inappropriate, or otherwise problem atic.
Policies may be judged to be objectionable because they contradict 
general bureaucratic norms or because they are inconsistent with the 
particular goals that d ifferen tia te  the organization from others. In such 
cases the standards for criticism  are embedded within the organization's self­
definition. However, policies may also be opposed because they are held to 
violate general moral standards, such as those of a religious tradition, the 
general culture, or some transcendent position. As in the case of norm 
violations, policies may be disputed because they harm subordinate employees 
in some way or because they harm the organization's relevant public.
Table 2.1 Grounds of Bureaucratic Opposition, Organizational Abuses
Rule Violations Policy DisputesBureaucratic Norms Moral NormsInternal injustice (toward subordinates) Dishonor (of subordinates) 
Incompetency
Inefficient
policies Unfairpolicies
External Injustice (toward relevant 
publics and individuals) 
Dishonor (toward relevant 
publics and individuals) Ineffective action
Ineffective
policies Immoralpolicies
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The formal structure of opposition, noted by Georg Simmel among others, 
requires that there be some points of agreem ent among the conflicting 
parties in addition to the issues on which they disagree. When the opposition 
to an organization is grounded in policy disputes, the areas of agreem ent 
among the contenders are usually quite broad. In a sense, the opposition 
group is hoisting the organization by its own petard; the grievance is 
organizational hypocrisy. The oppositionists claim tha t the organization is 
not living up to its own standards or th a t its policies and their implementation 
are not adequate to achieve its stated goals. Martin Luther’s objections to 
the selling of indulgences by the Catholic Church was, initially, nothing more 
than a bureaucratic opposition grounded in a dispute over policy. Luther's 
dissenting arguments were based on the New T estam ent, a book to  which the 
Church claimed to adhere. According to Luther, the practice of selling 
indulgences was contrary to the Church's major purpose, the salvation of 
souls.Disputes over policy may focus on internal issues of efficiency or external 
considerations of effectiveness. Efficiency, here, refers to the use of 
appropriate and economical means to achieve the organization's goals. 
Inefficiency is often more apparent to those who implement policies than to 
those who have the authority to  make them or change them. This irony is a 
continual source of strain in organizations. Some organizations acknowledge 
the tension and encourage subordinates to suggest ways of increasing 
efficiency, even to the point of awarding cash bonuses for cost-reducing 
innovations. An Indiana-based pharmaceutical firm, for example, provides 
empolyees with one-third of the money saved each year by implementing 
their suggestions. In most cases, the adm inistration and the subordinates 
should benefit from attem pts to make policies more efficient. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that when bureaucratic oppositions coalesce around 
policy disputes something more than efficiency is at stake.Behind some policy disputes concerning efficiency is opposition to an 
incom petent adm inistrator, one who is inflexibly com m itted to tradition, a 
personal ideology, or a literal in terpretation of the rules. Such disputes may 
also mask resistance to dishonor as the following example illustrates. In 
response to pilferage from its warehouse a large retail chain instituted a 
security policy in which drivers were ordered to unload their trucks and 
reload them while the invoice was checked against the goods. Although 
employees did not criticize the need for a security check they felt th a t this 
particular policy unduly harrassed them, forced them to do an excessive 
amount of work, and left them less time for the day’s deliveries. Only the 
last complaint related to efficiency; the others were concerned primarily 
with dishonor. After complaining to the foreman without success, the 
workers attem pted to have their union intercede for them . The steward, who 
was aware of the problem, indicated that the union approved of the company's 
policy. One driver in terpreted the union's inaction in the following term s: 
"Deep down, the union felt th a t with their refusal to help, the employees 
would forget the whole m atter and le t the company do what they want." (35) 
The resulting bureaucratic opposition, which was initiated by those involved 
in the thefts, escalated into a work stoppage. After a week of protest the 
opposition was successful and the policy was changed to require only that the
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goods be checked against the invoice while they were being loaded onto the truck for the first tim e.
In contrast to inefficient policies, ineffective policies are those which in 
some way are deemed inconsistent with the organization’s goals, for example, 
by subverting them or being irrelevant to them. A great many of the 
bureaucratic oppositions that have received public a ttention  are grounded in 
ineffective policies - they have been a ttem pts to redirect the organization 
towards its ’’proper" goal. "Sore Throat," a bureaucratic opposition composed 
of one or more employees of the American Medical Association, has exposed 
various policies that it considers inconsistent with the goals of the 
Association. For example, it publicized a policy which permits drug company 
representatives to sit on the scientific policymaking body of the Association 
because that policy contradicts the AMA's public claim to independence from 
the profitable pharm aceutical industry. (36) Other Sore Throat disclosures 
were aimed at demonstrating to the Internal Revenue Service that the AMA 
should be taxed on advertising revenues from its publications. Documents 
indicated AMA political contributions were aimed at preventing tax-reform  
legislation that would impose levies on advertising revenue. Sore Throat's 
objective was not merely to expose the financial interests and political 
lobbying of the AMA but to restore moral purpose to the Association: "Once 
in a financial shamble with its executives discredited, Sore Throat believes 
the AMA could 'be restored to its original constitutional objectives: To 
promote the science and art of medicine and the betterm ent of Dublic health'." (37) H
Oppositions grounded in resistance to ineffective policies confront the 
problem of identifying just what the organization's goals are. Organization 
theorists are notoriously divided over the proper way to  determ ine goals, and 
even over the issue of whether they can be determ ined at all. Functionalists, 
such as Talcott Parsons and Peter Blau, identify goals on the basis of prior 
theoretical categories. If this approach is rejected in favor of an empirical 
analysis, the problem of finding a starting point arises. Jam es D. Thompson 
argues th a t goals vary over time. Herbert Simon states th a t the goals "must 
be inferred from observation of the organization's decision-making pro­
cesses," (38) and thus recognizes th a t there  may be several, possibly 
conflicting, goals. Charles Warriner explicitly rejects determ ination based on 
official statem ents of purpose: they are "fictions produced by an organi­
zation to account for, explain, or rationalize its existence to particular 
audiences rather than ... valid and reliable indicators of purpose." (39) Yet 
for many people, including the members of bureaucratic oppositions, it is just 
such official statem ents that are believed to indicate the organization's goals. 
And it is to the goals mentioned in such pronouncements that they want to hold the organization accountable.
While some policies are in clear contradiction to the official goals of the 
organization, others are in a much more ambiguous relation. Is it a goal or a 
subgoal of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to obtain information about 
the in tim ate lives of public figures, such as Martin Luther King, Jr.?  Was this 
policy of the FBI merely a reflection of J. Edgar Hoover's idiosyncracies or 
was it directly related to the organization's official and assigned mission? 
Such uncertainty and ambiguity have caused some bureaucratic oppositions to
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become mired in debates about the "true” goals of the organization and the 
fitness of policies to these goals.A second and more serious problem confronted by oppositions to 
ineffective policies is the presence of two clearly distinct, and at times 
contradictory, sets of goals in all organizations. The first set contains the 
commonly understood aims of the organization, the products or services that 
it is supposed to provide. The second set comprises those goals related to the 
sheer continuation of the organization itself. Friedrich Baerwald refers to 
the first set of goals as the "object orientation” of a group and to the second 
as its "project orientation.” (40) This distinction is similar to others, such as 
Edward Gross' differentiation of "output goals” from "support goals.” (41) 
The object and project orientations of an organization are not necessarily 
contradictory, but in practice they often clash. For example, there have been 
allegations th a t the FBI had policies to foster rather than limit criminal 
activities. The aim of such policies, which are contradictory to  the Bureau's 
object orientation, was to obtain additional Congressional funding (project 
orientation). As an example of this policy, a "paid snitch for the FBI," 
confessing to Otis Pike and his Congressional Com m ittee on Intelligence, 
related "how the FBI paid him to lead a bunch of idealist ding-a-lings on a 
draft board raid: 'I was not only encouraging the group to raid the  Camden 
draft board, I was initiating all the plans to do so'." (42)
Another case of conflict between object and project orientations concerns 
the conditions in a Chicago psychiatric hospital tha t led to a bureaucratic 
opposition. The opposition charged that the adm inistration was primarily 
in terested  in maintaining the number of patients and in keeping the costs of 
their care to a minimum. The oppositionists, who saw the patients on a day- 
to-day basis and were members of the various "helping" professions, sought 
policies which would increase the quality of care. Prevailing policies were 
judged to be ineffective because the dissenters were com m itted to the 
facility 's object orientation. (43)In nonprofit organizations, financial interests form part of the project 
orientation. Businesses, however, present a special problem because there is 
disagreement about whether profits or the production of quality goods is the 
organization's primary object. Some social philosophers, such as Thornstein 
Veblen, have distinguished between "business" and "industry," identifying the 
first with the quest for profits and the second with quality production. They 
have adapted, then, the distinction between object and project orientations to 
the special case of capitalist economic organizations. Whatever the other 
problems with this distinction may be, it is useful for understanding bureau­
cratic  oppositions in economic organizations. For example, when the  Good 
Humor Corporation produced ice cream with dangerously high bacterial 
counts it did so in order to increase profits. It would have been costlier and 
less profitable to produce good ice cream, which their own advertising calls 
"the next best thing to love." Good Humor's pursuit of profit at the expense 
of quality and public health provoked a "whistle-blowing" opposition which 
was reported in the press. (44)
Project orientation, which refers to the perpetuation of the organization, 
often becomes confused with the continued domination of the organization's 
elite. Labor unions, despite their nominal democracy, are particularly subject
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to the replacem ent of the union's in terests as a whole by the oligarchy's advantage. Jock Yablonski's fa te  (he and his family were murdered) is 
testim ony to the violence tha t often attends efforts to change formally 
dem ocratic but effectively authoritarian organizations. It does not follow, 
simply because the "machinery" of democracy is present, that those in power 
will allow it to be used. Roberto Michels' work is basic to understanding the 
reasons for oligarchic structures in formally dem ocratic regimes, though his 
pessimism obscured recognition of such possibilities as oppositional move­m ents.
Dissident groups within the Team sters Union provide an example of opposi­
tion to an authoritarian union. One such group, PROD, with two thousand 
members, reaches perhaps the upper limit in size for a bureaucratic 
opposition group. PROD is prim arily opposed to ineffective policies, although 
it has also a ttacked corruption and rule violation. Its basic grievance is 
oligarchic domination enforced through policies which provide "its top brass 
with a fleet of luxurious jet a ircraft,"  give them incomes of over $120,000 per 
year, and trea t them to unlimited travel accounts and French chefs. (45) A 
second grievance, which also illustrates a concern for object orientation, is 
the charge that the union has not tried to achieve contracts which contain 
adequate safety clauses. The assumption of the opposition, which is 
consistent with the cultural ideal of a labor union and the union's own charter, 
is that the goal of union includes on-the-job protection of its members.’ 
Bureaucratic oppositions in many other unions, such as the United Mine 
Workers, the National Maritime Union, and the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union, have also been in itiated on the grounds of ineffectiveness and corruption. (46)
Policies that are considered to be abusive because they are ineffective are 
som etim es indistinguishable from those which are judged unfair. Fairness is a 
moral standard which applies to relations within the organization, but which 
does not necessarily coincide with bureaucratic norms. Fairness does 
coincide with those bureaucratic norms which prescribe equal treatm ent 
"without regard to persons" and hiring and promotion on the basis only of 
com petence. Hence, oppositions against policies which explicitly discrimi­
nate against one group of employees, such as women or minority group 
members, focus on both moral and formal abuses. Discriminatory policies are 
often in effec t for long periods before they are judged to be unfair. 
Perception of their unfairness is often spurred by social changes external to 
the organization, such as the effects of the various liberation movements. 
The message of such movements is tha t traditional differences in treatm ent 
have been based upon erroneous and immoral assumptions about the character 
and capabilities of the members of certa in  groups. Bureaucratic oppositions 
grounded in the struggle for fairness have relatively good chances for success. 
Not only do they often have at their disposal the resources of national groups 
and access to legal remedies, but their moral purpose stim ulates zeal and 
solidarity which are often absent in responses to norm infractions. Further, 
the adm inistrators are often less implacable, more ready to  yield, because 
discriminatory policies may contradict their own moral standards and those of the society at large.
When discriminatory policies are aimed a t relevant publics or client
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groups rather than at the employees of an organization, the abuse is 
in terpreted as a breach of the organization's function and is usually judged to 
be more reprehensible than "unfair" internal treatm ent. The greater public 
outrage at the unfair treatm ent of clients is probably due to identification 
with the victims (one might have been or might in the future be a client), the 
cultural separation between "public" and "private" activity, and the notion 
that people are free to change jobs but often cannot avoid the encroachment 
of an organization upon their lives.Other charges of unfairness and of abuses grounded in policies which harm 
those outside the organization stem from commitment to absolute moral 
principles rather than from issues of effectiveness or efficiency. Perhaps the 
most relevant moral principle here is the prescription to trea t people as ends- 
in-them selves, never as means only, which was form ulated by Immanuel Kant 
as the "categorical imperative." (47) The categorical im perative is 
inconsistent with bureaucratic rationality, which considers employees as 
means to enable effective and efficient goal attainm ent: they are mere role 
incumbents. Often when the goal of the organization is "service," clients are 
regarded as means to profits or as excuses for further government funding. 
Customers of production organizations are similarly viewed as means to 
profits, as is evidenced by much advertising.An extrem e case of the treatm ent of people as means to an organizational 
end is provided by various governmental bureaucracies, such as intelligence 
agencies, for which the goal is a reified public good. For example, "shortly 
before King was to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the FBI sent him and 
his wife an anonymous le tte r , along with a tape from one of the 'bugs' 
(recordings made with the approval of A ttorney General Robert Kennedy of 
King’s conversations), which King took to  be a suggestion that he commit 
suicide or face public disgrace." (48) Other FBI vendettas against persons 
from all sectors of the political spectrum have come to light, indicating gross 
violation of the categorical im perative. (49) Summing up the proceedings at a 
Senate hearing on this agency, columnist Ellis Cose writes:
... the feeling by the FBI (was) that once someone had been labeled as 
subversive (usually Communist) or was thought to  have close as­
sociations with subversives, any means of destroying tha t individual 
was justified. (50)
Disclosures of "wrong doing" by intelligence agencies before congressional 
com m ittees and the Rockefeller Commission, and statem ents to the press by 
"disgruntled" employees intent upon reform ist bureaucratic opposition indi­
cate that abuses were not "isolated incidents of zealous agents exceeding 
authority in the field, however frequently such may occur. Rather, the 
abuses were ongoing, bureaucratic programs, often continuing over de­
cades ...." (51) The nature of intelligence organizations, including their cult of 
secrecy, insistence on loyalty, and occasional use of violence, make 
bureaucratic oppositions aimed against their "immoral" policies difficult to 
undertake. The best known oppositions against such policies were undertaken 
by form er CIA agents Victor M archetti and Philip Agee, who "blew the 
whistle" from a relatively safe distance. Such oppositions are borderline
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cases which merge into public opposition to bureaucracy from the outside. 
Agee s struggle is also atypical because it had a revolutionary intent: he 
"feels tha t the abolition of the CIA is the only viable solution." (52) That 
M archetti and Agee resigned their positions and literally risked their lives 
indicates tha t the motivational ground for their opposition was immoral 
policies and not merely infractions of bureaucratic norms. Although 
intelligence agencies are often publicly opposed for their illegal actions, moral outrage seems to impel and sustain the struggle.
There are several possible explanations for the occurrence of immoral 
policies. Sometimes there has been a change in society's moral standards th a t 
has not been accompanied by altera tion  in policy. For example, intelligence 
agencies conceived and institu ted in wartim e conditions carry their policies 
forward into peacetim e activity . A second explanation affixes cause and 
blame on individuals who abuse their authority. Much of the blame for the 
exposed wrongdoing of governmental agencies in the 1970s, for example, has 
been placed, with strong conservative implications, on "sick" or "wicked" men 
such as Hoover and Richard Nixon. More structural explanations for immoral 
policies center on the dynamics of what was called "project orientation" 
above. The desire to perpetuate the organization and its elite  often results in 
policies tha t sacrifice persons to the bureaucratic equivalent of raison d' e ta t. 
Project orientation is intensified when the organization 7s locked in 
com petition with other bureaucracies or groups. Business policies such as 
"planned obsolescence" and President Nixon's use of th e  FBI and the IRS to harrass his "enemies" exemplify this dynamic.
The myth of bureaucracy - th a t it is purely an adm inistrative entity 
devoid of politics - does not allow for the identification of any of the abuses 
discussed in this chapter. That such abuses exist and tha t people have 
struggled to elim inate them is evidence against the validity of managerial 
ideology. Political activ ity  is ubiquitous and is not confined to the sta te , 
despite the protestations of some social scientists. Political processes have 
sim ilarities across disparate contexts, thus the work of those who have 
examined oppositions in the s ta te  is useful for the analysis of similar 
phenomena within organizations. However, for reasons stated  a t the 
beginning of this chapter, political scientists have not attended sufficiently to 
the grounds for such oppositions, concentrating instead on the overt activities 
involved in conflict. For a study of bureaucratic oppositions, investigation of 
their grounds is essential because different grounds lead to different 
strategies and outcomes. This chapter presented a typology of the grounds 
for opposition, showing their structural and motivational aspects and 
revealing their origin in the perception of abuse. Abuses were classified in 
term s of violations of bureaucratic norms, inefficient and ineffective policies, and immoral policies.
Grounds are the "good reasons" or bases for action. Generally, before any 
concerted action can occur, or the plans for it even be form ulated, people 
must have reason to depart from routine. Awareness of the grounds for 
opposition is often the result of a social process and is usually the first stage 
in constituting an opposition group. Such awareness is not only im portant 
from the viewpoint of self-knowledge but also because it is a tac tic  in group 
form ation and in la ter struggles. Having detailed the grounds for opposition, 
the next step is to investigate the processes and problems of initiating bureaucratic oppositions.
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The Conditions of 
Bureaucratic Opposition
... if someone took it upon himself to alter the disposition of 
things around him he ran the risk of losing his footing and falling to destruction.
Franz Kafka, The Trial
It is a fallacy born of optimism to believe a thing necessarily will be done 
simply because it should be done. As President C arter has said, "The world 
isn't fair." Thus, we may reasonably assume that changes are not made in 
bureaucracies just because there are abuses of moral and/or bureaucratic 
norms. The grounds for oppositions are all the reasons why subordinates may 
and sometimes do challenge the adm inistrative order, but they are counter­
balanced by the conditions of organizational life, most of which are directed 
to the results of uninterrupted functioning. The phenomenon of bureaucratic 
opposition may usefully be conceived of as a process in which the forces for 
change continually struggle against those promoting stability. Even when an 
overt opposition emerges, it remains subject to dissolution by the very 
dynamics of hierarchical systems as they influence both personality and the 
relations that bind informal groups together. It is essential for a 
comprehensive understanding of bureaucratic opposition, then, to grasp why 
people find it difficult to a ttem p t to make changes which would bring 
practice into line with standards, and also to understand which conditions are most favorable to the emergence of resistance.
The conditions promoting stab ility  have been discussed by social theorists 
primarily under the heading of "the problem of order": How is a stable and 
functioning society possible for individuals whose in terests may conflict? 
Hobbes' response to this question is tha t rational human beings subordinate all 
particular interests to their supreme self-in terest in survival, and, thus, will 
obey an effective sovereign regardless of the content of the commands. 
Rational individuals, according to Hobbes, prefer to be controlled because 
their alternative is to live in a s ta te  of nature where, in a condition of the
36
THE CONDITIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION 37
war of "every man against every man," there is "continual fear and danger of 
violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short." (1) Three centuries after Hobbes the problem of order continues to be 
a central concern of social thought. Talcott Parsons, in "Hobbes and the 
Problem of Order," claims that Hobbes "saw the problem with a clarity which 
has never been surpassed." (2) Parsons, however, does not ground order 
primarily in force and fear but in value consensus, which is developed during 
the individual's socialization and is reinforced by various institutions.
Hobbes, the utilitarian, and Parsons, who acknowledges normative control, 
together provide the twin bases of most theories of order: interest and duty. 
A dissenting tradition, which is generally opposed to authority, supplements 
m ainstream speculation with other/ conditions promoting stability. In the 
early modern period, for example, Etienne de La Bo6tie was concerned with 
the problem of order. Unlike Hobbes, however, he did not ask why people 
obey but why they do not disobey. La Boetie assumed that the ruler's power 
is partly dependent on the acquiescence of the ruled, on their consent. He 
conceded that fear, submission "under constraint and force," functions to 
insure initial compliance. But he noted that after the institution of a sta te  
most people "obey without regret and perform willingly what their predeces­
sors had done just because they had to." (3) La Boetie was concerned with 
understanding why people obey a tyrant willingly when they are in no 
im m ediate danger, and he added to the grounds of Interest and duty those of 
habit, propaganda, and cooptation. The grounds provided by both the 
m ainstream and dissenting traditions in modern social thought are sufficient 
as points of departure for understanding the relative imbalance between the 
ubiquity of organizational abuses and the less common response of bureau­
cra tic  opposition.The case data on bureaucratic opposition, which is used in other parts of 
this work, is not well adapted to the present issue. Bureaucratic oppositions 
are essentially activities in which people have surmounted the forces 
operating for stability and have overcome fear, duty to the organization's 
leadership, habit, propaganda, and/or cooptation. Such data do not provide 
much information about organizations in which abuse is widespread but overt 
struggle does not arise.
William James considered habit to be the "flywheel of civilization." 
Certainly, no habit is so universal as the habit of obedience. Habit, of course, 
does not explain much, but merely describes the overwhelming tendency of 
people to act in accordance with the expectations of others and not to violate 
the social, moral, or legal norms. Disobedience, which is often called 
deviance by the defenders of authority, is the exception rather than the rule. 
Obedience to organizations, then, is just an instance of a more general habit 
which must be broken before opposition to authority can arise. (4) Human 
habits are learned; they are not, sociobiology notwithstanding, genetically 
controlled. We are taught obedience from the very first moments of our 
existence and the lesson is retaught and reinforced by all of the institutions 
of society. Religious notions of original sin and eternal punishment, political 
appeals to patriotism  and the extraction of oaths, grading systems in 
education, evaluation procedures in business, and the th rea t of ostracism are 
only some of the ways in which obedience is taught.
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Now these are the Laws of the Jungle, and many and mighty are they;
But the head and the hoof of the Law and the haunch and 
the hump is - Obey! (5)
Experimental studies by Milgram, although questionable in regard to 
validity, provide evidence about how well the law of obedience is learned. 
His research indicates that people are so willing to obey authority th a t they 
will inflict pain on others simply because they have been told to do so. (6) 
Political philosopher Christian Bay concludes that "most of us have been 
trained, as generations of our ancestors have been before us, to obey almost 
all laws almost by instinct, and certainly by habit if not by conviction." (7)
The lessons of obedience that are learned in the process of socialization 
direct people not to question any authority. The success of the rhetorical 
strategy of arguing from authority rather than giving reasons to support 
claims and commands indicates the pervasiveness of habits of obedience. 
Organizations reap the benefits of the work th a t other social institutions have 
done. The adult associates "ought" with the commands of any authority, 
much as Pavlov’s dogs associated the bell with food. Unquestioning reverence 
for authority figures is learned early in life . Certain authority roles (for 
example, the parental) have been crucial to our existence and we have 
transferred fear, veneration, and the sense of dependence from them to 
authority in general. The vital authorities of our early years, such as parents 
and physicians, have had the litera l power of life and death over us and it was 
in the in terest of our peace of mind to regard them as benevolent, to  believe 
th a t they had our good at heart. We also tend to generalize these judgments 
to all authority figures. The fear of attacking authorities is also based on the 
difficulties of withstanding the consequence of the absence of authority: 
freedom. When people are not guided by authority they become responsible 
for their choices and, as many existentialists have noted, responsibility often causes anguish.
Habits of obedience may also be related to the establishment of a sense of 
loyalty to a formal group. After the manner of Erich Segal's idea of love, 
loyalty means "never having to say you're sorry." Slogans such as "my country 
right or wrong" and "America - love it or leave it" are examples of attem pts 
to fabricate loyalty. Advice to employees is redolent with such sentiments: 
a newspaper column reads, "Boss Bugs You? S tart job-hunting." The 
development of a sense of obligation to a hierarchy tends to color one's 
evaluation of it. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that if a person has a 
positive attitude toward X (for example, the firm) and X indicates that Y (for 
example, a policy) is good, then the person will tend to have a positive 
attitude toward Y. Certainly, some people can withstand cognitive 
dissonance to a greater degree than others, but the general tendency, a t least 
among Americans, is towards consistency, particularly when the defining 
object is as salient as one's employer. The high saliency of one's job makes it 
difficult to stand back and judge it, to achieve role distance, because if the 
job is found wanting it would be consistent to judge oneself unfavorably too. 
It is not surprising, then, that those who are very subservient to authority also tend to have a low tolerance for dissonance.
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Conformity is closely related to the habit of obedience. When individuals 
accept the dictates of their circum stances they have no autonomous standard 
against which those circum stances can be judged. Acquiescence makes 
criticism  impossible and opposition, a t least in its initial stages, depends upon 
criticism . However, once a bureaucratic opposition is underway it may be 
strengthened by conformity, particularly by the other-directedness described 
by Riesman et al. in The Lonely Crowd. (8) The "herd m entality" makes 
stampedes possible so long as there is leadership, which it cannot engender by 
itself.
La Boetie's second ground for passive obedience is propaganda. He refers 
to events such as the Roman circuses in which "the ancient dictators so 
successfully lulled their subjects under the yoke, that the stupefied peoples, 
fascinated by their pastimes and vain pleasures flashed before their eyes, 
learned subservience as naively, but not so creditably, as little  children learn 
to read by looking a t bright picture books." (9) Contemporary imperial and 
organizational societies have their functional equivalents of the circuses in 
televised football, country club golf, lavish expense accounts, and company 
supplied prostitutes. (10) Propaganda also includes ideological indoctrination. 
La Boetie writes of the authorities: "They never undertake an unjust policy, 
even one of some im portance, without prefacing it with some pretty  speech 
concerning public welfare and common good." (11) Company new sletters 
notoriously quote the chairman of the board in this manner, and the training 
in authority holds, witness the statem ent of Charles Wilson, a former 
President of General Motors who became Secretary of Defense, "What's good 
for General Motors is good for the country." Propaganda also inspires 
reverence and adm iration by the fabrication of mystery. La Boetie noted 
th a t "the kings of th e  Assyrians and even a fte r them those of the Medes 
showed themselves in public as seldom as possible in order to set up a doubt in 
the minds of the rabble as to whether they were not in some ways more than 
man..." (12) The washrooms and dining facilities of bureaucratic organi­
zations, strictly  segregated by hierarchical rank, appear to be modern 
counterparts of social mystery. Behind all such practices lurks the Aesopian 
assumption th a t "fam iliarity breeds contempt." (13) Joined to mystery are 
hypocritical appeals to democracy or community (pseudo-gemeinschaft). It is 
difficult to oppose authority figures when there is a widespread feeling tha t 
"the boss is such a nice guy it would not be the right thing to  hurt him."
The third ground for passive obedience noted by La Boetie is cooptation, 
in which the hierarchy creates a pyramid of privilege by dispensing m aterial 
benefits to a small group which develops its own loyal followers by parcelling 
out a share of its grants, and so on. This strategy, which may be term ed 
"feudalization," generates a hierarchy th a t mirrors but does not entirely 
embrace the organization. Feudalization, of course, is in s tric t violation of 
the adm inistrative ideal of achievem ent, and is a last resort because it 
impinges upon the autonomy of the leadership. It is often difficult to 
distinguish between reluctance to engage in struggles based on bought loyalty 
and reluctance based on fear of losing one's position, because where 
feudalization occurs stable expectations are built up. In organizations, 
privilege is generally relative to possible privation - the carro t may be more 
evident, but the stick is more fundamental. The centrality  of occupation to
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self-concept, the general scarcity  of employment opportunities, and the 
negative sanctions that an adm inistration can m ete out (for example, 
geographical transfers, assignments to odious or meaningless tasks, or simply 
s tr ic t enforcem ent of rules th a t would make work uncomfortable or 
intolerable) all make the comparison between opposition to  a tyrant and opposition to an organization plausible.
Another more inclusive account of the barriers to opposition is provided 
by utilitarianism  or, as it is called in contem porary social science, exchange 
theory. (14) In exchange theory what the early modern thinkers called fear 
and desire is translated into pecuniary term s as cost and benefit. Benefits 
such as liberty and justice are measured against the costs of opposition, and 
the decision whether or not to struggle is guided by the cost-benefit ra tio  (in 
Homans' term s) or by calculations of net profit or loss. This bourgeois theory 
(the adjective is used in a descriptive and not in a pejorative sense) is adapted 
to the culture in which i t  appears and seems to explain why many people do 
not oppose organizations in which abuses are widespread. Exchange theory, 
however, may be more a way in which people justify their opposition or their 
failure to oppose than a m otivator for conduct. In a capitalist society cost- 
benefit language is publicly acceptable, even when it is difficult or impossible 
to assign numerical or even ordinal values to the various outcomes.
The costs that enter into the "rational calculus" are varied. In trying to  
assess the differential success of his recruiting drive, one of the leaders of a 
bureaucratic opposition in a large law office w rites about a secretary: "Even 
if she fe lt that the rule was wrong, the fa c t that she endured it for so long 
made her want to pass on that rule to others." (15) The cost here was self­
esteem ; the woman did not want to admit to herself or others tha t she had 
suffered for nothing. The leader of the opposition continues: "The two 
associates who joined our opposition were both unusual in the sense tha t any 
hopes for quick partnership opportunities were destroyed." (16) Why did they 
bear this cost? "They both told me that it wasn't a hard decision. It was a 
responsible act of freedom." (17) Finally, the eight secretaries who joined did 
not intend to continue a t the firm of more than a few years. "Five were 
putting their husbands through school, two were working for a down payment 
on a house and one was working to  put herself through college." (18)
The degree of com m itment to long-term  employment in an organization is 
im portant in determining who is most likely to join an opposition, as the 
example of a bureaucratic opposition in a municipal agency illustrates. All of 
the members "did not look upon expressing their derogatory view of (the 
abusive supervisor) as synonymous with cutting their own th roats. The mean 
age for the five was 25 and not one of them had any intention of making a 
career out of their present employment. ... None would be fazed if after 
stating the ir minds, they were asked to perm anently leave." (19) The th rea t of 
the loss of employment, of course, usually works to dampen opposition. In 
trying to  alter sexually-biased practices in an accounting departm ent, the 
oppositionists were unable "to recruit the other two females in the office to 
join forces with us. Their excuse was that with the realities of the recession, 
we too had better have second thoughts about trying to ac t like crusaders."
(20) An intelligence agency oppositionist analyzed the risks in this manner:
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"The fear of such banishment from the warmth and security of 'us’ into the 
coldness and uncertainty of ’them,’ the fear of losing the favors of the powers 
that be, all tend to force ’good’ behavior, that is, following the ’company line.’ 
It's that or transfer to a far-away o ffice, a Bureau-type Siberia, or the 
banishment to the Sheol outside the Bureau." (21)
A potential factor mitigating the cost of opposition for those who fear 
loss o f employment or salary increases is some sort of job security. Thus, one 
would expect, ceteris paribus, that those with civil service protection, union 
membership, familial employment, or possession of a scarce and needed skill 
would be more likely to participate in bureaucratic oppositions. An attempt 
was made to test this hypothesis by questioning employees of unionized and 
nonunionized airlines. The results of the research indicated that union 
membership does not seem to affect participation in a bureaucratic 
opposition. Furthermore, a majority of respondents fe lt that union 
membership would have no influence on such activity. The data, based on 
responses to questions concerning awareness of abusive policies, suggest that 
unionized workers tend to assume that it is the union's responsibility, not 
theirs, to see that things are "done right." (22)
Once a bureaucratic opposition is underway, costs can also be assessed on 
nonparticipants. An active member of a bureaucratic opposition waged 
against an airline's new anti-hijacking regulations stated that the seniority 
and recognized expertise which she and several others possessed influenced 
those who were unwilling to participate to "go along" if one of the leaders 
was present: "If anyone disagreed with us, they would not admit it because 
they fe lt  the group pressure." (23) In this case people participated, were 
swept into action, because they found it too costly to remain inactive.
Even if each person could a ffix  relative values to the various costs and 
benefits of opposition, such calculations would be meaningful only for the 
moment and might be altered drastically with changing circumstances. When 
a leader of a bureaucratic opposition in a grounds department was asked 
about how he was able to handle his concern about losing his job if he 
participated in an effort to change a demeaning policy, he responded: "I was 
very concerned about keeping my job. I needed it greatly. But I became so 
enraged at the policy that I simply forgot about my fear." (24) Can his 
statement be analyzed in exchange theoretical terms to read that the benefit 
o f changing the policy outweighed the cost of possible dismissal? A 
preferable interpretation is that, for a period of time, he became a non­
economic actor, that he acted without calculation.
A modification of the utilitarian exchange theories, which is specifically 
concerned with whether or not people will participate in political action, 
appears in Mancur Olsen's The Logic of Collective Action. Olsen argues that 
rational and self-interested people will not help to achieve common interests 
except under special conditions, because they will enjoy the benefits whether 
or not they make sacrifices to bring them about. In order, then, to 
understand why so many people do participate in collective action it is 
necessary to assume that human beings are not always instrumentally rational 
and self-interested, and/or that opposition groups exert various pressures or 
o ffer incentives to join them. One may interpret the works of revolutionary 
theorists such as Mao Tse-Tung and Fidel Castro in a bourgeois fashion,
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arguing that they offered moral incentives to adjust the balance sheet. Such 
moral incentives include, as student of rebellions James Downton notes, 
comradeship, pride, and purpose. (25) In his analysis of various types of 
groups challenging the polity or the general society, William Gamson comes 
to a similar conclusion: commitment to a cause allows one to transcend the 
calculations of cost-benefit analysis. (26)
Narrow-gauge self-interest within the limits defined by a social structure, 
then, is only one motivation for action. It is ’’consciousness that does not 
transcend its rootedness in an economically competitive mode of produc­
tion." (27) Max Weber was well aware of other varieties of motivated action: 
"Less ’rational’ actions are typed by Weber in terms of the pursuit of ’absolute 
ends,' as flowing from affectual sentiments, or as 'traditional,' (28) Although 
Weber tends to associate different types of action with different kinds of 
collective associations, it is unwarranted to conclude that only one mode of 
action is present in each type of social structure. Although traditional 
conduct seems unlikely to motivate oppositions to bureaucratic authority in 
industrialized societies, action motivated by the pursuit of absolute ends and 
action impelled by affectual sentiments can and do, together or separately, 
actuate bureaucratic oppositions.
Attempts to use utilitarian theories to understand why people do not take 
part in grounded oppositions is further complicated by the complex relations 
between knowledge and action. The utilitarian theories assume knowledge of 
abuse and a considered decision about whether to act. However, at least 
some people are "blind to" or fail to see any abuse, and therefore fa il to act. 
Many theories of falsified or distorted knowledge and conception have tried 
to account for such blindness. Those concerned with why people do not 
believe or know what seems to be so obvious to others have coined terms such 
as happy consciousness, bad faith, false consciousness, repression, mystifi­
cation, and viciously acquired naivete to describe this phenomenon. Theories 
o f non-knowledge claim that people misinterpret situations either through 
unconscious distortion or through inattention. Thus, with reference to 
bureaucratic opposition, one reason why people do not act to correct abuses is 
that they are unaware of them. While certain structurally grounded abuses 
may be well hidden in some organizations, the vast majority of abuses are not 
concealed from employees. Weber indicates that "bureaucratic admini­
stration always tends to be an administration of ’secret sessions’: insofar as it 
can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism." (29) However, Weber is 
referring to the attempt to keep secrets from the public, not from insiders. 
The lack o f recognition o f abuses, then, is most often the result of some 
process of non-knowledge.
It is not surprising that recognition of organizational abuse is not the same 
for all o f those in similar positions. The psychological and social 
characteristics of those who say the "emperor has no clothes" are apt to be 
different than the characteristics of those who are oblivious to the nudity. 
For example, oppositionists are likely to be recent arrivals to the organi­
zation. Young Turks have not been habituated to convention, do not yet have 
strong loyalties, are potential or actual competitors with older employees, 
are uncertain about their future, often have standards that they bring with 
them from another organization, and feel the discomfort of alienation from
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ongoing informal groups. The experience of the stranger, who is unhindered 
by the everyday mentality of the natives and "sees" more than they do, is 
common to new arrivals. Distance from the everyday is also more 
pronounced in professionals who uphold standards which are explicitly 
independent of, and often in conflict with, conventional bureaucratic norms. 
This clash of standards is one of the bases of the tension between 
administrators and their professional subordinates that has been extensively 
studied by sociologists. (30) Professionals are expected, in Thoreau’s terms, to 
"march to the beat of a different drummer." For example, social workers 
who strongly identified with their profession were found to be more likely to 
deviate from administrative procedures than their less committed colleagues.
(31) The "professionalized" social workers justified rule violations in terms of 
more e ffective  service to their clients. In contrast, welfare workers with 
weak professional orientation had a greater tendency to follow organization's 
rules and procedures more strictly.
When people judge that the organization is violating moral and not only 
bureaucratic standards, they are placed into a condition of role conflict. In 
such cases the role of employee, which in a bureaucracy prescribes obedience 
to the commands of superiors, clashes with the more generalized dictates of 
citizenship, religious faith, or what Weber called ethics of ultimate ends. 
However, although Weber's idea of ethical autonomy makes role conflict 
intelligible, his own discussion avoids the issue by resolving it in favor of 
obedience to hierarchical command:
An officia l who, according to his own view, receives an order that is 
wrong can - and should - raise protests. However, if the superordinat- 
ed o ffice  persists in its instructions, then it is not only his duty but his 
Honor to carry them out in such a manner as if they were in agreement 
with his own convictions, and thereby show that his sense of duty to 
o ffice  outweighs his own willfulness. (32)
For Weber, the politician is of a different species or spirit <than the 
bureaucrat. He writes:
... it is immensely moving when a mature man - no matter whether 
young or old in years - is aware of a responsibility for the 
consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with 
heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and 
somewhere he reaches the point where he says: 'Here I stand; I can do 
no other.' (33)
One way of resolving role conflicts is to compartmentalize one's roles. "In 
modern societies, marked by a high degree of space and time specialization 
and separation of human activities, it is possible for someone to be one person 
at certain places and times and another person at other places and 
times." (34) By employing this schizoid tactic one fails to see the immoral 
actions for what they are (moral standards are reserved for roles which are 
not enacted in the bureaucracy). In his advice to clinical psychologists, 
Ernest Keen acknowledges the phenomenon of compartmentalization. He 
warns
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To become aware of his own experience of self-as-subject may 
enlighten latent values. This may put him into agonizing conflict 
between his personal values and his bureaucratic values, and the 
therapist must be willing to accept responsibility for his role in 
bringing that conflict to a head. (35)
Even in cases in which abuses are recognized, there are barriers to 
participation in bureaucratic oppositions that do not reflect the operation of 
the ’’rational calculus.” For example, Western sex-role norms inhibit 
opposition by divorcing means from motive. Men are expected to be active 
and aggressive, but they are also supposed to be "toughminded,” to be 
insensitive to personal feelings and morality, and to direct their attention to 
the ’’bottom line." Women, in contrast, are supposed to be "tenderminded" 
(attentive to feeling and morality), but they are also expected to be passive 
and quiescent. Thus, the male role permits the means to opposition but not 
the motive, and the female role permits the motive but not the means. 
Particular individuals, of course, do not always act consistently with either 
their own normative standards or social role expectations.
Aside from the barriers to opposition imposed by deep-rooted roles is an 
often unreasoned cynicism with regard to the importance and probable 
success of one's efforts, and a resulting ignorance of the appropriate means of 
making changes. In a study of American soldiers done during World War II 
about one-half of the sample questioned indicated that during their career in 
the army they had fe lt  the desire to bring a complaint to the attention of the 
authorities. Four-fifths of these people failed to bring any complaints and 
cited as reasons for their decisions:
1. difficulty in gaining access to the Inspector General (the o fficer who 
performed the role of trouble-shooter);
2. the judgment that it was futile even to try to do anything;
3. fear of reprisals. (36)
Whether or not cynicism is justified depends upon the circumstances of the 
particular case, but that it engenders ignorance of the e ffective  means of 
opposition is unquestionable. (37) When courses of action are not institutiona­
lized and when examples of them are not well known, they will not, ceteris 
paribus, be frequently pursued. In representative democracies the party 
system provides a form of institutionalized opposition, while revolutionary 
strategists have many blueprints and historical examples. Oppositional action 
within organizations has neither ongoing institutions to express it nor a 
historical tradition to support it - there is not even a term in the language for 
such action.
Bureaucratic opposition, of course, is not the only way in which a person 
can respond to disagreement with organizational policies or practices. 
Disagreement with organizational authority creates conflict and conflict can 
be resolved in many ways. Kurt Singer, in a decades-old article, made a 
persuasive case that there are four basic solutions, to conflict based on the 
two dimensions o f cognition and volition. (38) The first or cognitive 
dimension poses the alternatives of acknowledgment or repudiation of the 
conflict. The second or volitional dimension poses the alternatives o f active 
or passive response to the cognition. Repudiation of conflict coupled with
THE CONDITIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION 45
passivity means isolation from the field of activity. In an organization such 
isolation would involve either psychological withdrawal from one's job 
(lowering its saliency in one's life ) or actually quitting. Passive acknowledg­
ment of conflict means admitting defeat before any struggle is initiated, 
renouncing one's objectives: it is following the advice of "suffer and be still." 
This resolution is widespread and may account for high rates of absenteeism, 
lackadaisical work habits, and feelings of alienation and hostility. Such 
symptoms, including expressive acts of sabotage, are the result of partial 
resignation, the incomplete resolution of the conflict situation. A secretary 
writes, "And everywhere we rebelled in a thousand small ways - taking extra 
time in the ladies' room, misfiling important letters, 'forgetting' to correct 
typos." (39)
Repudiation of conflict coupled with an activist disposition leads to 
behavior that attempts to modify the conflict situation, to integrate in some 
way the opposing positions: it is the strategy of compromise that draws so 
much praise from mainstream administrative theorists, though its particular 
expressions may be mildly subversive. There are several ways in which 
employees may attempt to compromise a conflict situation. If a policy or 
superior prescribes violations of bureaucratic or moral norms the employee 
may obey sporadically, agreeing to the order but doing the "right" thing when 
the boss is not looking. A similar strategy is for the employee to try to 
compensate for the undesirable consequences in some way. For example, a 
secretary whose boss ordered her to give him monies from petty cash to use 
for his personal expenses replaced the funds from her own salary. Similarly, 
when a welfare department's policy changed and no longer allowed certain 
expenditures for home furnishings, a case worker would write up a report in 
which monies that were actually to be spent for furnishings would be charged 
to some allowable category. Another variant of compromise is the effort of a 
subordinate to "patch things up" with a client who has been abused by a 
superior. Bordering on more acute acknowledgment of conflict are forms of 
unproclaimed resistance. For example, when there is a directive to crack 
down on time spent for lunch, workers may begin to take only an hour instead 
o f their usual hour and fifteen  minutes for the officia l 45 minute break. On 
the whole, the development of informal rules arises from the compromise 
tactic o f conflict resolution. (40) Many rulings, of course, cannot be 
compromised and the efforts of employees towards compromise are frequent­
ly feeble attempts to assuage guilt.
The last resolution of conflict, in which incompatibility is actively 
acknowledged, is termed by Singer "resolute contention": When a person 
"does not want the clash of antagonistic forces to be eschewed, attenuated or 
denied, he takes his stand and decides to fight the conflict out...." (41) It is 
within this category of resolute contention that bureaucratic oppositions fall. 
They require both full recognition of incompatible rules and a decision to 
fight to establish the situation that "should" obtain.
Individuals do not randomly select one of Singer's four conflict resolution 
strategies. The choice among the alternatives is influenced by a number of 
factors, some of which are personality, the actions taken by others, and prior 
experience with and expectations of the organization's probable responses. 
Political scientists have been concerned with determining how those who
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participate in political activities differ from those who do not enter the fray. 
They distinguish among levels of participation (whether or not the person 
performs a leadership role) and among types of groups (traditional, democrat­
ic, or extremist). Lester Milbrath, for example, studied research on behavior 
directed towards affecting the "decisional outcomes of government." He 
concluded that those enacting such behavior tend to have above average 
education and socioeconomic position, a sense of political efficacy, a sense of 
political duty, self-confidence, and above average knowledge and sophisti­
cation. In addition, participants are more likely to be male, sociable and 
outgoing, and not cynical. (42)
The extent to which participation in the political system is similar to 
involvement in a bureaucratic opposition is difficult to assess. Impressionis­
tic conclusions based on the case data collected for this study indicate that 
those who are most active in bureaucratic opposition groups have charac­
teristics similar to Milbrath’s intensive participants. In addition, bureaucratic 
oppositionists tend to be concerned with the ethical dimensions o f existence. 
The sociological and political science literature on "extremist" group 
members does not seem to be applicable to bureaucratic oppositions.
The preceding discussion has been concerned with the conditions inhibiting 
opposition as they are expressed in the individual. There are also strictly 
social conditions that block opposition which are, perhaps, reflective o f 
individual motives when they are woven into group traditions. Within 
organizations, informal groups and their orientation to the formal authority 
structure are factors with considerable influence on the probability of 
struggle. In general, informal work groups are functionally adapted to the 
organization and provide their members with ways of coping within the 
boundaries of the administrative order. They are usually conservative forces 
because they make the workplace more personal and less distant, anonymous, 
and threatening. Their ideologies preach "live and let live," and although they 
may disparage the organization and its leaders they o ffer no proposals for 
change. There are, however, "deviant" informal groups which are positive 
conditions for opposition. In such groups there is a tradition or a culture of 
active opposition to authority. When this rate type of informal group exists it 
may have developed from past experiences with bureaucratic oppositions in 
which the possibilities for success were demonstrated. Despite the possibility 
of oppositional traditions, however, the vast majority of informal work groups 
negatively a ffect the potential for opposition. Their collective attitude is 
one of indifference or open hostility to any change. It is only when the policy 
which may provide the ground for an opposition is newly instituted, and 
particularly when it disrupts the informal group’s adaptation to the 
organization, that such a group is likely to become oppositional. An example 
o f a disruptive policy is a no-talking rule which interferes with the group's 
sociability function.
The structure of informal groups and their traditions are important 
because bureaucratic oppositions are best pursued when several employees 
participate. There have, of course, been both successful and unsuccessful 
one-person oppositions and they will be discussed in some detail in the 
following chapter. However, it is easier for an oppositionist not to go it alone 
for both tactical and emotional reasons. More participants generally means
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more resources such as ideas, knowledge, and contacts within and outside the 
hierarchy. For example, an opposition group of nurses fe lt strengthened by 
the presence of a nurse who was romantically linked with a medical staff 
member, even though he was already married. (43) Also, because the 
administrative myth claims that all policy is rational, any opposition is 
almost automatically suspected of irrationality. Lone oppositionists are 
often tagged as "mental cases," deviants, or troublemakers, and are not taken 
seriously. It is more difficult to make charges of mental imbalance when two 
or more people publicly acknowledge the same abuse. Generally, bu­
reaucratic oppositions that are one-man shows are so only because no allies 
could be found. There is almost always a search for allies, if only to fortify  
the resolve and corroborate the judgment of the lone oppositionist. Also, the 
search for allies may be motivated by a desire to avoid pariah status.
Large-scale social opposition groups, termed "challenge groups" by 
Gamson, tend to be increasingly e ffective  with greater membership. Such is 
not the case for bureaucratic oppositions which, except in special cases of 
oppositions to unions or other formally democratic structures, seem to depend 
upon face-to-face interaction. Where representative institutions exist 
attempts can be made to organize electoral support, but where they do not 
exist there is usually a necessity for tight solidarity. Between 12 and 15 
members seems to be an upper limit for oppositions, and many of the groups 
contain only four or five people. Of course, the pool from which opposition 
group members can be drawn also affects the size of the group, as does the 
level of authority against which the opposition is raised.
The development and maintenance of the opposition group, and not only 
its actual strategies, require great effort. Since groups do not form abruptly 
and spontaneously like mushrooms after a rain, it is necessary to mobilize and 
unite those who may be willing to act. Mobilization depends upon the 
existence of quasi-groups which may be transformed into self-conscious 
collectivities. The process of transformation has been described by Morris 
Ginsberg who stated that a quasi-group is a collectivity which has "no 
recognizable structure, but whose members have certain interests or modes 
of behavior in common which may at any time lead them to form themselves 
into definite groups." (44) There are many quasi-groups in organizations, 
some of which crosscut one another. The most obvious are formed by people 
who are in the same organizational position, such as dock loaders, nurses, 
social workers, accounting clerks, or, more generally, the subordinates of a 
certain officia l. Crosscutting groups may be based on ethnicity, sex, age, 
religion, or political affiliation (more generally, upon any nonoccupational 
interest), and whether or not they are activated depends a great deal on 
external social circumstances.
In addition to quasi-groups and, probably more important, are the informal 
work groups discussed above. Despite their generally conservative function 
within organizations, it is possible for informal groups sometimes to be 
transformed into oppositions, which is probably why they have both fascinated 
and scared apologists for the administrative ideal since the Depression. (45) 
The leader of the dock worker's opposition described earlier analyzed the 
development of his opposition group from an informal work group: "The 
workers in our area had gotten to be a close-knit group, because of all the
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talking and joking we had done. It’s possible that is why talking and joking 
aren't allowed.” (46)
The recruitment into bureaucratic oppositions is usually gradual because it 
involves risks and the testing of loyalties on all sides. Likely prospects for 
participation are those who indulge in the griping and black humor that is the 
first response to abuse. Although such activities are useful for spreading 
discontent and for delegitimating authorities, they do not themselves 
constitute opposition. Depending upon the circumstances, group formation 
may result from the exasperation with a long train of abuses or may be 
directly related to a single precipitating event. Different members of the 
group may have based their decision to struggle on different grounds (in 
response to different abuses). Initiation into the group is informal. ”Hey, you 
know, we ought to do something about that” is often sufficient inducement to 
participate for those who are already motivated. Formal groups have 
initiation procedures which tend to be elaborate and replete with ritual, and 
which function to inform everyone that the recruit is unmistakably a member. 
For example, military induction ceremonies are blatant and include shaving 
the heads of recruits, tagging them with metal identification plates, and 
outfitting them distinctively, all o f which is reminiscent of cattle branding. 
Initiations into fraternal and religious groups also are filled with instances of 
ceremonial investment. Such practices function to reinforce the newcomer’s 
commitment to the group and to make resignation difficult.
Informal groups, which generally lack initiation ceremonies, are continu­
ally threatened by casual participation and "dropping out” by members. There 
is no need for members to explain publicly why they have not participated 
fully, they have no gifts to return, and there are no legal proceedings for 
detachment. To bolster solidarity, noninstitutionalized pressures must be 
mobilized. For example, frequent face-to-face interaction among members, 
especially when it includes conversation about the organization's abuses, 
serves to maintain and enhance commitment. When others within the 
organization are aware of the group's existence the solidarity of its members 
is often enhanced and is sometimes intensified when members are stigmatized 
and ostracized by nonmembers. (47) In reciprocal fashion, those who are 
potential converts to the group but who have refused to join are usually 
viewed negatively by the group's members. A t times the hostility of the 
group against outsiders becomes more important to it than the original goal 
o f change. And when the opposition is terminated, whether or not it has been 
successful, these hostilities tend to endure.
Commitment to the group need not be based only on affirmation of its 
goal, but may also be based on personal loyalties. Personal loyalty is a 
general characteristic of primary groups, which are characterized by 
gemeinschaft (relations are personal and diffuse rather than specific to a 
certain role). Where oppositions are based on gesellschaft (self-interested 
exchange), there is often some unwritten bargain in which individual members 
receive something of value as an inducement to maintain their participation. 
Such rewards vary from the opportunity to exert power to "getting a piece of 
the action" (for example, being next in line for promotion to the position 
whose current incumbent is under attack by the oppositionists). When people 
become disenchanted with the issue that engendered opposition, despairing of
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victory or simply becoming annoyed with all the time oppositional activity 
takes away from other pursuits, their active commitment is supported by 
solidarity. In their analysis of the German Army's performance during World 
War II, Shils and 3anowitz claimed that the higher echelons miscalculated the 
source of the soldier's commitment to keep fighting under adverse conditions. 
It was assumed by the military command that patriotism and a faith in the 
nobility o f Hitler's mission was sufficient to sustain commitment. Shils and 
Janowitz indicate that, on the contrary, loyalty was accorded mainly to the 
soldier's small unit, to the individuals who comprised this primary group. (48) 
The formation of groups that do not have high status in their social 
environment, to which people find it risky to belong and which do not have 
legitimacy, is hindered by the difficulties in developing trust among potential 
members. Group formation is made even more difficult by the atmosphere of 
competition engendered by organizations, in which people vie with one 
another for advancement and privileges. Competitive relations and the 
alienation that accompanies them create undercurrents of mistrust and 
suspicion which are difficult to overcome. A leader of a secretarial 
opposition comments, "This hatred of other women, which was really self- 
hatred, made it easy for the Editor-in-Chief to divide and conquer." (49)
When people may face being fired or fired upon if their active opposition 
is publicly known, developing trust poses problems as acute as reaching the 
decision to fight to make changes in the organization. Once there is trust, 
however, high risk serves to foster commitment because each one feels an 
obligation not to let the others down. The positive relation between risk and 
commitment, noted by Downton in his study of rebel groups, (50) may also be 
explained by cognitive dissonance theory as a result of our tendency to feel 
positive e ffec t for that which we must suffer to achieve. (51) In part, this 
explanation covers the patriotism of war veterans, the loyalty of hazed 
fraternity brothers, and the love of a mother for her infant. Many 
bureaucratic oppositions, however, are not very risky. Pledges of "united we 
stand, divided we fa ll" and frank admissions of the risks involved in struggle 
are often sufficient to create a trust which extends as far as the 
organizational roles, but which does not involve the whole person. Once such 
trust is established among members of an opposition group there is rarely any 
further mention of the risks.
Even where trust has been created there is still a problem of maintaining 
commitment. Gamson indicates that
bureaucratic organization helps a group with the problem of pattern 
maintenance. By creating a structure of the roles with defined 
expectations in the place of diffuse commitments, a challenging group 
can better assure that certain necessary tasks will be routinely 
performed. (52)
Bureaucratic opposition groups, however, rarely become formal organizations 
themselves because they are usually small, face-to-face groups whose 
members believe (not always correctly) that their struggle will last for only a 
short time. Sometimes the informality of oppositions promotes their success, 
because the administrative authorities often prefer a well-organized adver-
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sary to loose congeries of disgruntled individuals. Organized oppositions, as 
Simmel recognized, are more predictable, can be more easily coopted, and 
can more readily arrange compromises than informal groups:
... against a diffuse multitude of enemies, one gains more often
particular victories, but has great difficu lty in achieving decisive
actions which definitely fix  the mutual relationship of the forces. (53)
Basic to the organization of a group is its degree of centralization and the 
nature of its leadership. Most ongoing groups have specific procedures for 
selecting leaders. For example, elections are used in democracies, accession 
in monarchies, and preemption in revolutionary governments. Small groups 
that are formed independently of the directives of authorities often use the 
method o f assumption in which the one assumed by all to be the best qualified 
becomes the leader. To the extent to which bureaucratic opposition groups 
are centralized and can be said to have leaders, assumption is the dominant 
method of leadership selection. However, the infrequency of oppositional 
activity makes it difficult to judge leadership ability. Unlike the hunting 
groups of the Bushmen, in which the most skilled hunter is the leader who 
deploys men to different areas and tasks, bureaucratic opposition groups 
cannot base selection of a leader on instrumentally rational criteria. Perhaps 
this is one reason why bureaucratic oppositions often have no clearly defined 
administration and why those that do have leaders have no formal procedures 
for acknowledging them. Generalizing from the data, leaders of opposition 
groups have two basic characteristics: they are highly articulate and they are 
the most strongly or among the most strongly motivated to achieve the 
group's goal. Taking liberties with Weber's categories, the authority of these 
leaders is based on charisma. Their personal influence alone determines the 
extent to which they wili be heeded. They have no reservoir of force with 
which to compel obedience. Like all unofficial leaders they must consult far 
more than command. Leaders of bureaucratic oppositions serve as advisers 
coordinators, and planners, provided that others are willing to listen to them’. 
Such noncoercive administration is frequent among small groups and even 
characterizes whole communities such as the Northern Algonquians, the 
Kalahari Bushmen, and some Eskimo. These communities are characterized 
by primary interaction, low population density, and relatively simple social 
organization.
Leaderless bureaucratic opposition groups differ very little from those 
with leaders. In the former, advice is more readily given by and taken from 
those who have special-area competence, and, thus, most of the members of 
the group are at some time in positions o f leadership. (54) Lack of 
centralization is not only due to the small size and expected brief duration of 
the opposition, but to the relative status of and risks taken by the members. 
Most often all the members of the opposition group are at the same level of 
the organizational hierarchy and, therefore, confront similar risks. When 
subordinates and their immediate superiors unite, the latter usually become 
the leaders. For example, in academic bureaucratic oppositions those who 
have tenure tend to take the lead and to expose themselves to the authorities 
of the university more than do the untenured faculty who face the risk that
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their contracts will not be renewed.
When bureaucratic oppositions are expected to last for an extended period 
o f time (more than a few weeks) and/or when large numbers of people are 
involved in them, organizational complexity develops. Specific roles are 
created and filled, including leadership positions. Examples of highly complex 
opposition groups are found most frequently in labor unions. Not only are 
unions legally required to have a democratic form, but they were initiated as 
a kind of bureaucratic opposition and maintain a mythology of struggle and 
organization. Also, oppositions against union authority often require the 
coordination of large numbers of people. The wildcat strikes by mine workers 
in Appalachia, which lasted for several months during the summer of 1977 and 
which were directed primarily against the United Mine Workers, exemplify a 
highly complex opposition group in action. The fact that workers were 
scattered among numerous sites throughout the regior^eif required centralized 
planning and coordination. The event that precipitated the opposition was a 
change in medical benefits, which had been free in the past but which were 
then put on a fee basis. Comments made by the miners, however, indicated 
that the precipitant was only the straw that broke the camel’s back: the 
oppositionists accused the union of being generally indifferent to the needs of 
the workers. The wildcat strike included about one-half of the UMW's 
175,000 working members and it appeared that the organization of the 
opposition was based in some of the UMW district o ffices. (55) The most 
militant district, //17 in Charleston, West Virginia, was treated by the UMW 
hierarchy as a kind of ’’bargaining agent" for all of the strikers, although it 
had not been authorized to speak for the other districts. Oppositions against 
unions, such as this wildcat strike, are on the borderline between bureaucratic 
oppositions and traditional political processes because they may involve 
actions against a federated body by some of its legally constituted parts.
Another complex bureaucratic opposition group is the Professional 
Drivers' Council (PROD, Inc.) which has been in conflict with its union, the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, since 1971. Membership figures 
vary, but in 1977 PROD claimed 10,000 members, of whom 4,000 had paid the 
$20 yearly dues. PROD has charged that the top officia ls of the Teamsters 
have been financially irresponsible, have failed to push for legislation and 
contract agreements which would reduce safety hazards, and have made a 
mockery of union democracy. Unlike the UMW wildcatters, whose opposition 
arose within the union’s formal structure, PROD was inspired by Ralph 
Nader’s public interest group, from which it became independent after a year 
of tutelage. The diversity and complexity of PROD’s activities preclude a 
simple structure for the group. It has won court cases which the Teamsters 
grievance committees had refused to fight and it has lobbied the Departments 
of Transportation, Justice, and Labor, and the Internal Revenue Service. 
PROD also publishes books and a "hard-hitting" bi-monthly newspaper which 
recounts the actions of its members and Teamster retaliations. (56) Finally, 
the organization has been a literal prod, holding meetings throughout the 
United States in which teamsters are informed about how to clean up their 
local unions.
Despite the publicity that they get, large and complex bureaucratic
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?PPf° S‘ n grouPs arue anomalies. Most oppositions are small, leaderless, face-
l r  * Z *  r Sr  r/ / niu pecialized activ ity is done on an ad hoc basis and 
n!  e stnct discipline of a revolutionary party is only
needed in those few instances in which there are risks of violence. Such
u iT v !£ le n r iS “ h™ res.tricted to bureaucracies that have the means to 
use violence, such as the police and, for different reasons relating to their
= r tIglnf ’ Su°me In mar|y oppositions internal conflicts arise from
a + n k f differences o f opinion about tactics. Such conflicts 
HnZ of f f  i l i  tue °PP°sition as different people test out their own
nnnL t Theu beneflts o f a multiplicity o f tactics in bureaucratic
proi?^ ast arp y ,wlth the need for discipline in societal challenge
groups. (57) However, even large-scale social movements may benefit from a 
diversity in the challenge groups that compose them. For example, the black
S S S 2 7 5  n v °  ha,ve b" nefited from the blend of violent^ tactics and threats (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Black Panthers),
N A A rm  j  atl0f?aI Association for the Advancement o f Colored People, 
NAACP), and moral persuasion and example (Martin Luther King, Jr. and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference).
t , The formation and coordination of individuals into opposition groups are
thp ora + .lnterplay betweer> the ever-present grounds for struggle and 
the organizational conditions which inhibit dissent. That the countervailing 
conditions against conflict can be overcome is evidenced by the appearance
th^ n S 10?5’ ^  theSe conditions Pose difficult obstacles is shown by
the usually transient duration, localized scope, face-to-face nature, and lack
L  ™ ,  of labor of opposition groups. A t times, o f course, group 
formation does not occur and an individual decides to go it alone. Energies
t E t i ™  " 8i ^  ,opposition 8rouP t0 attempt to change policies or rule-
olating personnel only form the prelude to bureaucratic opposition itself. 
The actual struggle must proceed according to a strategy or course of action 
through which the oppositionists attempt to achieve their goal of instituting 
esired changes. Such strategies and the tactics derived from them form the 
subject matter of the following section.
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Strategies and Tactics
Every public action which is not customary, either is wrong or, 
if it is right, is a dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing 
should ever be done for the first time.
- F.M. Cornford, Microcosmo- 
graphia Académica, vil
Bureaucratic opposition is a political phenomenon that appears in an 
administrative entity, which is defined so as to exclude politics. According to 
the myth of administration, each employee has a prescribed role, the 
performance of which is instrumental to the achievement of the organi­
zation's purposes. Under ideal circumstances there is no conflict between the 
performance of a role and the efficient achievement of o ffic ia l organization­
al goals. Each employee is assumed to be competent, motivated to perform 
the prescribed function, and able to contribute to the overall purpose. When 
any of these assumptions are not met, and they are never met completely, 
there is a possibility for opposition to business as usual. As Locke pointed out 
in the Second Treatise, there are always abundant excuses for revolt in any 
political situation, there are always grounds for opposition. The ideal 
organization is no less a utopia than the ideal state.
As noted previously, bureaucracies resemble authoritarian states because 
they do not provide for legitimate and institutionalized opposition. Oppo­
sition parties and interest groups in democracies need not legitimate 
themselves because they are acknowledged to be integral components of the 
ongoing system. Bureaucratic oppositions are, by definition, outside of and 
subversive to the system in which they appear and must legitimate 
themselves. The grounding of oppositions, described in the second chapter, 
can be conceived of as a process of seeking for justification under conditions 
in which, according to officia l definition, justification is ruled out. The task 
o f bureaucratic opposition is to create itself as a legitim ate phenomenon.
The grounds for bureaucratic opposition are sought in deviations from or
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infractions of the norms of the organization itself or the norms of the wider 
society. Although the members of an opposition may have multiple and even 
conflicting motives for their participation, they must usually espouse the 
cause of making the organization live up to its own standards or the standards 
of the wider social environment. Only if an opposition is carried out secretly 
can its members avoid the problem of justifying their dissent. However, the 
grounding of an opposition merely gives it an ideology; it does not make a 
place for it within the system and certainly does not insure its success. As 
noted in the third chapter, oppositionists must make a self-conscious 
commitment to challenge business as usual. They must organize, or at least 
take individual risks. Bureaucracies are, in one respect, hierarchies of 
authority. Opposition within them is a threat to the exercise of authority and 
will nearly always be perceived by officia ls as a signal that control is giving 
way to chaos. As in all authoritarian situations, the first concern of o fficials 
is that obedience be maintained. In general, oppositionists must walk softly 
and carry as big a stick as possible. Y e t just because their activity is not 
legitim ate they cannot lower their voices, and just because they lack 
authority they have little clout. Bureaucratic oppositions, then, will 
predictably meet the resistance of the offic ia l hierarchy. Higher officials, 
who become or are made aware of dissent, will be concerned not merely with 
the validity of the grounds, but with the maintenance of obedience, 
submission, and the semblance of order. The oppositionists, however, are 
often unaware of or, to use Royce's expression, "viciously naive" about the 
resistance they w ill meet and the reprisals that they may suffer. Often they 
believe that the "facts" will speak for themselves, that if only the officials 
are made cognizant of abuses the abuses will be corrected. Without such 
innocence or naivete there would be fewer oppositions undertaken. Often the 
belief that the "facts speak for themselves" is the vital lie that fuels 
opposition, at least in its initial stages. The oppositionists not only use the 
norms of the organization or the society to justify their case, but they often 
believe that the higher administrators are committed to these norms, even to 
the exclusion of maintaining the appearance of control and wisdom. Such 
belief is almost never warranted. As Serpico found, the authorities 
themselves may be corrupt. However, even if they are generally honest, they 
will feel threatened by breaches in the chain of command. The initial 
innocence of many oppositionists is, of course, instrumental to their taking 
action. They are concerned with rectifying a perceived abuse, so concerned 
that they put on blinders and fail to take the role of the authorities. It is 
frequently their innocence or naivete that allows them to overcome 
bureaucratic inertia and to transcend the paradox of their powerlessness. 
Although they are engaged in a political activity, a combat, they often do not 
interpret the organization as a political system, and thus are as much as or 
more victims of the administrative myth than their superiors.
Just because oppositions are not legitim ate phenomena within bureaucra­
cies they are relatively unstructured activities. There is no culturally- 
prescribed role for the oppositionist, no ready-made routine for successful 
dissent. Highly organized social acts, such as those undertaken by 
bureaucracies, may be described as linear, sequential, and ordered because 
they are patterned by a preordained plan. Of course, bureaucracies are not
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as orderly as their handbooks have it, or else, for one thing, oppositions would 
not occur. However, business as usual in a bureaucracy often approximates 
the o ffic ia l plan. The Platonic illusion that form structures content cannot 
be maintained in any sense for bureaucratic oppositions. Their grounds are 
not given to them by a charter, but must be sought and created, often in the 
very process of conflict. Even when the grounds are clear, the oppositionists 
must devise ways of effecting their goals, must innovate strategies.
The use of the term ’’strategy" implies a situation of combat. The word is 
derived from the Greek and originally meant the "art of the general." Its use 
in the present discussion implies a judgment that the nature of political 
activity is combative. In the Western tradition, the idea that politics is 
essentially conflict is paralleled by the idea that it is or should be a rational 
discussion aimed at determining the common good. The political scientist 
Maurice Duverger writes:
Ever since men have been reflecting on politics they have oscillated 
between two dramatically opposed interpretations. According to one, 
politics is conflict, a struggle in which power allows those who possess 
it to ensure their hold on society and to profit by it. According to the 
other view, politics is an effort to bring about the rule of order and 
justice in which power guarantees the general interest and the common 
good against the pressures of private interests. (1)
The two definitions of politics tend to become confused with one another in 
bureaucratic oppositions. The oppositionists often believe initially that they 
can e ffec t the changes that they seek merely by appealing rationally to a 
supposed normative consensus. In later stages, if such stages occur, they 
frequently shift to the view that politics is a power struggle or at least to the 
idea that power is a key factor in winning the debate over just what 
constitutes the common good. In the present discussion, the use of the term 
strategy is meant to stress the judgment that even when the oppositionists do 
not believe that they are engaged in combat, the element of conflict, of the 
military campaign and the adversary relation, is always present. The mere 
act of "speaking the truth to power" is a combative act because the officia l 
who receives the message and is responsible for the organization’s proper 
function is implicitly being accused of dereliction of duty. He or she should 
have spotted the incompetent or unjust employee, or should not have 
tolerated the ineffective or immoral policy. Oppositionists, of course, are 
often unaware that they are mounting such an attack, so involved are they 
with their cause.
The idea that politics is a rational discussion about the public good implies 
that the participants in the discussion are equals whose arguments are judged 
by their intrinsic merits. In the words of Jurgen Habermas, rational politics 
implies an "ideal speech situation," in which each member is concerned to 
determine truth and goodness, not to maintain a chain of command or to gain 
power and privilege. The Machiavellian definition of politics as the act of 
gaining and maintaining power is more appropriate to the study of 
bureaucratic opposition than the Platonic idea of rational discourse because 
the oppositionists are not equal participants in the political process and they
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confront authorities who are concerned primarily with maintaining order. 
k i j  uS 1° iud8ment made in the present discussion about what politics 
should be, but only about what politics in bureaucracies have been.
The dynamics of a bureaucratic opposition can, in its most general form, 
be viewed as developing goals, designing strategies for implementing the 
goals, and enacting strategically appropriate tactical maneuvers. "One can 
say that tactics is fighting and strategy is planning where and how to fight, 
with the 'how' construed so as to exclude the details." (2) The goals o f a 
bureaucratic opposition are related to the grounds of the opposition but are 
not always determined by them. At one extreme the actual goal of an 
opposition may be the perpetuation of an illegal activity, such as pilferage, 
while the public ground is the supposed incompetence of a supervisor. A t the 
other extreme the actual goal may follow directly from the ground, as when 
the oppositionists attempt to remove a rule that causes inefficient or 
ineffective functioning. Most oppositions fall between the two extremes. 
First, the members of the opposition may have widely different goals, some 
o f which follow from ungrounded motives and others of which are based on 
commitment to the public grounds. Second, there may be a range of specific 
goals compatible with the general ground and the oppositionists may disagree 
among themselves about which of these specific goals is the best or the most 
prudent to pursue. For example, when a promotional policy bars the 
advancement of women and/or minority-group members, a new policy might 
allow for "token," "m erit," or "affirm ative action" promotions of those 
against whom discrimination is directed.
There are many determinants o f goal selection. For example, how 
radically the goal departs from the organization's current modus operandi is 
often a function of the perceived resources of the opposition group, such as 
its morale, connections, and bargaining skills. Further, the goals may be 
influenced by prevailing policies in comparable organizations and may change 
in the course of the opposition as actions disclose new information, close o ff 
options, and open up new alternatives. Finally, the choice o f goals may 
become subordinate to the opposition’s strategy through considerations of 
prudence or the presence of ungrounded motives, such as revenge or the 
e ffort to maintain solidarity or avoid dismissal. Oppositions often adapt 
satisficing" strategies in which they ask for more than they need or expect 
so that they can bargain down to their actual goal, which itself only becomes 
clarified in the bargaining process. The indeterminacy of goal selection is 
related to the unstructured and unprogrammed nature of bureaucratic 
opposition. Clarity about goals is, for the most part, a luxury of those who 
are confident that they have the means to achieve those goals and can count 
on a consensus about their desirability.
Most generally, the goals of a bureaucratic opposition are either to stop 
norm violations by having the violator dismissed or reformed, and/or to 
change a policy in whole or in part. The goals of changing the personnel and 
of changing the structure are not mutually exclusive. Other things being 
equal, if there is a choice about which of these two goals to select, then 
altering personnel will be preferred. The organization is not structurally 
damaged by personnel changes, so by concentrating on the removal or reform 
of incumbents the oppositionists can better maintain their loyalty to the
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organization itself. Attempts to alter policy are more costly. Serpico first 
went after the removal of several corrupt cops, but then realized that 
corruption was an unwritten policy of the New York C ity Police Department. 
He altered his goal to changing the structure of the Department, to 
eliminating ineffective, and immoral policy, and met with strong resistance 
and reprisals. The Watergate investigators also sought "to determined which 
of the President's men were responsible. The paradoxical conclusion was 'all
the President's men'." (3)
Once a goal is set, even provisionally, the general plans for achieving it 
need to be developed and put into e ffect. These general plans or strategies 
fall into two major classes, based on whether they primarily involve giving 
information about perceived abuses to authorities, outside agencies, or news 
media, or involve taking direct action against the abuses, such as harassment, 
filing suit, or disrupting the routine of work. The informing strategy is an 
attempt to exercise power indirectly by pursuading someone else, usually 
someone with administrative or legal authority, to rectify the perceived 
abuse. Direct action, of course, involves the commitment to participate in 
the power struggle oneself. However, most forms of direct action also 
require the final action to be taken by those in authority.
For many reasons the informing strategy is the most prevalent used in 
bureaucratic oppositions. Perhaps the most important reason for this is that 
it does not appear to be political, it does not seem to commit one to a 
conflict. The informer often makes the naive assumption discussed above, 
that if those in positions of responsibility knew that something was amiss they 
would be grateful for the knowledge and promptly go about setting things 
right. Informing, then, reminds one of children tattling to their parents about 
their sibling's misdeeds. The informer can, at least for a while, keep up the 
pretense that the administrative ideal is honored by the authorities, that 
there is a normative consensus. As Alvin Gouldner noted, human beings tend 
to associate goodness with power. (4)
A second reason for the popularity of informing is that it appears to be 
less costly than direct action, because it relies upon others who have 
authority to do the "dirty work" of effecting change. Informing appears to 
leave the decision in the hands of the authority, and, thus, it does not seem to 
be rebellious. Informers break with business as usual only by violating the 
chain of command, not by challenging the principle of command itself. They 
are often not aware, at least consciously, that the authorities tend to 
associate the chain of command with the principle of command. The 
informing strategy also seems to be less costly than direct action, because 
typical instances of direct action, such as work stoppages, may be grounds for 
dismissal from the organization, while complaints generally are not. Again, 
the oppositionists are frequently aware that authorities, who are embarrass­
ed, discredited, or compromised by revelations of misconduct, can find 
excuses for bringing reprisals against dissenters. Informing, then, is as much 
a political strategy as any other and, of course, many oppositionists
understand this from the outset. . . .  u
Just as the goals of actual oppositions are often multiple and may change 
over time, strategies are various and mutable. If informing fails, one may 
continue to inform to higher levels within the organization or to other
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agencies with authority, or engage in some form of direct action. 
Disagreement within the opposition group, or merely lack of coordination 
among its members, may generate the trial of different strategies or tactics 
simultaneously. In contrast to more structured conflicts such as wars, going 
in more than one direction at the same time may benefit the opposition 
because the dissenters are not engaged in a zero-sum game. In particular, 
informing, despite its risks, does not necessarily consume much in the way of 
resources. The choice of strategy, however, is not necessarily based on 
calculations of instrumental rationality. Participants in oppositions usually 
lack knowledge of the full range of their alternatives and of the consequences 
of following the options of which they are aware. The use of an ’’economic” 
metaphor in this discussion merely serves to indicate that choices are not 
made randomly and that there is more or less a logic at work which takes 
costs into account and seeks to minimize risks. If economic rationality were 
a major concern of oppositionists, however, there would be few bureaucratic 
oppositions.
INFORMING
There would seem to be nothing easier to do than to provide information 
about an abuse. However, when the informing strategy is undertaken a 
number of unforeseen problems may arise. It is not sufficient for the 
oppositionist to stand in the lobby and vocally announce the abuse or to pass 
out circulars to those who happen by. The proper recipients for the 
information must be found and they must be willing to listen.
As hierarchies of authority, organizations attempt to restrict and to 
control communication as well as to secure the performance of other tasks. 
Orders are handed down from the top through a chain of command and any 
information passed in the opposite direction is not supposed to break that 
chain. Employees are expected to report only to their immediate superiors. 
Oppositions, however, are frequently directed against just those supervisors 
to whom the dissidents ordinarily report. Immediate subordinates are more 
likely to become aware o f the rule violations of their superior than are 
officia ls at the superior’s own level or at higher levels. In order to inform 
then, the hierarchy must often be breached.
An opposition group which attempted to inform on a supervisor's 
discriminatory action against the female accountants in his o ffice  went one 
level higher in the chain of command. However, the supervisor's superior 
refused to talk to us because we had failed to follow corporate procedures. 
He pointed out to us that our first point o f contact was Mr. V " the 
discriminatory supervisor. (5)
Rigid adherence to the hierarchy, which makes informing within the 
organization impossible, is not the only barrier to communicating about 
abuses. Some counselors in a drug abuse clinic found out that the vice­
directors o f the agency had been "skimming money from federal funds for 
their own personal use. ... The scheme was camouflaged nicely, by talented 
book-juggling' by the culprits. Funds, supposedly used for drug purchases,
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improving 'job-readiness,1 and counseling tools were confiscated by the vice­
directors." (6) A statement detailing the malfeasance was drawn up by the 
counselors and given to the director, but no action was taken. The 
oppositionists soon learned that the director was also dishonest:
Therefore, we had to make an appointment which finally got through, 
to enlighten the Executive-Director to the present conditions. This 
was fairly difficult to do, because of his 'isolated position' he kept 
himself in. Finally, after three weeks of trying to get through we got 
that appointment, by one day barging in his o ffice and announcing we 
needed to talk to him. (7)
In this case, the information was appreciated and action was taken.
Informing over the heads of one's immediate superiors can also backfire 
when they are told about it. A weapons analyst in the U.S. Air Force, 
physicist Kenneth S. Cook, broke the chain of command in the course of his 
bureaucratic opposition. His immediate commanding officer informed him 
that he had a copy of his "confidential" letter to the higher brass.
What followed was a Kafkaesque nightmare. Cook's top-secret 
security clearance was summarily removed without explanation.
Then, before a military medical panel ... he was found mentally and 
physically incapable of performing further service ... within the 
government. (8)
Similarly, after his superior held up a report about air charter abuses for 
more than five weeks, a Federal Aviation Administration employee, P.I. 
Ryther, went over the official's head to the deputy administrator. When he 
did not take the report seriously, Ryther tried to contact the administrator of 
the agency. He did not respond and passed the word that he would not 
comment on the report. Shortly afterwards Ryther was forced to resign when 
he was "called on the carpet at a special meeting of his superiors for ignoring
proper channels." (9)
Working one's way up the organizational chart, even if gaining access is 
not a problem, does not always make sense. The o ffic ia l chart may not 
coincide with the way that power is really distributed. The more that the 
oppositionists are familiar with the "shadow table" (the actual hierarchy of 
influence), the better they can target their activities. A t one university it is 
well known that one of the several vice-presidents controls or can control all 
areas of the administration. Several bureaucratic oppositions which began 
with informing strategies went directly to him, by-passing chart-relevant
deans. .
Information may be ignored, used against those proffering it, or used to 
further the goals of the bureaucratic opposition. Monarchs were known to kill 
bearers of ill tidings and, while not nearly as severe, administrators rarely 
welcome the bad news that oppositionists bring. O fficials more or less 
correctly fee l that imprpprieties are their responsibility, because they have 
formal authority over the situation. Often they were responsible for the 
hiring, promotion, or good ratings of the rule violator. Anthony Jay, author 
o f The Corporation Man, writes:
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... the hardest and most thankless task is to tell the higher managers in 
the corporation that your immediate boss is no good. In the first 
place, they appointed him, so you are implicitly criticizing their 
judgment. In the second place, maintenance o f corporate authority 
demands that they take his word against yours. In the third place, no 
one much wants to employ the sort o f person who is liable to go behind 
his back to a superior and v ilify  him, even (or especially) if the person 
is telling the truth. In the fourth place, your motives are bound to be 
suspected. (10)
Illustrating Jay's point is an opposition which took action against a 
supervisor o f a research staff who "treated the staff in a belligerent and 
undignified manner." (11) A complaint was lodged with the o ffice  manager, 
who was the next highest authority in the department. It turned out that the 
manager "placed greater credence on the reputation of the supervisor than on 
the complaints of the staff." (12) His only action was to tell the supervisor 
which employees had complained. "In an e ffort to discourage and prevent 
future contacts, he scrutinized the work o f those employees who visited the 
O ffice  Manager. When mistakes were found, no matter how significant, the 
employees were told that they were fired." (13)
Many oppositionists have considered using the informing strategy but have 
fe lt  that it was too dangerous to undertake because of the potential for 
retaliation. A police homicide detective maintains that "speaking out against 
immoral or perceived unethical conduct o f superiors can be a dangerous 
practice.... When a member becomes known as a 'trouble maker,' a telephone 
call will precede him to every new assignment warning of his character 
deficiencies." (14) An FBI agent acknowledges that "agents who wrote letters 
o f protest during Hoover's time could expect, at least, to be transferred to an 
undesirable o ffice ." (15)
Various reasons, including the fear o f transfer to distant schools, impelled 
a bureaucratic opposition group of elementary school teachers to pass 
information through a third party. The teachers opposed their principal's 
illegal orders to have them coach students for standardized examinations and, 
also, upgrade their scores. Instead of reporting to the city's board of 
education directly, they informed the school's P.T.A. and helped the parents 
draft letters accusing the principal and calling for his resignation. These 
letters, which were sent to the members of the board of education and the 
superintendent of schools, did not reveal the identities of the teachers. The 
opposition group achieved its goal through an informing strategy involving 
minimal riask. (16)
The tactical issues of how to inform are multidimensional. Is the 
information to be proffered in person or by mail? In either case, is it to be 
transmitted by each of the individuals in the opposition separately or is it to 
be delivered collectively? Available examples show the use of many tactics 
and it is difficult to generalize about which are the most e ffective . Physical 
accessibility, a sense of one's communications skills, the degree that the 
authority intimidates, and the nature o f the information are possible 
influences on which tactic will be employed.
One of the major problems that informants have is gaining credibility.
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The numerous derogatory epithets hurled at informers, such as snitch, 
squealer, fink, and rat, dampen the urge to give information. John Dean, 
described as "the pariah of Washington, the detested 'bottom-dwelling slug,' 
the 'well-poisoner,' Nixon's despised 'Heartbreak Kid,"' (17) recalled his de­
cision to tell what he knew about the Watergate break-in: "Now I fe lt the 
razor edge between the squealer and the perjurer. I had never fe lt more 
squalid." (18) The negative view of the informer also allows the recipient of 
the information to be suspicious of it and, thus, to be reluctant to act on it. 
The automatic labeling of an informer as a "troublemaker" shifts the burden 
from the accused to the accuser, while imputing personal (non-grounded) 
motives to the oppositionist classifies the information as mere propaganda, 
nothing to be taken seriously.
Oppositions mounted by only one person are most easily discredited. A 
group, as long as it is not perceived to be a mob, is believed to be more 
objective. Credibility is increased not only by having several people inform, 
but by the "consistency credits" of the oppositionists and their organizational 
status. The longer that people have been with the organization as 
"cooperative team members," the more seriously will the charges be 
considered. Thus, numbers, consistency credits, and level of status are all 
resources of the oppositional group.
When some nurses mounted a bureaucratic opposition against an incompe­
tent nursing director, their information was ignored. However, the hospital 
administrator regarded the same statements with considerably more gravity 
when some physicians joined the opposition. (19) The e ffec t of the 
composition of the opposition group on its success indicates that an informing 
strategy is not independent of considerations of power.
Credibility is also influenced by the evidence used to support the charges. 
The pervasive legalistic mentality, probably stronger in public than in private 
bureaucracies, gives "hard" evidence, such as memoranda, disinterested 
observers, bookkeeping records, or tape recordings, more weight than 
unsupported recall or hearsay. Some abuses are easier than others to document 
with evidence convincing to the legalistic mind. Because the bureaucratic 
opposition depends for its success on the administration acting on its 
information to eliminate the abuse, the evidence, ceteris paribus, must be 
compelling enough to overcome inertia. It is very difficult to obtain such 
convincing evidence, for example, to demonstrate the incompetence of 
administrators. There is usually no physical object to examine, and if 
declines in output or morale are cited they can be attributed to factors other 
than the manager.
Circumstantial evidence and the testimony of subordinates are often 
insufficient to impel action, especially if the administrators fear legal suits 
or reactions from the Civil Service Commission or unions. Thus, one 
informing tactic, as was indicated above, is to inform on an easily 
demonstrable abuse rather than on the abuse on which the oppositionist's 
commitment is grounded. For example, the failure of a straight informing 
tactic on an incompetent supervisor led the frustrated opposition group to 
take advantage of a situation which would normally have been ignored. "In an 
emotional outburst the Supervisor insulted a female staff member with the 
use of sexist and racist slurs." At this stage of the opposition the group was
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aware that "there was (only) one provision in the company policy for the 
removal of an employee at the supervisory level - the use of profanity and 
abusive language to subordinates. (The group) united behind the insulted 
employee and encouraged her to register a 'formal grievance' with the o ffice  
manager, who had ignored the oppositionists' previous complaints. (20) A 
member of the group recalled the efficacy of altering the public ground: 
"The Staff was now basing its opposition movement on a clear-cut issue of 
company policy .... " (21) and anticipated the supervisor's removal. The 
evidence for the new ground was easy to gather and was credible to the 
administration.
Informing on sexual harrassment is particularly difficult because in serious 
cases there probably will not be witnesses and there is still a widespread 
belief that women are seducers "asking for" advances made by males. One 
woman who was harassed stated: "As in rape cases, the woman is often held 
responsible for encouraging animal urges in her male co-workers. Almost 
always, the woman loses." (22) A young girl working as a housecleaner for an 
older man told her residential counselor that "she wouldn't go back because he 
grabbed her breast and tried to kiss her." The counselor reports that "my pain 
and anger intensified when one of our male counselors said, 'She's probably 
just fantasizing.'" (23) Although there are now many statutes against sexual 
harassment, the problem still remains one of establishing proof. A lawyer 
advised women to use a method "that is perfectly legal - that is, to 
unobtrusively wire one’s self for sound by carrying a hidden tape ’ re­
corder." (24)
Although the lawyer's advice is perhaps farfetched in most cases of 
harassment, tape recordings have been successfully used to provide indisput­
able evidence against corrupt police. The lone oppositionist, Detective Ellis, 
’’was outfitted with a tape recorder which he wore beneath his clothing." (25) 
Ellis feigned interest in joining the activities of taking money from 
prostitutes, pimps, and drug dealers, and in keeping some of the money 
confiscated in drug arrests.
In many cases, evidence of abuse is obtainable in incriminating memo­
randa and other documents. At times these are easily accessible, especially 
when the violators are unaware of the impropriety of their actions or do not 
believe that they would be prosecuted for such offenses. However, when they 
are cognizant of their culpability, they will carefully protect access to 
potentially damaging material. The prospects of obtaining documentary 
evidence are increased by bringing individuals who have access to it into the 
opposition. Such evidence is also more easily secured if the informants can 
act anonymously and conceal their intentions.
An example of anonymous informing was the e ffort of one or more 
employees of the American Medical Association to change some of the 
organization's illegal and unethical practices by transmitting "dozens of 
confidential letters, memoranda, and other documents from AMA files ... "
(26) to the press. The informant's anonymity allowed continued access to the 
embarrassing material. Humorously clubbed "Sore Throat" by the higher 
o fficia ls of the AMA, the oppositionist has caused them to hire a private 
security firm to plug the leaks. Several staff members have been given lie 
detector tests. (27) Had Sore Throat's intentions and identity been known,
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the material would surely have not been available to him.
Informing strategy requires convincing evidence and the tactics used to 
obtain it may include stealth. The directors of a hospital were not impressed 
by the argument that a doctor made accusing a fellow surgeon literally of 
killing a number of patients. They took no action against Dr. X. Dr. Harris, 
the accuser, then obtained more credible evidence than his previous 
testimony about a pattern to the deaths that were linked with Dr. X. He " ... 
obtained a master key from a nurse and, alone in the hospital's dressing room, 
opened locker number 4, assigned to Dr. X. The locker 'was a mess with 
items strewn about,' Harris testified. 'The thing that struck me were these 
empty vials of tubocurarine (a trade name for purified curare) and this loaded 
syringe. That was enough for me. I closed the locker and shuddered.'" (28) 
"Astounded by the discovery," that is, armed with more solid evidence, the
directors finally took action.
Informing strategy in oppositions directed against policies is, ceteris 
paribus, more difficult than in those aimed at rule violators, if only because 
of limited accessibility to needed evidence. In an article about managerial 
strategies, Paul Goodman and Donald Van Houten contend that "limited 
access to financial and production data plays an ... important role in 
maintaining the corporate status quo." (29) They conclude, pessimistically, 
that those "who wish to challenge managerial decisions on rational grounds 
may thus have inadequate data from which to plead their case." (30)
In order to boost the prospects of the success of an informing strategy, 
the oppositionist or opposition group may marshal a number of tactics. 
Among the possible tactics is the use of rhetoric in the disclosure. Rhetorical 
skill, the power to persuade, is unevenly distributed and may or may not be 
used self-consciously by the opposition. Particularly when there is resistance 
against a policy, the dissenters must present arguments and not merely 
factual evidence. The policy may be shown to be "irrational" because it leads 
to a loss of efficiency in reaching the organization's goal or because it 
actually subverts the attainment of this goal. Discriminatory policies are 
fought by dramatic "demonstration" that members of a group are competent 
to perform relevant tasks. If the policy contradicts some moral norm the 
argument may involve what rhetoricians call appeals to authority, invoking 
the Church, for example. Arguments may be geared to arouse emotions, such 
as sympathy or prejudice. Appeals to the awesome power of the herd 
("Everyone else is doing it") are often useful. Finally, one may appeal to fear, 
which is more than mere rhetoric. It is the threat of calling on other 
resources and, as such, borders on direct action.
There is a paucity of data with regard to the rhetoric used by bureaucratic 
oppositionists. The comparable challenge groups, social movements and 
revolutionary cadres, use rhetoric too, but theirs is made public as ideo ogy. 
When a bureaucratic opposition uses rhetorical arguments the appeals are 
often created without self-conscious awareness and are hidden from public 
view. It would be interesting to compare the rhetorical devices used within 
organizations to those used on a wider public. One might expect the appeal 
to reason to be more frequent in bureaucratic oppositions than elsewhere 
because of the specialized content of the issues and the limited number of 
people involved.
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In the use of persuasion, arguments are judged to be strong only within a 
specified context. The art requires sensitivity to the situation and to the 
personalities involved. One may play on the honor of the firm or the 
sympathies of the administrator; appeals may be couched in the "patois" of 
the organization. One of the more e ffec tive  o f the several tactics used by 
members of a bureaucratic opposition in a law o ffice , who tried to change a 
trivial but annoying policy, was to write a memo to one of the partners. In it 
was explained "the illegality o f withholding funds involuntarily"; that is, the 
memo was couched in the legalese common to their work. (31)
Another tactic used by those without authority to accompany an informing 
strategy is what may best be described as harassment. This tactic involves 
repetitive informing, either by the same person or others. It persuades not by 
reason but by continual annoyance. When the harassing tactic is e ffective , 
the administrator, in exasperation, corrects the grounded abuse because his or 
her inertia has been made too painful. Children, another group of people with 
no authority and few  sources of power, quickly learn this tactic to obtain 
privileges and goods initially denied to them. Parents are known, much to the 
delight o f manufacturers and advertisers, to cave in to repeated wails of "Buy 
me, buy me." The housewife, traditionally pictured in a situation not 
dissimilar to the child’s, supposedly resorts to the same tactic - in this case 
called nagging - to get what she wants.
A special kind of informing with the organization is contacting the board 
o f directors or board of trustees. Appealing to this body differs in several 
ways from merely going up the organizational chart to a higher-level 
executive. Most obviously, the o ffice  is occupied by several persons, not a 
single incumbent. More significant is the ambiguous position of the board 
members who are both insiders and outsiders. They have the highest 
authority within the organization, appointing those who are charged with the 
administration of day-to-day affairs within the broad policy guidelines 
outlined by the board. But they occupy their o ffice, both physically and 
functionally, very rarely; they are not full-time employees of the 
organization, but are more like absentee owners. They pursue other 
occupations, if they are employed. Because of their status as partial 
outsiders, the act o f informing is perceived by them to be a somewhat 
disloyal. However, the board is the first logical recipient of complaints 
against the higher administrative o fficer o f any organization. Typically,
bureaucratic oppositions whose goal is to oust incumbent presidents go to the 
board. °
Several accounts of bureaucratic oppositions against college presidents 
have been written up in the news media. Nora Ephron has extensively 
described two of them in remarkable detail. (32) In an Esquire article 
ironically entitled "The Bennington A ffa ir," the bureaucratic opposition to 
remove Bennington College President Gail Parker is analyzed. The climax of 
the case was the faculty's reporting to the trustees that they had no 
confidence in her ability as President. Grounding their opposition on Parker's 
incompetence, the faculty recounted incidents o f "poor judgment, tactless­
ness, lack o f follow-through." (33) They also mentioned Parker's well-known 
a ffa ir with an outspoken faculty member. Ephron hints broadly that many 
faculty members were not committed to the opposition's grounds. Their
STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 69
motives varied. One professor, who was a major impetus to and coordinator 
o f the opposition, had been acting president the year before Parker was 
appointed and was thought to have been disappointed that he was not chosen 
for the permanent position.
Parker antagonized the faculty in various ways and had few consistency 
credits le ft. For example, at the customary fall presidential address she read 
a long section from The Groves of Academe, a novel by Mary McCarthy.
The section concerned a faculty meeting at McCarthy’s Jocelyn 
College, where the same people got up and said the same things year 
after year, and nothing happened. To this day Gail Parker cannot 
understand why the faculty found the reading condescending and 
offensive; she thought the section was terribly funny - and it is, of 
course, which is not the point. The Bennington faculty resembled 
Jocelyn’s almost too perfectly.” (34)
It was not surprising that when Parker went against tradition to announce 
sweeping new policy changes without the approval or even consultation of the 
faculty, the bureaucratic opposition began in earnest. Not only did this 
precipitating act dishonor them, but the new guidelines were a direct threat. 
Parker's report called for a reduction in both the number of faculty positions 
and the percentage of tenured slots. (35) In the Bennington tradition, the 
president is viewed as a leader rather than an administrator. Thus, the 
charge of incompetency which led to the vote of no-confidence by the faculty 
was taken seriously by the Board of Trustees. Parker and her husband, the 
vice-president, were forced to resign.
At Boston University a bureaucratic opposition to oust its president met 
with no success at all. John Silber is an abrasive and uncompromising person, 
and was known to be so by the search committee that selected him as 
president. They thought, at the time of selection, that he was just who the 
university needed. The incidents that created the nucleus opposition group of 
deans involved Silber’s handling of the budget. ’’The deans had turned their 
budgets in months before, when the budgets were due, and Silber had sent the 
budgets back to be revised. They turned them in again and Silber had sent 
them back again” without comment. (36) They resented having to cut back 
continually, especially when Silber had allocated large chunks of money to 
support pet projects. Some of the deans discussed strategy. One said that he 
might resign and was told by another that it was ”a futile gesture ... because 
no one would care if the deans resigned.” (37) Within a week two-thirds of 
the deans agreed to call for Silber’s resignation. A fter word of this was 
’’leaked” to the press ’’the faculty joined the deans, and at a full Faculty 
Senate they voted 377 for resignation, 117 against, with 12 abstentions.” (38) 
The grounds of the bureaucratic opposition to the president concerned his 
’’financial malfeasance.” Among other things, he was charged with obtaining 
interest-free loans, having the university build a private tennis court, and 
paying for his Beacon Street apartment-hideaway. It is doubtful that these 
incidents would have raised many eyebrows had they been committed by some 
other president, one who was not as outspoken and abrasive as Silber. The 
administrators and faculty composing the opposition mainly wanted Silber
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removed from o ffice  because he had continually dishonored them, but they 
did not consider this ground to be strong enough. The Board's response to the 
ini or mat ion about Silber's malfeasance was to have a member confront the 
president privately, over drinks. Silber deftly "explained away" each charge 
to the satisfaction of his somewhat inebriated prosecutor. He then mounted a 
campaign to have statements supporting him sent to the trustees by major 
politicians and educators. When he formally faced the full Board, many of 
the trustees arrived thinking that he "was just wonderful." (39) Silber 
toughed out" the confrontation and "defended himself brilliantly." (40) 
Several years have passed since the opposition was mounted and John Silber 
whose salary is over $80,000 per year, is still President of Boston University. 
Why one bureaucratic opposition based on informing to the board of trustees 
tailed while another succeeded cannot be determined with exactitude. One 
may surmise that the contrasting political climates of the two schools, as 
well as the personality differences of the presidents and board members, 
helped cause the divergent outcomes.
The informing strategy is generally the first to be chosen because it 
appears to demand less commitment than direct action and is relatively less 
costly. The options within the broad informing strategy include alternative 
recipients of the information and different ways or tactics of presenting it. 
Ifkthu flrSt tfy  at informinS is not successful by the opposition's standards, 
which may alter, the dissenters may switch to direct action or inform 
elsewhere. If they choose the latter alternative, they have three directions in 
which they can move: up (to a higher level on the organizational chart), 
laterally (to some supportive association such as a trade union), or outside (to 
a controlling agency or the press).
Many of the same considerations relevant to informing to one's superiors 
are applicable to lateral informing. Employees are involved with one or more 
groups to which they can supposedly turn for redress of grievances. These 
groups, such as unions, the Civil Service Commission, or professional 
associations, are more or less independent of the organizational hierarchy and 
can contribute various resources to bureaucratic oppositionists. Such groups 
may also have some authority over the organization in which the employees 
work, through laws or contractual agreements. In a sense, they can short- 
circuit bureaucratic oppositions. When one of their members reports an 
infraction, their representatives go to management to have it corrected. 
Because they have some independent authority, their relations are best 
described as negotiations rather than as bureaucratic oppositions as defined in 
the present discussion. However, getting a union to take one’s grievance 
seriously and act on it often amounts to making a bureaucratic opposition 
within the union. Making the organization change its policy is beyond the 
scope of the union's business-as-usual and involves working the political 
machinery of the union.
It is not uncommon for union offic ia ls to assume the view of the upper 
echelon of the organization being opposed by the employees. (41) A transit 
worker in a large city attempted to make some minor policy changes in the 
municipality-owned system. He first spoke with the union president:
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He listened attentively to my plans but refused to take an active role 
because he was dedicating most of his time to seeking reelection. He 
tried to pacify me by ... indicating that the organization was too finely 
tuned to permit changes in one part. (42)
In another case, workers at a warehouse loading dock objected to a new 
policy of tightened security measures. They first complained to the foreman, 
informing him that the new policy placed an undue physical burden on them 
and was also insulting.
Not getting any results from the foreman, the workers decided to go to 
their union steward, who by that time was well aware of the situation, 
(The union said) .. that they thought the security measures were good, 
and they fe lt no need to change them because the employees wanted 
it! (43)
In both of these examples, the failure of informing strategies to lateral 
groups led to an escalation to direct action against the employing organi­
zation.
The difficulty with using unions to correct perceived organizational abuses 
is that their major purpose lies elsewhere. The membership, particularly in 
the United States, is interested in decent wage contracts and fringe benefits, 
such as medical insurance and paid vacations. Resolving grievances that are 
not clear-cut and explicit in the contract is generally beyond the union’s self- 
imposed scope, and policy disputes are beyond its purview altogether. The 
union’s power ultimately rests on the strike, thus, informing it of an abuse 
which it resolves borders on direct action. However, as far as the employee 
is concerned, an appeal to the union is an informing strategy. Ralph Nader 
and his associates conclude that
In theory the union may, through the collective bargaining process, 
demand both substantive rights to protest work that threatens the 
public and procedural devices for a fair hearing when those rights are 
asserted. In practice this potential has been neglected. (44)
Unlike bureaucratic organizations, unions have, at least on paper, the 
political machinery with which those without formal authority may make 
input. Electoral practices and other democratic mechanisms, however, are 
often window dressing concealing entrenched oligarchy. The classic study of 
union democracy done by Lipset et al. worked from the premise that such 
democracy was the exception, not the rule. They attempted to explain how it 
is possible for a democratic union to occur rather than why it does not. 
Oppositions within unions rarely use informing tactics alone because it is 
usually the top echelon that is being fought; informing within the union is 
useless. Also, because of the political structure, dissidence is expected to be 
worked out through majority opinion as expressed in union elections. 
Democracy is more of a sham in some unions than in others. A Teamsters 
member made a proposal at a union convention to slash President F itz­
simmons’ salary. He was beaten by several sergeants-at-arms; ’’the beating
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le ft  his face swollen and purple." Another member charged that "tactics such 
as adjourning Teamsters’ meetings when dissidents try to speak or holding 
meetings at hours when many union employees cannot attend are common...." 
(4.5) In e ffec t, unions which are strongly authoritarian, despite democratic 
camouflage, are significant for the present study because they are similar to 
bureaucratic organizations.
Other lateral groups have less power than unions. Employed professionals 
can inform to their professional association which often can or will do no 
more, a fter investigating the charges, than to censure the organization. The 
association's newsletter will then describe the injustice and put its members 
on notice to "try" to avoid securing a job at that institution. Among 
university professors, the tight job market of the 1970s lessened social 
opprobrium as an e ffec tive  enforcer of the American Association of 
University Professors' list of censured colleges and universities. The 
association's power is mainly the ability to make swipes at an institution's 
reputation among professionals.
Ernie Fitzgerald, involved in a complex bureaucratic opposition against 
the cost overruns in the Defense Department, sought help from his 
professional engineering association when he was dismissed from his job. He 
asked that the association "investigate the professional and ethical questions 
involved ...(But) the American Institute o f Industrial Engineers suddenly 
decided it was not a 'professional' society; it was a 'technical' organization. 
Thus it absolved itself of dealing with ethical questions." (46) The overruns 
were charged by Lockheed in its work on the C5A cargo plane. Fitzgerald 
contends that the effectiveness of the AIIE and similar groups is "undermined 
by their practice of allowing 'sustaining' or 'corporate' members. Large 
military contractors are contributing members of his own society. ... "(47)
A second type of lateral group is directly incorporated into the 
bureaucracy. Organizations such as the United States Armed Services have 
built-in units to redress grievances of those without authority. The Inspector 
General's O ffice  has been in existence since 1813, and similar agencies are 
iound in the armies of many nations. It is formally independent of any other 
channels of command. A campus Reserve O fficers Training Corps (ROTC) 
instructor enthusiastically told me that while the suggestions which emerge 
from the Inspector General’s investigations are called recommendations, they 
are ordinarily received as commands. My general skepticism was nourished 
by cases of bureaucratic oppositions within the army whose members did not 
deem it worthwhile to use this O ffice .
In a United States Artillery installation in Germany a group of young 
college-educated enlistees found their sergeant to be inordinately abusive. 
His excessive drilling, overly rigid inspections, unfair distribution of passes, 
and misuse of recreational funds were intolerable to them. There was no 
concerted action until "for some minor infraction the sergeant pulled the 
passes of the entire unit for the whole weekend. While having lunch in the 
mess hall later that day the unit booed the sergeant as he passed by the 
window. It was this spontaneous action that precipitated the formation of the 
opposition group." (48) At a meeting that evening they discussed various 
courses of action and specifically rejected the use of the Inspector General, 
believing it to be ineffective. They decided upon an informing strategy. The
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unofficial leader proposed that they write up a list of their grievances and 
give it to the commanding officer. Eighteen of the 20 men in the unit signed 
it. The leader requested the signatures, indicating that he fe lt that there was 
"safety in numbers." However, they failed to present the list because the 
sergeant’s permission was needed to do so. Rather than change to direct 
action or attempt to inform to the Inspector General or to some agency 
ouside of the army, they used some ingenuity to get to the Commanding 
O fficer (C.O.). The leader gained access on the pretext of "personal 
problems" and delivered the list. The C.O. was shocked by the list and 
despite the sergeant’s threats ("I’ll get you for this") most of the injustices 
were eventually eliminated. (49)
William M. Evan, in an analysis of the Army’s Inspector General 
Department, gives substance to suspicions about the ability of the I.G. to 
reduce the need for bureaucratic oppositions. He begins by suggesting that 
"the I.G. complaint procedure may seem to involve an organizational anomaly 
in granting all army personnel a legal right to lodge complaints directly with 
I.G. officers, for it thus sanctions the circumventing of the chain of 
command." (50) Evan indicates that the chain of command is rarely 
circumvented in practice, and he supplies various structural reasons to 
account for the observation. Of greatest importance is the fact that the I.G. 
personnel are recruited from line officers who, after a brief stint, return to 
the line. Thus, the officer serving in the I.G. has been socialized "to see the 
value of the chain of command."
Upon transfer to the I.G. he learns of the opposing principle of direct 
and horizontal communication. Since he is destined soon to return to 
his duties as a line officer, he is not likely to repudiate the principle of 
the chain of command, much less become committed to the function of 
the I.G. complaint system. (51)
Also, the o fficer ’s transfer to the I.G. is usually viewed as down-grading. 
Evan concludes that investigators would "prefer that army personnel take up 
complaints with their immediate superiors ... , and (have) a tendency to view 
them as being largely unjustified." (52) And although a soldier has the right 
to lodge a complaint with the I.G., line officers "may be inclined to view such 
action by subordinates as virtually disloyal conduct." (53)
Substantiating Evan’s analysis is the narrow call a Staff Sergeant in the 
Air Force had in using the Inspector General's o ffice. Sergeant Hayden filed 
a complaint against a superior officer, charging him with conduct unbecoming 
an o fficer. An officer of the Inspector General conducted a two-week 
inquiry and not only confirmed the charges but found further detrimental 
information against the accused major: " ... petty theft, drinking on duty, and 
calling the Air Force Secretary a meddling fool and an idiot." (54) The 
Inspector General asked Hayden to drop the charges and when Hayden refused 
he was ordered to the mental health clinic for evaluation. There, too, he was 
asked to drop charges. His refusal led to his transfer into the psychiatric 
facility  at another base, Lackland. Fortunately for Hayden, the doctors at 
Lackland discharged him with a "clean bill of health" after two weeks of 
examinations.
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Further corroboration of the I.G.'s ineffectiveness is the emergence of 
unofficial complaint systems. Rather than "suffer in silence,” go through the 
LG. o ffice , or participate in a bureaucratic opposition, army personnel may 
bring grievances to the chaplain or to the Mental Hygiene Consultation 
Service, both of which act unofficially on complaints. (55) Whichever of 
these three groups are used, the issues involved in informing, particularly 
achieving credibility and having the abuse perceived as a serious one that 
should be eliminated, still obtain.
Internally created groups, such as the Inspector General's O ffice  and 
company unions, are only as e ffec tive  as their top echelon allows them to be. 
Corporate malfeasance, on the whole, and rule violation by those in ultimate 
authority are abuses outside the o ffic ia l jurisdictions of ombundsman-style 
o ffices. The types of abuses which they are prepared to take seriously and 
the scope of the recommendations they are prepared to make are influenced 
by the climate of each particular bureaucracy. Whether such offices are used 
or by-passed by employees is a function of their perceived effectiveness. 
Because they allow their employees to "blow o ff steam” as they inform, they 
may function more as "pressure escape valves" than as mechanisms to correct 
abuses. As such they are rather functional to maintaining the status quo and, 
thus, it is understandable that bureaucracies have created them.
Ombundsman offices within bureaucracies correspond closely to those 
created by various levels of government to give their citizens redress of 
grievances against o ffic ia l agencies. More specifically, they resemble the 
executive ombundsman found in many American cities and counties more than 
the classical ombundsman developed in Scandinavia. The latter is an officer 
of Parliament who investigates citizens' complaints about unfair treatment by 
governmental departments and who recommends a remedy if a complaint is 
deemed just. The o ffice  was begun in Sweden and Finland and was adopted by 
Denmark in 1955. Since then Norway and New Zealand, among others, have, 
adopted it. (56)
The executive ombundsman differs from his classical cousin in that the 
former is dependent upon the chief executive and serves at his 
pleasure, while a classical ombundsman, once appointed, serves for a 
fixed term at least formally independent of the appointing agency. (57)
The lack of independence of the executive ombundsman tends to interfere 
with the task of redressing grievances, whether the executive is a mayor or a 
corporation president. (58) It is interesting to note that those governments 
which have institutionalized the classical ombundsman may be termed the 
most progressive; they are the best exemplars of the welfare state. They 
represent, also, Max Weber's fears of a rationalized world - the Crystal 
Palace where politics has been replaced by administration. The ombundsman 
provides a small measure of politics in a system that considers politics to be 
an anachronism. Because the ombundsman o ffices are ultimately controlled 
by the administration within bureaucracies, policies and rule violations that 
are in the administration's interests cannot be opposed by them. Thus, the 
offices serve a rather limited function in correcting abuses.
A second alternative to informing to one's superiors within the organi­
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zation, which may supplement or substitute for appeal to a lateral 
organization, is informing to a governmental agency or to the general public 
through the news media. "Whistle blowing" may be undertaken after other 
informing or direct-action strategies have failed or it may be the first resort 
of oppositionists. When an organization is systemically corrupt it is neither 
prudent nor e ffective  to inform within it.
The rationale for whistle blowing is that the interests of the public are 
generally harmed by organizational abuses that are illegal, that violate 
widespread moral norms, or that breed inefficiency. Both public and private 
sector organizations are, in some sense, responsible to the public. The 
consumer, the taxpayer, the citizen, and the patient, among others, are all 
recipients of the effects of organizations and can be appealed to by the 
whistle blower. Most often, of course, public outrage at organizational 
abuses is not very great. (59) Regulatory agencies, which are often staffed by 
personnel on loan from the organizations that they monitor, also cannot be 
relied upon to act against reported abuses. Nonetheless, if the oppositionists 
cannot trust the higher levels of their own organization, they may have 
nowhere else to go but to the public, or its officia l representatives in the 
executive or legislative branches of government, or to independent regulatory 
authorities.
Although going outside the organization to the public seems to be merely 
a logical progression in the attempt to make changes in an organization by 
those without the authority to do so, it is not perceived to be continuous with 
other strategies. Dissent is interpreted as disorganization and making 
internal dissent public is viewed as a direct attack on an organization, a 
treasonous act. Even those outside the organization may deem the whistle 
blower a traitor: "Martin Luther seems to be about the only figure of note to 
make much headway with public opinion after doing an inside job on a corrupt 
organization." (60)
Organizations can be usefully conceived of as miniatures of society.
They have a hierarchy of status and of roles, a system of myths and 
values, and a catalogue of expected behaviors. ... (They) meet many of 
the most basic needs of their members and expect in return loyalty and 
conformity. (61)
Americans who protested against the Vietnam war were told directly by 
bumper stickers and indirectly by police actions, "America - Love it or Leave 
it." Those who have fe lt  the response to whistle blowing are familiar with 
this kind of sentiment: "the principle is 'your organization, love it or leave 
it.'" (62) The self-image of organizations as self-contained polities leads 
administrators to view governmental agencies as foreign powers. Organi­
zations are usually willing to submit voluntarily to governmental authority 
only when it suits their interests to do so. Otherwise they must be coerced in 
some way. Bureaucratic oppositionists who call upon the power of Congress, 
for example, are seen in the same light as the Spanish Republicans viewed 
Franco's use of German fighter planes or, better yet, as anti-Communists 
view Soviet support of revolutionary groups in Western democracies or non- 
Marxist dictatorships.
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In the past decade there has been a spate of whistle blowing activities. 
Several books have been written on the phenomenon itself and conferences 
have been organized around the theme. (63) It is the form of bureaucratic 
opposition that is most widely known because gaining public awareness is its 
central strategy. Whistle blowing, especially when it is the first tactic used 
in an opposition, is more likely to be done by one person rather than by a 
group. Perhaps this is partially explained by the extreme risk, including 
opprobrium, of such action. Going beyond narrow self-interest may be 
possible in crowds, but opposition groups tend to discuss alternatives 
"rationally,M including the possible reprisals that might be taken against them. 
Heroic stances are easier to take when others are not around to remind one of 
the consequences of an action.
Even its supporters recognize that whistle blowing is a strategy that 
supports a basically conservative position. Informing in general is not 
designed to change but rather to restore. The information proffered 
demonstrates that what "is" is not what was "supposed to be." It is designed 
to provoke outrage - the organization is shown to be exceeding the bounds of 
authority and/or decency. The bounds, secured by social values, are upheld by 
the whistle blower, or at least they are espoused in public, whatever other 
motives may be involved.
A classic example of the whistle blower's temperament is found in 
Christopher Pyle's opposition against the United States Army's practice of 
civilian surveillance. In two articles, one published in January and a follow- 
up in July 1970 in The Washington Monthly, Pyle described in some detail the 
surveillance apparatus used by the Army and its development after 1967. He 
also argued vigorously that the Army's activities were unconstitutional. The 
grounds of this opposition were provisions of the United States Constitution, 
while the strategy was to make it public that the U.S. Army was violating the 
fundamental law. The effectiveness of an informing strategy rests upon the 
commitment of those who have the authority to uphold a standard to enforce 
it. If the authorities are neither indignant nor enraged about transgressions 
they will not be moved to take action merely because of the oppositionist's 
information. Pyle's disclosure did not fall on deaf ears. It was picked up by 
the American Civil Liberties Union and the press. Senator Sam Ervin, 
Chairman of the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, was particularly 
disturbed and instituted hearings on the case in February 1971. The Senate's 
power over the Army is related not so much to substantive legislation as to 
the disbursement of military funding. The armed services are concerned for 
their budgets. A few weeks after the start of Ervin's hearings the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense revealed Defense Department regulations that prohibit­
ed military involvement in civilian affairs, promised that these regulations 
would be followed, and indicated that much of the irregularly collected 
information had been destroyed. (64)
The problems that face all bureaucratic oppositionists who attempt an 
informing strategy, deciding upon and gaining access to those who should 
receive the information, and presenting credible evidence to them, are also 
confronted by the whistle blower. One of the major decisions involves the 
choice among the alternatives of going to the "authorities," contacting a 
referee group, or bringing the case to the attention of the general public. (65)
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The bases for the selection of one or more of these possibilities are rather 
complex. Potential whistle blowers may not be aware of all of the agencies 
that might have an interest in their information. And even if all of the 
possible recipients of the revelations are known, the oppositionists might 
believe that most of them would not be sympathetic, that they have been 
’’captured" by the organization they regulate.
With regard to personal security, particularly to future employment, 
blowing the whistle to a governmental agency is usually less costly than 
presenting the information to the general public. Not only is more 
confidential informing viewed as a less treasonous act, but there are often 
built-in protections for the oppositionist. For example, it is a violation of 
federal law to retaliate against someone who testifies before a congressional 
committee. Whether or not potential whistle blowers are aware of the 
different risks involved in different strategies is not easy to assess. The 
option selected is usually related to the ground of the opposition. If the abuse 
is a clear-cut violation of an enforced statute and a remedy is obvious, 
informing to the appropriate governmental agency is the reasonable alterna­
tive.
The selection of the recipient may also be made in terms of the non­
grounded aims of the opposition. Even if the whistle blowers are all 
committed to the grounds and sincerely seek to remove the abuse, their 
commitment may still be accompanied by a desire for vengeance. Durkheim’s 
distinction between two types of sanctions for rule violations, retributive and 
restorative, is useful here. (66) The first type of sanction corresponds to 
criminal statutes and, according to Durkheim, is prevalent in premodern 
groups characterized by strong we-feelings based on the similarity of each 
individual to the others. Restorative sanctions, in contrast, predominate in 
modern societies which have a complex division of labor. People are aware of 
one another as functionaries who may not resemble them, but upon whom 
they depend.
The hypothesis here is that those who seek vengeance do not as closely 
identify themselves with their occupational roles as do those who seek only 
the elimination of the abuse. Whistle blowing to the general public is a more 
punitive measure than bringing information to a referee group or to a 
government agency, especially if the information is not made public. 
Informing to the public holds the organization up to scorn. Threatening the 
organization’s "good will," lowering the public's opinion of it, is painful to 
those who identify with that organization. Further, a tarnished public image 
may lead to fewer customers, lower work effectiveness, or reduced funding 
by a constituent-pressured Congress. A certain amount of vengeance will be 
accomplished if some arm of the government calls those who are responsible 
for the abuse on the carpet. However, other things being equal, more 
vengeance can be had by going to the general public.
Once the initial choice is made about where to blow the whistle, the 
problem of obtaining access and of gaining credibility still remains. The 
approach to a congressional committee or a government regulatory agency is 
much like the political insurgent's appeal for international support. And as 
Mostafa Rejai indicates, there is typically a counterappeal by the incumbents.
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This taking of countermeasures for international aid is usually easier 
for the incumbents, since they are in formal control of the political 
and diplomatic apparatus of the country and since they are likely to 
have a variety of international contacts. (67)
In like fashion, the heads of the organizations employing the oppositionists, 
because of their officia l legitimacy, political ties, access to lawyers and 
sometimes to large funds, have a greater opportunity to debunk the claims of 
the oppositionists before governmental agencies than their adversaries have 
to discredit them. The organization's records are often accepted as valid and 
even blunt and unsupported denials by officers are greeted as e ffec tive  
rebuttals to the oppositionists. Discussing the problems of labor union 
members who have attempted informing strategies against the myriad abuses 
of union officials, Burton Hall remarks:
...the rank-and-file union member who appeals to the Secretary (of 
Labor) against the union leaders feels that he is appealing to the ally 
o f his enemy to protect him against his enemy.... Yet the law bars 
union members from complaining of stolen union elections to any court 
or agency other than this very friend of the officials he is complaining 
about. (68) K 5
Regulatory agencies were not set up to handle complaints from the 
employees of the organizations that they monitor. Their inspiration, when it 
does not emanate from the regulated themselves, comes from other 
government agencies, legislative bodies, or consumers. The regulatory bodies 
frequently do not carry out their public charges e ffectively . For example, 
the Food and Drug Administration was barraged with complaints from both 
consumers and physicians about the baneful effects of feminine deodorant 
sprays, but no investigation was made of the charges. Finally, the Federal 
Trade Commission, in checking out the truth of the advertisements for this 
product, advised the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to investigate. 
Unable to subpoena records, the FDA took the word of the manufacturers, 
delaying their own research on the issue. (69) Confidence in the effectiveness 
o f such "watchdog’’ agencies is further shaken by the existence of bureau- 
cratic oppositions within them.
One such opposition occurred in the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. It illustrates the difficulties involved in using such agencies to aid 
bureaucratic oppositions, because it demonstrates the e ffec t of politics on 
the will to enforce the law. The O ffice  for Civil Rights, authorized by T itle 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was responsible for seeing that schools, 
universities, hospitals, nursing homes, and welfare agencies which received 
HEW subsidies did not engage in discriminatory practices. OCR Director, 
Leon Panetta, was rather e ffec tive  in accomplishing his duties, much to the 
chagrin o f the new Nixon administration. In February 1970 he was dismissed 
and his staff understood this action as "simply the climax o f a series of 
attacks by the Administration on 'the program'...." (70) Their bureaucratic 
opposition, planned in numerous strategy discussions, was to protest against 
the policy to the White House, since the President was the ultimate chief of
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their bureaucracy. Their opposition, grounded in charges of ineffectiveness, 
used strategies other than informing, such as several high-level resignations 
and a letter signed by almost 2,000 HEW employees.
Another case of a bureaucratic opposition within a government agency 
involved the microbiologist J. Anthony Morris. For a decade he had been at 
the National Institutes of Health, involved in experiments on the long-term 
effects of flu vaccine. The response to his internal memo that questioned the 
benefits of flu vaccine was the removal of his staff, his experimental animals, 
and laboratory, and the blockage by his superiors of the publication of his 
scientific articles. (71) Helped by one of Ralph Nader’s "raiders,” his 
statement detailing the irregularities of the NIH flu vaccine program set o ff 
investigations by Senator Abraham Ribicoff and the General Accounting 
O ffice . Morris’ whistle blowing to the government resulted in HEW 
Secretary Elliot Richardson transferring him to the Food and Drug Admini­
stration to continue his flu research. No punitive or remedial action was 
taken against or within NIH. In 1976 Morris publicly criticized the swine flu 
program. He had tested the live vaccine in mice and found that it was 
potentially carcinogenic. Further, he claimed that it might trigger various 
neurological illnesses, including Guillan-Barre Syndrome. Morris turned out 
to be correct and the Federal government has agreed to pay ’’reparations” to 
those who suffered from vaccine-related disorders. The Commissioner of the 
Food and Drug Administration, however, fired Morris for ’’insubordination.” 
Thus, even well-grounded bureaucratic oppositions are not always successful. 
Morris upheld the organization’s o ffic ia l functions, to protect health, and 
presented information that showed the organization’s policies were detrimen­
tal to health. Rather than being rewarded for his efforts, he was punished.
Congressional subcommittee hearings seem to provide would-be whistle 
blowers with once-in-a-lifetime opportunities to gain a receptive audience for 
their revelations. In the early 1960s Senator Kefauver headed a committee 
investigating the drug industry. A medical director at E.R. Squibb and Sons, 
Dr. A. Dale Console, testified on the ways in which drug sales were increased 
by the exploitation of physicians. (72) Although Dr. Console was apparently 
committed to a bureaucratic opposition on moral grounds, he gave a 
psychological explanation for his action: ” 1 had compromised to the point 
where my back was against a wall and I had to choose between resigning 
myself to total capitulation or resigning.... ” (73) ’’The invitation to testify 
before the Kefauver Committee offered him the platform he sought.” (74)
Similarly, an employee of the Internal Revenue Service from 1948 to 1971 
came forward (the religious metaphor is appropriate) at the Senate 
subcommittee hearings on the Internal Revenue Service conducted by Senator 
Montoya. Stanley Prescott described policies which resulted in the 
’’abusive treatment of the taxpayer” and the ’’violation of taxpayers' rights.” 
(75) Prescott's grounds for opposition were the immorality and the ineffec­
tiveness of policy. He stated that "the overseer at each level must find 
among his subordinates at least one 'weak' employee and 'help' him into 
unemployment or a nervous breakdown." (76)
With seizures and the threat of seizures hanging over taxpayers' heads,
the fear to which IRS employees are subjected is thus passed on to the
taxpayer, which is the whole intention of the program anyway. (77)
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The Senate Watergate Committee allowed numerous White House 
bureaucrats to blow the whistle. It is doubtful that Alexander Butterfield, a 
major aide of John Haldeman, would have informed on his bosses had he not 
been called upon to testify. It was Butterfield who revealed the existence of 
ixon s taping system, which made the President's "stonewalling" technique 
ineffective. He did not regret giving the testimony, however. 'I was a loyal 
troop, he explains. 'But my mother also raised me to be an honest troop, and 
told the truth. No other way."' (78) It is difficult to determine whether 
Watergate was an externally provoked opposition or a true bureaucratic 
opposition as the phenomenon is defined here. The identity o f Deep Throat 
would make it easier to classify the affair.
Whether or not congressional hearings are held to advance political 
careers, as a journalist with conservative leanings claims, (79) they do seem 
to encourage whistle blowers. In 1975 Nicholas von Hoffman remarked that 
these days you can't walk in a door in the Capitol without coming upon 
s???e. ^ recounting to a raised row o f legislators some awful business of 
o ffic ia l betrayal and ignominy. The tales they tell in these hearing rooms of 
government murders, burglaries, and pornographic pictures are incontestably 
icky.... \o0/
One such tale-teller was ex-Marine Hardy. As a paid informant for the 
i ! i  !r\ WaS n° t as embedded in the Bureau's hierarchy as an agent. He 
told Otis Pike's congressional committee on intelligence how the FBI paid him
o ead a raid on a draft board. (81) Although Hardy considered the policies 
that he had executed to be immoral, it is not likely that he would have 
initiated a bureaucratic opposition had the Pike hearings not occurred. They 
provided a whistle-blowing forum where he could give the detailed infor­
mation about the abuses without much fear of retaliation and could also clear 
his troubled conscience: "I only hope and pray that by coming here today, I 
can right some of the wrong that was committed." (82) It seems that the 
spate o f congressional hearings that started with the Watergate investigations 
has abated. Perhaps future election years will generate their reemergence, 
encouraging both political careers among members of Congress and the 
testimony of whistle blowers.
Another arm of government, the courts, can be used by those without 
authority to correct abuses in their places of employment. The ground of the 
bureaucratic opposition must be some organizational rule violation or policy 
that breaks a public law. Unless the information that one has would interest 
a district attorney or federal prosecutor, who would then base a case on it, 
going to court is a costly and time-consuming undertaking.
The successful use of a public prosecutor is illustrated by a bureaucratic 
opposition mounted by a lone employee of the Good Humor Corporation, the 
Pr°ducer* The identity o f the informer is not known, but he or she 
told the Brooklyn District Attorney's o ffice  that the ice cream was knowingly 
marketed with an illegally high bacteria count. Furthermore, the company 
was keeping " ... two sets of quality control records: a false one to- show 
state inspectors and an elaborately coded secret set containing true bacteria 
counts for the company’s own use. The secret books showed coliform counts 
on some batches of ice cream 200 times as high as the law allows." (83) The 
District Attorney investigated and subpoenaed company records. Although
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several thousand documents had been destroyed, enough evidence remained 
for the oppositionist to sit back as a grand jury handed up a 244-count 
indictment. (84) The press-dubbed "Ice-cream gate" was a successful 
bureaucratic opposition in which the legal system acted on information and 
allowed the employee to maintain anonymity.
The costliness of informing in court by suing the organization results from 
the need to have professional help and adequate evidence. There are a 
number of possible sources of assistance, such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union, that have helped bureaucratic oppositionists use the courts to check 
organizational abuses. Access to the courts, then, often requires access to 
interest groups that can provide resources. Also, there are governmental 
agencies that are empowered to press law suits. For example, the O ffice  of 
Civil Rights within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare can 
bring a case before an administrative court if there is evidence of 
discriminatory practices. But administrative courts, like the Federal 
judiciary, have the ability to construe rules more or less strictly. Thus, 
despite "watertight" evidence, there is no guarantee of success.
Use of the courts is made especially difficult for those who cannot obtain 
legal assistance. Mike LaVelle, a columnist who champions blue-collar 
interests, reports:
I have run into a few cases where a union member has asked me if I 
knew of a good labor lawyer and then added, "I can't seem to find one.
As soon as they find out that my beef is against a union they won't 
have anything to do with me."(85)
A further difficulty for those wanting to inform to the courts or to their 
union is that "the by-laws of some unions allow them to fine a member or 
expel him if a worker files any legal action against the union." (86)
Relative to informing against one's organization to the government, 
bringing charges to a private referee group is, in general, easier but less 
e ffec tive . Such groups vary widely in their areas of concern, modes of 
action, and sources of support. Among them are the Anti-Defamation 
League, Consumers Union, Underwriters Laboratories, Sierra Club, and 
Common Cause. Some are independent of the groups and organizations that 
they monitor (for example, the Consumers Union), while others are supported 
by these organizations (for example, the Better Business Bureau). Referee 
groups are distinguished here from lateral groups because the latter are 
formed by employees while the former are either created by the organi­
zations themselves or by some constituency.
Referee groups may sometimes take legal action against abuses where 
there are codes of good practice, as in the numerous "self-regulated" 
industries. For example, New York Stock Exchange members may "discipline 
member firms for defrauding customers or for failing to maintain adequate 
supplies of working capital." (87) However, most referee groups utilize the 
methods of persuasion, which may vary from rational arguments to threats of 
public exposure. They may also serve as conduits to access for oppositionists 
to more directly powerful agencies such as courts and legislative committees. 
When the National Institutes of Health took Dr. Morris' laboratory facilities
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away from him after he disagreed with their position on flu vaccines, he was 
helped to present his case to Congress by the public interest organization, 
Common Cause, and by Ralph Nader’s group. (88)
Other referee groups, such as the Consumers Union, act by directly 
exposing abuses to the public. Whether or not they have their own publishing 
ve icle, the press, which accepts their information as highly credible, will 
help the exposure. These referee groups appear to be e ffec tive  in aiding 
ureaucratic oppositions against the production of dangerous goods. Although 
it is possible to debate the potential danger of a product, it is far easier to 
reach consensus that people should not be physically harmed by their 
purchases and to "prove" that an item is unsafe, than to demonstrate such 
intangibles as dishonor, injustice, or even inefficiency.
Perhaps because of the actual or perceived difficulties in obtaining 
ettective action by informing to referee groups, governmental agencies, 
courts, or Congress, many bureaucratic oppositionists bring their information 
directly to the general public. Some take this route because the nature of the 
abuse is complex or not specifically covered by law, although it is judged to 
be an offense to public morality. There are other reasons for going public 
such as the oppositionist’s wish to remain anonymous or to damage the 
reputation of the organization.
Many oppositionists who inform to the public do so only after failures of 
other options. An example is Karen Silkwood's bureaucratic opposition 
against the plutonium plant in which she was employed. The Kerr-McGee 
^ a r r o n  River facility makes plutonium pellets for nuclear power plants. 
Ms. Silkwood was highly critical o f the plant's health and safety procedures. 
She had gone to her union, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, 
claiming definite instances of company sloppiness." (89) The OCAW had 
litt le  influence with management but helped Silkwood to present her case to 
the Atom ic Energy Commission. As a result of the Commission's inaction, 
she compiled careful documentation of safety lapses and contamination and 
was on her way to blow the whistle. She had her evidence in a brown manila 
t older and a notebook which friends had seen in her hands just before she le ft  
lor her appointment with a reporter from The New York Times. (90) She never 
met the reporter and was found dead in her wrecked car. there was good 
reason to believe that she had been murdered, particularly because the 
evidence she had with her was never found. (91)
The A EC finally did complete its investigations. It found that only a few 
.nu™erous allegations referred to possible violations of the 
Commissions standards, but admitted that many others "had substance or 
partial substance." (92) The AEC did not put an end to the dangerous 
situation, however, and wary environmental groups conclude that the AEC is 
an ineffective regulator because it "needed the fuel rods and thus had a clear 
interest in keeping Kerr-McGee's plant in operation." (93) Karen Silkwood 
never had the opportunity to give a statement to the press, but informing to 
the media was clearly a logical recourse for her after the failure o f her 
informing strategy.
Informing to the general public is somewhat different from going to 
various superiors within the organization, to a lateral group such as a union, 
or to some arm of government. When following the latter courses, those to
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whom one presents the information have the authority to act to eliminate the 
abuse or at least have the power to put pressure on those who do have such 
authority. The public is several steps removed from the ability to change the 
objectionable actions. Instrumentally, citizens can pressure politicians to 
take action through individual contacts, organized lobbies, or the expression 
of opinion, among other means. However, immediate remedies are usually 
ruled out by this informing strategy. Informing the general public is similar 
to bringing information to Congress which may become more widely known 
through press coverage, because the consequences may overflow the goals of 
the opposition. Sometimes bureaucratic oppositionists acknowledge the 
possible repercussions and use the informing strategy merely as a tactic 
within an overall strategy of direct action.
Taking one’s case to the public is more complicated than playing the town 
crier with prefacing shouts of ’’Hear ye, Hear ye!” Communication in a mass 
society is mediated by complex organizations. Thus, informing to the public- 
at-large requires the use of the news media, where the usual set of informing 
problems, such as gaining access and establishing credibility, are encountered. 
However, because newspapers and television newscasts are business enter­
prises, there are additional considerations. Frequently the media employ 
criteria that are not relevant to ’’the public interest,” such as what will boost 
profits or maintain business power in general. Even if the oppositionist's 
information is not suppressed, it may be reported in such a way as to raise 
doubts about the credibility of its source. Despite obstacles, however, many 
bureaucratic oppositions succeed in placing their facts before the public.
There are a few media outlets that are very cooperative in publishing the 
information of bureaucratic oppositionists. The magazine Washington 
Monthly and Jack Anderson's syndicated column have been used by many 
whistle blowers to present their cases. Both are modern-day exponents of the 
muckraking philosophy. Its notable representatives, Upton Sinclair, Ida 
Tarbell, and Lincoln Steffens, did their work prior to World War I. In 
newspapers and books muckrakers exposed unseemly, corrupt, and dangerous 
practices of politicians and corporations. Their work was characterized by an 
attitude of ”throw-the-rascals-outism.” (94) As professional journalists, the 
muckrakers were not employed by those who they exposed. In a sense, a 
person who blows the whistle is "the muckraker from within.” (95)
A bureaucratic opposition mounted by staff members against Senator 
Thomas Dodd used the columns of Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson to reach 
the public. Relying on the rest of the Senate to take action against the 
abuses which grounded their opposition would probably have been fruitless. 
There were two major and interconnected grounds for the opposition: Dodd 
had been syphoning o ff hundreds of thousands of dollars from campaign 
contributions for private use, and had accepted funds from those whose 
vested interests he supported on the Senate floor. The opposition consisted of 
Dodd's administrative assistant, James Boyd, and an o ffice  secretary, 
Marjorie Carpenter. Peters and Branch's description of the bureaucratic 
opposition indicates that Boyd, anguished by the corruption, had intended 
merely to "leave quietly and loyally.” (96) A 1964 election campaign report 
filed by Dodd for the State of Connecticut was so fradulent that the decision 
was made to expose the malfeasance, but only after the Senator had
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dishonored his assistant. Boyd recalled: ,fThe campaign diversion in 1964 was 
bad but it took Dodd’s malevolence to make his actions real - not abstract. I 
fe lt  small and like I was being toyed with for the first time since I was in the 
Marine Corps.” (97)
Actions that dishonor members of the opposition group are not unusual 
catalysts for the emergence of dissent. Several accounts similar to Boyd's 
can be found in the statements of other oppositionists. The rage fe lt  at 
insults is often sufficient to overcome the fears of the risks involved or, as in 
Boyd's case, the appeal of a good position. The reaction to dishonor, however, 
does not rule out a strong commitment to the grounds of the opposition. Boyd 
and Carpenter failed to take action, despite their initial decision, for six 
months. They have candidly revealed their thoughts during this period:
We kept wondering 'Who are we to take him on?' And there was always
a fear of looking naive - of summoning up a burst of moralism and then
having everyone laugh and say that's just the way things are done. (98)
But Boyd and Carpenter did finally act, giving their information to Jack 
Anderson "who encouraged them with his muckraker's fervent argument that 
the public had a right to know if there was evidence of foul deeds behind 
Dodd's senatorial pomp.” (99) Twenty-three columns were devoted to their 
information over a period of several months. Pressured by an informed 
public, the Senate voted to censure Dodd. However, support for the judgment 
that difficulties are involved in using the press is provided by the fact that 
the first two of the columns were suppressed by The Washington Post. Only 
edited versions of the others were printed after Drew Pearson exerted 
pressure. (100)
Informing to the press is probably easier since Woodward and Bernstein's 
capitalization of Watergate, with the aid of the indispensable Deep Throat. 
Investigative journalism has become the rage. Newsmen are willing to use 
"tips” from insiders to expose wrongdoing. Giving data to the press is often a 
way of getting political officials to take the complaints which are 
simultaneously revealed to them seriously. Such whistle blowing is frequently 
a costly escalation of informing and is often tried after initial failure with 
intraorganizational personnel. A typical illustration is the opposition 
mounted by two nurses at the Shiprock Indian Health Service Hospital, 
located on a Navajo reservation in New Mexico. (101) The nurses complained 
about filth and poor patient care, protesting for three months through the 
hospital's chain of command. They then sent a letter describing the 
conditions to President Ford, which was also published in a local newspaper. 
They were admonished and within a month were fired for "continued 
disruption of the work force and conduct unbecoming an Indian Health Service 
Employee." (102) The charge against them was, in essence, "washing dirty 
linen in public," a deed sure to displease any administrator.
Frank Serpico's opposition mirrors the nurse's plight, although it was far 
more protracted and dangerous. He had gone up the line of command within 
the New York C ity Police Department in an e ffort to combat the corrupt 
practices that abounded. He soon learned that accepting payoffs was not a 
rule violation committed by a random few, but was an unofficial policy,
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condoned by the highest echelons. He enlisted the aid of the Internal Security 
Division of the Department, but was soon disheartened by their inaction. He 
was unable to reach the Mayor, only getting as far as one of his aides. (103) 
Serpico's friend, David Durk, had earlier suggested going to the press:
Durk had a contact on The New York Times, and they would go to him 
and blow everything wide open. ... He reasoned, it was highly unlikely 
t i^at The Times would act simply on the say-so of two cops at their 
level, even though Durk was a detective. ... Serpico had another 
thought. Suppose a superior o fficer, a full inspector, a Paul Delise, 
accompanied him to The Times and confirmed what he had to say 
about corruption in the department and the system which allowed it to 
flourish? That, maybe, would make a difference. (104)
Serpico was aware that he had a problem of gaining credibility for his 
information with the press. A t first Delise refused to join the opposition, 
pleading: "I have a w ife and kids, and I just bought a house and there's a 
mortgage on it, and if I had to leave the department I don't know what other 
field I could go into. ..." (105) But Delise was finally persuaded to 
accompany Serpico and Durk to the Times contact. Serpico was correct that 
he needed an upper-level police o fficer to support his information. The Times 
journalist, Burnham, indicated that if "Delise hadn't been there, nothing would 
have happened." (106) Burnham's editor gave him the go ahead to write up a 
three-part series about police misconduct with Serpico's revelations inter­
spersed throughout. When the story finally appeared in print it set o ff a spate 
o f similar ones in the competing daily newspapers, and on radio and television 
news programs. The Mayor appointed an independent investigatory Commis­
sion headed by a lawyer, Whitman Knapp. Several suits were brought against 
the Commission by the police. One of them declared that the investigation 
might result in "great expense, harassment and inconvenience to police­
men." (107)
Serpico gave testimony in both the closed and open phases of the Knapp 
Commission's investigation. Unlike other witnesses who concentrated on the 
misdeeds of specific persons and who testified because they were granted 
immunity from prosecution, Serpico repeatedly stressed the policies of the 
department that allowed corruption to flourish and, more important, that did 
not permit honest police work. Despite the publicity generated by the 
investigation, only a few individuals were charged with offenses and they 
received minor administrative punishments. The overall policy which 
encouraged corrupt and ineffective activities remained intact.
Serpico's opposition shows some of the problems of the informing strategy 
in general. Because he did not have documentary evidence, as did the 
anonymous "Sore Throat" who opposed the American Medical Association, 
Serpico needed to supplement his word with the testimony of a higher 
o ffic ia l. Serpico also could not control the direction that the response to his 
revelations took. While he had realized painfully that the entire system was 
corrupt, the ensuing investigation concentrated on specific misdeeds.
A two-man bureaucratic opposition against Southwest Bell Telephone 
Company was able to get incriminating information into the newspapers
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despite the lack o f "hard evidence." The method used to gain credibility, 
however, was costly. One of the two oppositionists, T.O. Gravitt, a chief 
executive for the phone company in Texas, committed suicide and le ft  a 
detailed death note. In it he stated that the company was making political 
payoffs, doing illegal wiretapping, and using questionable bookkeeping 
methods to secure telephone rate increases. (108) According to Gravitt's 
widow and James Ashley, the other member o f the opposition who was 
general commercial manager for Southwest Bell's San Antonio o ffice, the 
suicide was a direct result of the company's attempt to squash the 
bureaucratic opposition. "Ashley claims that when Bell learned that he and 
Gravitt were planning to expose such practices, the company started 
investigating their private lives." (109) Gravitt's family and James Ashley 
won a slander suit against Southwestern Bell for three million dollars, but in 
light of the events, one may question whether the opposition was successful. 
(110)
Another way of disseminating information to the public about organi­
zational abuse is to publish a book. Like the other means of informing, this 
tactic has difficulties. The information has to be both substantial enough to 
fill at least part of a book and capable o f arousing public interest. If the 
latter requirement is not met the manuscript will probably not be published 
by a commercial press and, therefore, will not be distributed widely or 
reviewed in magazines and newspapers. "Vanity" publishing is not usually 
e ffec tive  for oppositionists, although it is possible for a privately published 
work to be picked up by a commercial press if it has some success. Other 
difficulties with publishing arise if the organization to be exposed has enough 
clout to discourage publishers from printing the damaging information. For 
example, several former agents have tried to publish books exposing the 
illegal, ineffective, and immoral policies of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Philip Agee had to have his book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, published 
in London by Penguin Books. A t least three American publishing houses, 
Straight Arrow, Simon and Schuster, and Warner Paperback had "been 
dissuaded from publishing it by the prospect of interminable legal hassling and 
expense." ( I l l )  Having to write the book after leaving the CIA was also 
difficu lt for Agee. He wrote it "abroad while bugged and hounded, he claims, 
by Company agents." (112) Once the book was in print there was a concerted 
e ffo rt to discredit the author. Agee was called a Communist agent, a traitor, 
a fool, a drunk, and a womanizer. (113)
Victor Marchetti, a former high-ranking CIA o ffic ia l who has co-authored 
a book exposing the Agency, has also been harrassed in his efforts to make 
evidence public. Portions of this book, CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 
written with John Marks, a former State Department o ffic ia l, had been 
censored prior to its publication. The CIA also obtained a permanent 
injunction, upheld by the Supreme Court, which prohibits Marchetti from 
"writing or saying anything, 'fact, fiction, or otherwise' about intelligence 
without prior approval of the Central Intelligence Agency." (114) The Agency 
even tried, though unsuccessfully, to block the publication of the book by 
attempting to discredit Marchetti's character with the publisher. Another 
exposure of the CIA, John Stockwell's book In Search of Enemies, was 
published secretly by W.W. Norton. Only six people within the company knew
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about the project. (115)
It is instructive to compare the bureaucratic oppositions of Victor 
Marchetti and Philip Agee. Both chose to publish books as the way to inform 
the public and they exposed similar types of organizational abuses. Both 
resigned from their positions before writing their respective books. Yet the 
goals of their oppositions differed. Marchetti, who had a high rank within the 
Agency, hoped that the information he provided would "win public support for 
a comprehensive review of the CIA in the congressional arena." (116) That is, 
Marchetti wished to curb the abuses, to reform the Agency. In contrast, 
Agee's case described the limit of bureaucratic oppositions: his goal being 
the abolition of the CIA. (117) Agee does not believe that significant reforms 
of the Agency are possible and, so, he aims at the bureaucratic analogy to 
revolution in the polity.
Publishing a book about organizational abuses has several drawbacks that 
tend to make it a less e ffective  tactic than other variations on the informing 
theme. The author often becomes a celebrity while the book's message is 
relegated to a secondary importance. Philip Agee complained: "people seem 
more interested in me and my potential trajectory than in what I can say 
about the Central Intelligence Agency." (118) Also, while the public expects 
the press to check on the facts and to serve as an authenticator of them, the 
same expectation does not apply to book publishers. Finally, blowing the 
whistle through publishing a book allows the oppositionist to gain financially 
and, therefore, casts doubt upon the veracity of the story.
The advantages of exposing abuses through a book incjude the whistle 
blower's control over the context in which the information is presented. He 
or she can both analyze the causes of the problems identified and offer 
proposals for change. The book can also serve as a public confession, since 
many bureaucratic oppositionists have participated in the abuses that they 
later expose or try to eliminate. For example, Victor Marchetti comments on 
Philip Agee's expose:
I am a Catholic. I understand what Phil was trying to do in his book. 
This was his sincere act of contrition and complete confession that 
every Catholic has to make before he dies so that he at least has a 
chance to go to heaven without a mortal sin on his soul. (119)
Most bureaucratic oppositions which inform to the general public are 
undertaken by people who are no longer employed in the target organization. 
Usually the whistleblowers resign, but if they do not, as soon as their 
"treasonous" act is known they are usually fired promptly. In those 
bureaucracies where the employees have some protection, such as those 
covered by civil service regulations, paychecks may still arrive, but the 
executive or professional informer will not be allowed to do any meaningful 
work. When informing outside of the organization is done by those who were 
never employed by it, the phenomenon is no longer classified as bureaucratic 
opposition, because different principles of action and consequences apply. 
The outside informer, for example, cannot be deemed a traitor. Also, 
external oppositions often do not have as much access to confidential 
information as do informers from within.
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Bureaucratic oppositions using an informing strategy focus all of their 
attention on the grounds of the opposition. Their method is to gain access to 
those who are empowered to act to remedy the abuse and to give them the 
facts." The underlying assumption of informing is: "If they only knew, boy, 
would they be angry!" When this assumption is contradicted, the opposition­
ists either believe that the person who heard them is an exception and 
proceed to look for a more appreciative ear, or they become disillusioned and 
give up, or they explore the possibilities for direct action.
While the informing strategy is often based on the belief that "the facts 
speak for themselves," direct action is governed by the premise that the 
facts" must be supported by power. If the facts do speak for themselves 
then the number and status of opposition-group members should make no 
difference for success. Ideally, an informing strategy works like the feed- 
back given by a thermostat to a furnace or a gyroscope to a steering 
mechanism, maintaining a steady state or an equilibrium. The information 
should be sufficient to correct the "error." O f course, the ideal o f the 
informing strategy is nearly never actualized. Because of the risks involved 
in undertaking a bureaucratic opposition, which are often most severe when 
one goes outside the organization, and the general lack of rewards if the 
opposition is successful, whistle blowers tend to be highly committed to the 
grounds they publicly announce. They are the most idealistic of opposition­
ists, whether in terms of the public goals of an institution, the laws of the 
state, or the precepts o f a moral system. They are also the firmest believers 
in the efficacy o f the "facts."
Informing strategy is most applicable to getting rid o f incumbents who 
have violated important organizational rules, especially if these rules are 
backed by wider cultural standards. Oppositions against organizational 
policies that run counter to strongly held norms of the larger society may be 
able to inform e ffec tive ly  to authorities outside of the organization or to the 
general public. Bureaucratic oppositions grounded in abuses other than these 
two are less likely to employ informing e ffec tive ly  and often find direct 
action to be more expedient.
DIRECT ACTION
The informing strategy presupposes that the recipients o f revelations 
about abuses share a formal if not a personal commitment to the norms or 
values grounding the opposition. Frequently, however, oppositionists find that 
such a consensus does not exist, or they are aware of dissensus from the 
outset. When the authorities do not subscribe, at least o ffic ia lly , to the 
public goals of the opposition, the dissenters must develop strategies that 
exert influence or power more directly. The use of persuasion to alter the 
value commitments of authorities is a possible option, but it does not seem to 
be an e ffec tive  one, because higher administrators are not known to be 
favorable to having their goals changed by subordinates. Debate over value 
commitments is an e ffec tive  mechanism of change only where political 
participation is legitimate, and it is not in bureaucracies. Thus, oppositionists
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who do not inform or who go beyond merely providing information usually 
attempt either to rectify the abusive situation by themselves or to get the 
authorities to make the desired changes despite their disagreement. In both 
of these cases the oppositionists usually must admit to themselves and to 
others that they are engaged in a political conflict.
The distinction between informing tactics and more direct exercises of 
power or influence is not sharp and in many concrete cases the two shade o ff 
into one another. Each type of strategy can be used subordinated to the 
other in a variety of circumstances, but in the most frequent cases a basic 
informing strategy is bolstered by other tactics. Some of these instances 
have already been described. For example, when the Bennington faculty 
informed on the college's president to the board of trustees "dozens of 
impassioned faculty galleys arrived at the offices and homes of the trustees." 
(120) The oppositionists assumed, correctly or not, that merely describing the 
grounds, citing the president's incompetence, and expressing their lack of 
confidence in her leadership ability was insufficient. To get the board to fire 
Parker they fe lt that they had to spell out the detrimental consequences of 
her behavior in a dramatic way. Although the faculty members believed that 
they shared a normative community with the trustees, they augmented their 
presentation of facts with arguments and with demonstrations of mass 
indignation. In this case the power of rhetorical persuasion was used within an 
informing strategy to convince authorities that the conditions grounding the 
opposition were seriously discrepant with common values.
Another dramatic way of highlighting the seriousness of an abuse is the 
recruitment of those with relatively high status in the organization to inform 
with the original opposition group. This tactic is analogous to the 
rhetorician's argument from authority. A group of nurses attempted to 
remove the director of nursing services from o ffice  on the grounds of 
incompetence by allying themselves "with a group of militant anti­
administration doctors ... " who presented their complaints to the hospital's 
board of directors. (121) This tactic was unsuccessful, but it was easily 
converted into a direct-action strategy that will be discussed below.
The presentation of arguments may be accompanied or replaced by various 
actions with persuasive aims. Administrators who do not share an 
oppositionist's judgment about a certain policy may reexamine their stand 
when the employee resigns in protest, particularly if it is done publicly and 
supplemented with whistle blowing. Resignation adds greatly to credibility, 
in the same way as did the suicide of the telephone executive cited above.
A bureaucratic opposition was mounted by three middle-management 
engineers who were employed in the nuclear energy division of General 
Electric Corporation. They did not believe that the radiation-containment 
safety devices in nuclear plants provided adequate protection. Their 
superiors did not seem to be concerned about the functioning of the system 
and denied ever having heard the engineers' complaints. (122) The engineers 
decided that because of the safety hazards nuclear reactors should not be 
produced. Thus, they opposed the goal of the division in which they were 
employed on moral grounds. The authority to which they appealed was the 
general public, since they assumed that the corporation was not interested in 
abolishing one of its major divisions. They called a press conference to
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announce their resignations, and to assert that the nuclear power plants now 
in operation in the United States ’’are plagued by design defects and operating 
problems to an extent that poses a major safety dilemma for the nation." 
(123)
Their action was directed towards changing the values of citizens who 
might pressure state or national governments to regulate nuclear plants out 
o f existence. The e ffec t of their resignation was assessed by one journalist, 
in a front-page story, in the following terms:
It was like a shot heard 'round the nuclear energy world, signalling
what could become a national reappraisal of the growing dependence
on nuclear power in the United States. (124)
A direct attempt to exploit the drama of a situation to change a practice 
WufS ^  .some legal secretaries in Chicago. They wanted to eliminate
the o ffice  policy that required them to prepare co ffee for their bosses. (125) 
One of the secretaries in the o ffice  protested this policy verbally and was 
promptly fired. The others then came to the o ffice  dressed in waitress' 
uniforms. (126) Their action is reminiscent of the tactics of the Yippies, who 
threw money onto the floor of the New York Stock Exchange where brokers 
ran over one another to retrieve the bills. Both events dramatized the values 
of the opposed practices for those involved in them. By holding up a mirror, 
distorted to be sure, it was hoped to shame the opponent into abandoning the 
practice. It is difficult to assess the efficacy of the secretarial opposition 
because the local news media publicized it. Had the secretaries intended to 
use a whistle-blowing tactic they could not have chosen better. Access to 
television newscasts is made easier when the visual element is emphasized 
and even more so when people look slightly ridiculous. The fired secretary 
was rehired and the policy was changed.
When the women's movement began denouncing the treatment of females 
as sex objects, but before anyone had thought to struggle against such 
dishonor by legal or administrative means, a secretary told me about a 
political tactic used in a bureaucratic opposition against a boss who made 
lewd remarks about her and her co-worker's bodies. He was particularly 
intrigued by breasts, but would observe and comment on other parts of the 
body as well. The two women began to feel more and more demeaned, but 
were sure that if they complained to him or to any other male they would be 
met with derision. A fter some months of frustration they hit upon a tactic 
which proved e ffec tive . Whenever they looked at their boss they stared 
directly and continuously at his crotch. He became flustered almost 
immediately but it took him some time to make the connection between their 
stares and his own behavior towards them. Nothing was said but he no longer 
closely observed or commented on their bodies. One suspects that his 
standard of appropriate behavior toward women was changed by the 
secretarial guerilla theater and not by a change in his appreciation of their 
anatomy.
Some bureaucratic oppositions use informing as a tactic to accomplish a 
hidden goal. Particularly when the aim is to remove a superior from o ffice , 
or to restrict his or her power, the dissenters may try to build a case by
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presenting evidence of infractions that do not really concern them. Here 
informing is neither idealistic nor naive, but instrumental and manipulative. 
The dissenters rationally choose the information that will be taken most 
seriously by the authorities, and select the most sympathetic and e ffective  
recipients; they exercise political savvy. This tactic is feasible in many 
oppositions. Subordinates, especially assistants, aides, and secretaries, are 
often privy to compromising information which they generally help to keep 
hidden because of their loyalty. Abuses which diminish this loyalty allow the 
use of confidential data. As in the case of dramatizing tactics, informing 
with ulterior motives requires some acting ability. One must pretend to some 
show of outrage over conditions that are not fe lt to be abusive.
Acting and dissembling are also required when informing itself is disguised 
under a cover of sociability. It may be e ffec tive  and diminish risks merely to 
chat with a superior’s boss on a person-to-person basis; thus, a member of the 
bureaucratic opposition group who has social access to an administrator is a 
great asset. Showing no sign that one is pleading a case, disparaging remarks, 
gossip, and insinuations can be dropped which put the abusive superior in a 
bad light. The more that one is aware of the particular values held by the 
administrator, the better one can tailor one’s ’’casual” conversation. The 
grounds to which the oppositionists are committed need never be mentioned. 
The aim here is to have the superior viewed less favorably, to redefine the 
situation as viewed by the higher administrator. If the tactic is e ffective , the 
targeted superior will no longer be given the benefit of the doubt and 
otherwise innocuous behavior may be judged to be grounds for dismissal.
The various means of dramatization and the devious uses of informing are 
embroideries of the basic informing strategy. There is a class of tactics, 
however, that rely upon verbal expression, but which border on or constitute 
direct action. As the courts have recognized, speech may incite or harm as 
well as provide information. In bureaucratic oppositions speech ordinarily 
becomes direct political action in the form of threats.
The power to threaten a superior with informing others about an abuse is 
available to all employees who dare to use it. The assumption is that while 
the superior does not object to the rule violation or disputed policy, at least 
not strongly enough to take remedial action, he or she acknowledges that 
higher authorities might be outraged if they were apprised of the situation. 
In most cases it is probably less risky actually to do the informing than to 
threaten to do so. The threat gives the superior time to cover tracks, to 
prepare a case against the oppositionists, or to try to silence them. Threats 
can evoke cooptation offers, counter threats, or even physical attacks. Karen 
Silkwood supposedly was murdered when it was found out that she was going 
to blow the whistle on her employers. (127)
A special variant of the tactic of threatening is the threat to resign. The 
assumption here, whether made explicitly or merely understood, is that the 
organization w ill be adversely affected by the oppositionist’s departure. The 
threat of resignation is meaningful when those issuing it are not readily 
replaceable, and it has long been viewed as a test of power in the polity. 
Authorities who give in to such threats are perceived as weakening their 
control, and according subordinates a veto power over decisions.
The bureaucratic opposition against an incompetent director of nursing
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services at a suburban hospital, which was mentioned above, escalated its 
attack to the tactic of threatening resignation after trying numerous means 
o f informing. The group recruited some doctors to give them more authority 
when they informed. The hospital administration finally acted and removed 
the director when the doctors issued an ultimatum indicating that they would 
leave en masse in two weeks if remedial action were not taken. (128) Doctors 
are not easily replaced and the resignations would have diminished the 
effectiveness of the hospital greatly.
In an even more successful case the staff (nurses, mental health and social 
service workers) at a psychiatric hospital opposed the authority structure of 
the organization on the grounds of ineffective policy. The doctors, who 
visited the hospital infrequently, had administrative control over the therapy 
program, and thus, over the staff. The opposition arguedthat the staff
... should be free from outside control so it could develop its own 
treatment philosophy and experiment with different approaches. It 
seemed rather obvious that the psychiatrists had become rigid in their 
approach. They were, in e ffec t, alienating themselves from the unit 
workers and from their patients while perpetuating their own roles 
without evaluating their efficiency. (129)
Presentation of their case to the administration did not meet with success, 
but when the staff threatened a mass resignation, which would have closed 
the hospital, the authorities reluctantly gave in and changed the struc­
ture. (130)
The threat of resignation, however, sometimes backfires. A number of 
college book travelers opposed their supervisor's unethical sales methods and 
threatened their mass resignation if the practices were not changed. The 
sales department made no response to their move. In e ffec t, their bluff had 
been called and, one by one, the salesmen resigned.
The use of threats as an opposition tactic is always risky because a threat 
is a direct attack on an adversary, an open acknowledgment of conflict. If the 
bluff is called and the threat is not carried out, credibility, power, and dignity 
tend to be lost altogether. The costs of threatening are, at one extreme, 
dismissal or actual physical harm, and, at the other, a breach of the trust that 
is necessary to conduct day-to-day business without uncertainty and tension. 
A t the very least, those who threaten show that they no longer uphold the 
myth of obedience to authority. In contrast, nonverbal political tactics allow 
the oppositionists to appear to be as loyal as ever - the opposition to a 
supervisor, for example, can be kept a secret and yet be e ffective .
Abusive supervisors are particularly appropriate targets for being secretly 
undermined. A telephone company employee, who was a member of a group 
that wished to oust a foreman who made disparaging remarks about his 
subordinates, indicates why and how such a tactic works:
The job of the foreman is to make sure that the workers are doing 
their specific task. But most often, the foreman never knows how the 
workers do their job. All telephone problems are discovered and solved 
through a computer. The foreman has only been trained about basic
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computer ’’know-how.” On the other hand, the workers know how to 
’foul up the works’ long enough for just a little  trouble. The foreman 
gets called ’on the carpet’ every time the computer ’’goes down” - stops 
for some unknown reason. Note that this is an e ffec tive  means of 
opposition because the foreman does not know enough about the 
computer to know if he has been deliberately set up or not. He just 
"looks bad.” (131)
The astute participant-observer assesses this tactic:
... the workers can oppose without getting reprimanded in any way. It 
has one drawback however; the workers cannot attend the meetings of 
the officials when the foreman is being called in. So the workers never 
know if they are having any success. (132)
In order to overcome their uncertainty and gain quick results, the opposition­
ists tried another strategy which resulted in reprisals. What they did not 
know was that before they had implemented their second strategy the 
administration had decided to transfer the foreman. The opposition had been 
successful in making him look incompetent, but its members learned about 
their effectiveness too late. They underestimated their power, the source of 
which was their technical expertise.
This tactic is also described by Robert Merton with regard to its use 
against political appointees or elected officials who are in charge of public 
bureaucracies: " if the bureaucrats believe that their status is not adequately 
recognized ... detailed information will be withheld from (the o ffic ia l), 
leading him to errors for which he is held responsible." (133) Here, too, job 
expertise is a source of power for the "lower participants." David Mechanic 
formally states the principle involved:
Other factors remaining constant, to the extent that a low-ranking 
participant has important expert knowledge not available to high- 
ranking participants, he is likely to have power over them. (134)
Making a superior appear to be incompetent need not rely on expertise. 
Sabotage may be effected by other means. For example, a secretary may 
insert a compromising sentence into a letter dictated by her boss, who usually 
signs his correspondence without reading it over. Possibilities for disruption 
proliferate once the decision to begin hostilities is made.
An alternative tactic to sabotage, which is also aimed primarily against 
superiors who are perceived to be abusive, is harassment. As was noted 
earlier, the harassment of employees is often a ground for opposition. 
Administrators who are blocked from dismissing disliked employees by union 
or civil service rules frequently attempt to make life  at the workplace 
difficult for them. A government report on whistle blowing notes:
Informal harassment is a common bureaucratic practice ... often used 
against whistle blowers because it is difficult to prove and quite often 
the employee has not done anything technically improper to justify 
formal action. (135)
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Oppositionists do not usually have the authority to create difficulties for 
their targets legitimately, but they may be able to exercise informal power.
In a small municipal agency a bureaucratic opposition used psychological 
warlare against an abusive supervisor. She was what may be termed a "power 
reak, ever, eaSer to display her control by committing injustices and 
ishonoring her subordinates. A fter the supervisor had dishonored the 
individual with the least tenure and the weakest personality in the o ffice, all 
ot the ^subordinates met to chart their opposition. They believed that the 
agencys director and his administrative assistant were not concerned with 
the o ffice  and, thus, that informing would be fruitless. They decided to use 
psychological pressure to try to get the supervisor to resign or at least to be 
less abusive. They isolated her; "Her attempts to engage in conversation 
were totally ignored." (136) Each morning the employees greeted one another 
wi exaggerated friendliness but did not even speak to the supervisor. 
Having no one else in the o ffice with whom to be sociable, the supervisor was 
e ectively ostracized. The tactic itself probably would have been sufficient 
o get results, but success was speeded when the administrative assistant 
noticed the situation and inquired about its cause. The staff told him about 
the problems and shortly afterwards the supervisor was reprimanded and 
certain functions were removed from her authority.
Ostracism is not the only means by which subordinates can drive their 
superiors to want to leave a position. Neurotic tendencies can be 
exacerbated and reinforced to the point at which the target of the opposition 
does become emotionally incapacitated. When the tactic is successful the 
superior either quits or is dismissed, but when it is not the oppositionist's 
situation is probably worse than it had been before.
Pushing an abusive superior over the brink has also been literally 
attempted and sometimes effected . There are many cases of murder or 
battery by disgruntled" employees against supervisors. Most often such 
incidents are based on perceived dishonor suffered by the subordinate and 
occur after a reprimand or a dismissal. Battery against the foreman has, in 
tact, been glorified in country music. Murderers, o f course, are not allowed 
to enjoy the new bureaucratic climate that they have created, unless they can 
escape detection. A seeming example o f the use of murder as a tactic in a 
bureaucratic opposition took place in a perfume factory in New Jersey A 
worker, Robert Mayer, brought suit in a federal court against the company, 
alleging safety violations. Three months after the suit was thrown out of 
court he walked into the factory "...and, without a word, shot to death the 
company president and two plant foremen..." (137) He then killed himself. In 
this respect murderers resemble the "alumni" whistle blowers who do not seek 
anonymity and who have no intention or hope of regaining employment in 
their former organization. Murder and whistle blowing are also similar 
because most cases mix grounded opposition with emotional intensity.
Forcing a superior to leave the organization through psychological or 
physical pressure is the only use of power in which bureaucratic oppositionists 
need not ultimately rely on those with authority to put the desired change 
into e ffec t. There is, however, another possible tactic against abusive 
superiors which might preserve the anonymity o f the oppositionists. Rather 
than try to make superiors appear to be incompetent, as did the telephone
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workers mentioned earlier, the oppositionists might attempt to goad and 
guide them into actually committing some abuse or violating a rule that is 
considered to be important by the authorities. Ideally such transgressions 
would be obvious to the higher levels of administration or the evidence of 
them strong enough to be presented anonymously. A variation on the same 
theme, if the situation was not ideal, would be to inform on the artificially 
induced abuse. In the use of this tactic the rule violation would not serve as 
the ground to which the oppositionists were committed; their power of 
cunning would be used to provoke and induce a grounded abuse. It is of 
interest that in none of the more than one hundred cases of bureaucratic 
oppositions of which I have accounts has this tactic been deployed. 
Omniscient narrators did not write the case descriptions and those who might 
use this kind of tactic may either be ashamed to own up to their deeds and/or 
be afraid that admission might overturn, even at a later date, the successful 
opposition.
The various tactics of harassment, psychological pressure, and deception 
are most e ffec tive  against abusive personnel, but have little  applicability in 
policy disputes. Policies cannot be changed directly without administrative 
action, nor can they be altered indirectly by tactics such as goading in which 
the authorities are not aware that there is an organized opposition. It is 
possible, however, for subordinates to use ’’the power of lower participants” to 
make it plain that the administration's projects will be obstructed.
Many if not most workers have the power that comes from their bending 
the rules to achieve greater efficiency. Thomas Scheff describes the 
power that hospital ward attendants have over physicians. (138) The paper 
work concerning medication is extensive and is the offic ia l responsibility of 
the doctor. The attendants assume some of this work, which allows them 
influence over decisions made about the patients. If the attendants opposed 
some policy they could refuse to fill out the numerous forms which are not 
their responsibility. The tacit threat of such action keeps the physicians from 
making policy changes that would displease the attendants.
One of the more popular kinds of direct action, the greve du zele ("work 
by rule"), consists of "slowing down the work flow and paralyzing the 
functioning of the organization just by observing, to the letter, all the 
required prescriptions ... ’’ (139) This tactic involves an open attack upon the 
effectiveness of the organization and requires the participation of a large 
percentage of the work force. It trades upon the paradox that rule 
infractions are instrumental to the efficient functioning of the organization.
(Although many organization theorists have stressed) ... the functional 
characteristics of rules within an organization, it should be clear that 
full compliance to all the rules at all times will probably be 
dysfunctional for the organization. Complete and apathetic com­
pliance may do everything but facilitate achievement of organizational 
goals. (140)
Work-by-rule is probably a popular tactic because it requires the 
oppositionists to obey the rules, not to break or circumvent them. Work 
slowdowns, which result from strict adherence to rules, are often psychologi­
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cally rewarding to the participants as well as minimal in their risks. Because 
the action impairs the functioning of the bureaucracy, participants and 
others, both inside and outside the organization, become aware of the 
importance of the work they have been doing.
A bureaucratic opposition in the suburban-area marketing department of a 
major telephone company was grounded in dispute over a policy change. A 
team of efficiency experts had been brought in and they proceeded to 
reevaluate jobs, install a new set of procedures, and increase the norms of 
expected output. One of those affected by the reorganization reported that
Employees became so caught up in paper work, detailed procedures and 
seemingly unnecessary reports, many of which were repetitious, that 
our department began to lose sight of its real purpose, which was the 
sales and servicing of our markets. (141)
The opposition seemed to be grounded not only in the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of the new policy, but in the judgment that the department 
had been dishonored, that departmental authority had been usurped by the 
consultants. The new procedures also resulted in a number of demotions, 
transfers, and forced retirements. The informant expressed the mood of the 
dissenters: "Our plea was to have the honor of having our own management 
team attempting to get rid of bunglers rather than these outsiders." (142)
Their collective action consisted of a work slow down in processing each 
order and a refusal to put in the overtime needed to clear up the situation. 
The results were that the number of installation orders dropped sharply and 
the installers complained. Customers, many of them large businesses, sent in 
a rash of complaints, some directly to the president’s o ffice. Not only did the 
oppositionists recognize the importance of their jobs, but the tactic was 
appropriate to the abuse, and therefore psychologically satisfying. They were 
aggrieved by the imposition of new rules without consultation - "The 
administration only seems interested in our functioning with mechanical 
e ffic iency." (143) Their work-by-rule tactic told the upper echelons, "Well, if 
you treat us as machines we will behave as machines. Machines will follow 
all directions explicitly, have no flexib ility or discretion, and will not put in 
any extra effort. We will show you how ineffective machines are!"
A similar opposition in a legal o ffice  used, among other tactics, a greve du 
zele  to oppose a minor personnel policy that was thought to be u n fa ir.----------
We decided to do everything by the rules. Time cards which a ffec t 
billing time were fully written out with no abbreviations. All long 
distance calls were refused unless accepted by an attorney. No 
Xeroxing was done without an appointment in the Xerox log. Nothing 
was notarized by secretaries until completely read. Nobody signed 
their bosses' names to documents no matter how urgent the necessity 
o f sending out the document became. In essence everything the o ffice 
manual required was done. But this really fouled up the system because 
o f the numerous informal rules which had developed were no longer 
being followed. (144)
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The sense of poetic justice associated with this tactic was obvious and 
satisfying to the opposition group members: "If the unfair policy was coming 
from the o ffice  manual then we will show you how stupid that manual is by 
obeying all of its rules to the letter."
The gratification fe lt by many of those who initiate a greve du zele is 
underlined by the fact that this technique is used as an end-ln-itself. 
Frequently slaves and others who feel that they cannot successfully make any 
changes in their conditions engage in continuous work slowdowns. Others call 
them "lazy" or "stupid" but they and their comrades know that they could 
work much more rapidly and with greater precision. "Backstage" they 
exaggeratedly mimic themselves to show that they know that they are 
purposely "presenting themselves" as having diminished capacity. Their 
gratification comes from "putting one over" on their masters and the poetic 
justice of "you treat me as less than human and I will behave accordingly."
Work stoppages are similar to greve du zele because they also require 
widespread support. Both tactics presuppose that the administration values 
effectiveness and efficiency enough to make concessions if these goals are 
threatened. The power exhibited in a work stoppage is the least specialized 
resource of the "lower participant." Mechanic states, "To the extent that a 
person is dependent on another,'he is potentially subject to the other person's 
power." (145) The strike, then, depends for its e fficacy upon the difficulty of 
replacing the dissidents. Those with highly specialized skills have greater 
leverage than those without them who also often have clauses banning wildcat 
strikes in their employment contracts.
The strike which is initiated and authorized by a union is not a 
bureaucratic opposition as defined in this study because it is a type of inter- 
organizational conflict rather than a movement for change from below. The 
wildcat strike, however, since it is not sanctioned by union authority and may 
even be a rebellion against it, falls squarely within the bounds of the present 
discussion. Unionized workers are knowledgable about strikes in general, so it 
does not take much creativity to suggest a wildcat. The solidarity nurtured 
for strikes called by the union also serves wildcatters. The tactic requires a 
strong sense of camaraderie that exceeds any loyalty to the union or, of 
course, to the employer.
Coal miners are well known for the use of wildcat tactics; their bloody 
labor history and the dangerous conditions of their everyday work have helped 
to establish very strong bonds among co-workers. Many Appalachian locals of 
the United Mine Workers union engaged in unauthorized work stoppages 
during the summer of 1977. The workers were protesting cutbacks in miners’ 
health benefits. On June 20, 1977, the miners received a letter stating that 
they would each have to pay 40 per cent of medical costs up to $500. Until 
then they had enjoyed free medical care, the legacy of John L. Lewis' 
negotiations. "The next day, scarcely a ton of coal was mined in Eastern 
Kentucky." (146) The change in policy came about because of the depletion of 
the medical funds contributed by the owners on the basis of days worked and 
tonnage mined. The contributions had dropped in part because of previous 
wildcat strikes.
The national union election had been held less than a week before the 
change in medical policy was announced and, despite denials of any
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foreknowledge, re-elected United Mine Workers President Arnold Miller was 
suspected of complicity by the rank-and-file. The wildcat strike probably 
hurt him more than it a ffected the mine owners:
The longer it lasts, the less leverage Miller will have in national
contract talks. Moreover, his authority in the union is rapidly
eroding... (147)
The workers, who wished to have their medical benefits restored immediate­
ly, were not satisfied with Miller’s explanations that they would have to wait 
for national contract negotiations to open. A fter the workers refused to go 
back to work, the union hierarchy dispatched ’’armed organizers from 
Pennsylvania to do battle with unruly picketers.” The wildcatters broadened 
their opposition and mounted a recall movement against Miller. The situation 
was not resolved before the national contract was negotiated, as was 
evidenced by the great coal strike of 1978 which grew directly out of this 
bureaucratic opposition.
Wildcat strikes are direct challenges to the authority of the union 
hierarchy and they are rarely undertaken when the union leadership can 
marshal e ffec tive  violence to enforce its control. When single members or 
small groups oppose a union they cannot strike, but may resign. If they do so 
they are often vulnerable to reprisals if they attempt to keep working in the 
same line. For example, an electrical worker attempted to oppose corruption 
in the Communications Workers of America. When he realized that the 
abuses could not be cleaned up by his efforts he resigned, not in protest, but 
because he did not want to support a corrupt union. He was harassed, beaten, 
and fired. (148)
Work slowdowns and stoppages are highly visible protests that sharply 
define a conflict situation. They are opposition tactics that are aimed at 
changing administrative policy and, more rarely, personnel by diminishing 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency. It is often possible for workers 
to oppose a policy without bearing the costs of open confrontation by 
circumventing the rules or ignoring them. Disobedience itself is not 
necessarily a tactic of bureaucratic opposition. To qualify it must be 
interpreted as insubordination both by the workers and by the authorities. 
Executive orders may not be carried out merely because of misunderstanding 
or inability to comply rather than because of defiance. (149) Robert Presthus 
observes that ” In organizations, people rarely withhold consent. Rather, they 
evade, procrastinate, ’misunderstand,’ ’fo rget’ ... " (150) Such actions are not 
bureaucratic oppositions because there is no attempt to change the 
organizational policy.
Self-conscious and conspicuous disobedience of an organizational rule is an 
oppositional tactic which directly challenges the principle o f command. 
Unmistakable defiance not only may cause inefficiency but also dishonors the 
authorities. (151) Many administrators tend to believe with Chester I. 
Barnard that
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... the efficiency of an organization is affected by the degree to which 
individuals assent to orders, denying the authority of an organization 
communication is a threat to the interests of all individuals who derive 
a net advantage from their connection with the organization ... (152)
Frequently, open disobedience is succeeded by other tactics because 
reprisals are taken against some of the participants. These reprisals may be 
sw iftly enacted because authorities usually have the legal or administrative 
right to retaliate against rule violations without interference by unions or civil 
service commissions. Thus, broad participation is an important factor for the 
success of defiance. Reprisals are not easily directed against more than a 
very small percentage of the work force without damaging efficiency.
The host of tactics open to bureaucratic oppositionists, whether within an 
informing strategy or direct action, does not assure success. There is no way 
of estimating what percentage of oppositions achieves their goals of 
eliminating an abusive administrator or changing a policy. Some movements 
are defeated swiftly, others may escalate from less costly tactics to more 
risky ones. Combining two or more tactics may be e ffec tive  when done either 
simultaneously or in sequence. Some oppositions do not fu lfill their goals but 
continue to fight nevertheless. A few try to become permanent by formally 
organizing.
PROD is a group of Teamsters Union members who are opposed to the 
corruption of the union hierarchy. The group has existed for a number of 
years and has a research director and a newspaper to enable it to inform on 
the leadership. (152) Engaging in other tactics such as court suits and 
informing to the government, PROD is a multifaceted and resourceful 
opposition group. It can o ffer some protection against executive retaliation 
and has finances and manpower that dwarf oppositions within other 
bureaucracies. Such institutionalized dissent as PROD is the limit of 
bureaucratic opposition, because it borders on the creation of a new lateral 
organization with a specialized staff and hierarchy of its own. As Max Weber 
noted, formal organization means routine. The essence of bureaucratic 
opposition is to disrupt routine, which is why its tactics are so diverse and 
the probabilities of their success so difficult to determine.
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Consequences and Policy
MTut, tut, child," said the Duchess. "Everything's got a moral if 
only you can find it."
Lewis Carroll, A lice in Wonderland
Bureaucratic oppositions are political phenomena that appear within social 
entities which are not supposed to be political systems. According to the 
administrative myth, the officials of a bureaucracy are primarily committed 
to the efficient and e ffec tive  achievement of their public mission. They are 
responsible, through a board of directors, a board of trustees, or an elected 
o ffic ia l, to one or more broader constituencies. Their ultimate goals are 
provided for them by others, and their task is to make sure that these goals 
are fulfilled by developing specific policies and securing adequate implemen­
tation of them. If there are any obstacles to e ffec tive  goal attainment, the 
administrators are supposed to be aware of them and to correct them. In 
terms of the administrative myth there should be no grounds for conflict 
within a bureaucracy, because employees are aware that they have no formal 
right to dispute the organization's public aims and administrators are 
motivated to achieve those aims efficien tly and according to the rules. The 
ubiquity of bureaucratic oppositions shows that organizations are not self­
corrective and, therefore, are not nonpolitical. They are, instead, seedbeds 
of conflict in which overt struggle is often muted by repression, just as it is in 
the authoritarian state, which also claims to have dispensed with politics.
The grounds for oppositions show that in contemporary organizations some 
employees do dispute the policies that specify general goals, though not 
usually the goals themselves, and that administrators often are not 
committed to the offic ia l aims of the organization, are not dedicated to 
effic ien t performance, and are not motivated to rectify  even abuse that 
results from breach of the organization's own rules. For whatever motives an 
opposition may be initiated, it is usually possible to find abundant grounds for 
it and, perhaps, to induce such grounds. The conditions for political activity,
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then, are present within the everyday life  of bureaucracies, though they may 
be concealed by widespread belief in the administrative myth and, more 
importantly, by fear of hierarchical power and habits of obedience that may 
originate in belief and fear. If the barriers to opposition are overcome, the 
administrative myth is dispelled, at least temporarily. Even the most 
innocent informer acknowledges, at least implicitly, that some abuses have 
escaped the attention of the authorities, that supervision is not all that it 
should be. In the ideal bureaucracy, "feedback" in the form of suggestions, 
praise, and reports of work output, not demands, is the only legitimate 
communication from the lower to the higher levels. Oppositions make 
demands, even if they are attenuated as tacit expectations that the 
authorities will act on information presented to them.
OPPOSITION AND AUTHORITY
Once a political process has been unleashed in a bureaucracy the first 
concerns of the authorities are to contain it within the organization, reassert 
the chain of command, and refurbish the administrative myth. They may also 
attempt to correct the abuses, but they will try to do so without admitting 
that there are abuses. Thus, they are not likely to reward oppositionists and 
tend to punish them even if they believe that the opposition was warranted. 
The authorities will attempt to depoliticize the situation as quickly as 
possible by suppressing conflict. They may do so through taking punitive 
measures, through making concessions, or through a combination of the two. 
Usually there will be some use of power and the main consequence of 
opposition will be reassertion of the hierarchy. Conditions, however, will not 
return to the status quo ante, because the political nature of the organization 
will have been revealed. A ll parties to the conflict will learn what a General 
Motors executive found out:
What is really involved is politics, the conscious sharing of control and 
power. History does not o ffer many examples of oligarchies that have 
abdicated with grace and good will. (1)
Of course, if the hierarchy fails to reassert itself e ffective ly , the organi­
zation will have become politicized.
The "bureaucratic genius for retaliation" (2) is at its most creative in 
devising reprisals against those who mount oppositions. Among reprisals, 
personal attacks can be distinguished from job and career related measures. 
Aggression against persons includes various forms of physical attack and 
mental harassment, for which no authority is required. Vindictive admini­
strators, who are anxious to maintain their control, often resemble school­
yard bullies or sadistic prison guards. Particularly, as in unions, where 
o fficia ls do not have authority over a dissident’s working conditions, personal 
reprisals are likely to be used frequently.
For example, when several electrical workers tried and failed to rectify 
corruption in a local union, they "resigned from the union - determined not to
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finance an organization whose leaders refused to account for its funds.... 
They were pelted with bolts and screws, punched, tripped, and burned with 
cigarettes. Only a few friends of the three refused to take part in the 
harassment." (3) The whistle blower, who attempts to go outside of the 
organization to expose abuses, is particularly vulnerable to attack. Karen 
Ann Silkwood may have been murdered to keep her from presenting 
incriminating documents about the Kerr-McGee Corporation to the press. (4) 
Co-workers who interact with oppositionists are viewed as disloyal and are 
subject to "guilt by association." Thus, there is a tendency to ostracize 
dissenters. "The Amish know exactly what they are doing when they ’shun' a 
brother; so do the Russians when they make a comrade a 'nonperson’." (5) 
A fter blowing the whistle on the Air Force's cover-up of cost overruns Ernie 
Fitzgerald returned to his o ffice  and found "the beginnings of a small pile of 
call messages on his secretary's desk - each one a cancelled invitation to a 
meeting, party, or dinner." (6)
Job and career related reprisals are more common measures against 
oppositionists than physical and psychological attacks, because they allow 
officia ls to use the organization's powers against isolated individuals or small 
groups. Vindictive administrators need not commit themselves to a personal 
conflict, but need only manipulate the rules and exercise their authority to 
make the oppositionist's work life  difficult or impossible. Attacks upon one's 
career can be as damaging as physical or psychological assaults because work 
provides the means to subsistence and leisure and, for many people, a purpose 
for existence.
Dismissal is, of course, the most extreme job-related sanction and is a 
measure frequently taken against dissidents. A psychiatric nurse who was 
quoted in a news article as criticizing the quality of patient care and the 
behavior of the medical staff at the Philadelphia hospital where she worked 
was fired. (7) Also fired was a policeman who appeared on a television news 
program and told about other police o fficers who had taken for their own use 
recovered stolen property obtained in their regular course of duty. (8) A sales 
executive at U.S. Steel blew the whistle on defective pipes and was 
discharged. Ralph Nader and his associates analyzed this reprisal:
The reason given: insubordination. Apparently, even though he may 
have saved the company substantial costs had the pipe been prema­
turely marketed and saved users of the pipe from physical and 
financial injury, he had ignored the rules of the game and breached the 
etiquette of hierarchical management. (9)
Yet another example of retaliation by firing concerns a civilian doctor 
working for the United States Army who blew the whistle. He charged that 
there was "widespread negligence in military medical exams." The Army 
expected him to handle 25 complete physicals each day, while he claimed that 
only ten could be performed adequately. He was fired on the grounds of 
inefficiency. (10)
In addition to being dismissed, oppositionists may also be denied letters of 
recommendation or be blacklisted. In essence, they may be "exiled" from the 
profession, craft, or career to which they have devoted much of their lives, 
and, therefore, may suffer many of the same problems, frustrations, and
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bitterness as political exiles. Less severe measures of reprisal which also 
damage the individual materially and socially are demotions and, if there is a 
rating system, demerits. Such formal reprisals are used when the authorities 
believe that they can act with impunity, free from the scrutiny o f unions, 
civil service commissions, or other groups to which they might be answerable.
When it is not prudent for administrators to remove a dissident from a 
position, either by demotion or dismissal, their authority over the workplace 
can be used to make the conditions of employment difficult or intolerable for 
the targeted individual. Such measures cannot be grounds for court cases or 
administrative actions because they are within the discretion of officials, and 
are usually not logged on the employee's permanent record. Interference with 
a dissenter's work is a common bureaucratic practice, and is particularly 
prevalent in governmental agencies which are circumscribed by civil service 
regulations. It can be used by immediate supervisors on their own initiative 
or as part o f an overall plan involving top agency officials. A congressional 
report referring specifically to whistle blowers employed by the federal 
government states: "Informal harassment can interfere with an employee’s 
ability to do his work and result in disillusionment, resignation, or grounds for 
formal removal." (11)
The aim of interference with an individual’s work can be to force the 
employee to resign, to set an example for other subordinates, or simply to get 
even with the dissenter. The forms taken by such retaliation are myriad and 
can be especially painful to the recipients when they are tailor-made 
tortures, as were those described by George Orwell in 1984. Many 
bureaucratic oppositionists initiate dissent just because they are dedicated to 
high standards of job performance. Reprisals that prevent them from doing 
their work well are severe punishments. For example, a high-level meat 
grader for the Food and Drug Administration made the "mistake" of helping 
to force the resignations of 70 percent o f the Chicago meat graders by 
working with the FBI to prove their corruption. Since his involvement he has 
been assigned a steady flow o f assistant supervisors. "By the time he finishes 
training one to be of any real assistance, transfer orders come in and the 
process starts again." (12) J.A. Morris' bureaucratic opposition against the 
National Institutes of Health has been described previously. He was opposed 
to the agency's policy of promoting flu vaccines because his own research led 
him to conclude that such programs were ineffective and potentially harmful. 
The hierarchy's reprisal was to prevent him from doing any research. The 
authorities destroyed thousands of his experimental animals, forced him from 
his laboratory into a small room, and crated away his research materials. (13) 
When the targeted employee is not a dedicated and committed worker 
there are other reprisals that can be taken by the administration. Among 
employees in law enforcement agencies and school systems the measure most 
feared is transfer to an undesirable area where, for example, the likelihood of 
physical attack is high. The power of corporations to make punitive transfers 
is discussed by Anthony Jay. Employees "can be told to go and live in another 
part of the country, or another part of the world, or to desert their wives and 
children for months or years ...." (14) The authorities also have discretion 
over perquisites, which are not only valued for their intrinsic worth, but for 
the status-honor that they confer. Corner o ffices, a private secretary instead
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of the typing pool, a convenient parking space, travel, and flexible schedules 
are some of the privileges of certain jobs that give satisfaction and that may 
be revoked.
More general measures of reprisal involve the denial of possibilities for 
promotion and salary increases. Advancement on the organizational ladder is 
largely a function of loyalty. Critical analysts of bureaucracy claim that 
"individual workers gain promotion only by manifesting managerially-defined 
norms of behavior and commitment and by accepting, without protest or 
grumbling, authoritative commands from above." (15) The individual's 
performance is often difficult to evaluate, so promotion is frequently granted 
on the basis of loyalty to superiors and social conformity. Robert Presthus 
concurs:
For various reasons, including the desire to preserve internal unity and 
discipline, LO YALTY seems to have become the main basis for 
bureaucratic succession. (16)
Presthus interprets bureaucracies "as miniature social systems that meet 
many of the most basic needs of their members and expect in return loyalty 
and conformity." (17) Thus, punishing bureaucratic oppositionists by failing to 
promote them, despite their competence, is a "natural" reprisal.
The retaliatory measures against oppositionists may be more or less 
severe. Assuming that the authorities are instrumentally rational, one would 
expect in return the strength of reprisals to be commensurate with or at least 
relative to the real or potential damage done by the opposition to the 
administration. Bureaucratic oppositions which are grounded in policy abuses 
rather than in rule violations, which have goals of policy change rather than 
of personnel change, and which utilize tactics that reveal the opposition to 
outside agencies rather than keep it within the organization are more 
dangerous to the hierarchy of authority and tend to call forth more severe 
retaliation. Similarly, open political tactics threaten the chain of command 
more than informing and, thus, will tend to be more severely suppressed.
Organizational reprisals against bureaucratic oppositionists may serve 
purposes other than retribution and deterrence. Administrative measures 
may be counter attacks to repulse the opposition's assault, to prevent the 
erosion o f authority, and to stave o ff the changes in policy or personnel that 
are the aims of the opposition. When the authorities attempt to damage the 
reputations o f dissenters they not only harm the individuals but diminish their 
political effectiveness. Such techniques of character assassination are 
spelled out in a manuscript known as the "Malek Manual," which was written 
for Nixon appointees with the intention of helping them rule the federal 
agencies. The measures advised in the Malek Manual are "designed to focus 
attention on the employee and not his or her allegations." (18) The strategy is 
similar to that used against rebels in the polity. "The rebel is depicted in 
negative terms by society, labeled 'irrational,1 'degenerate,' or at least
'irresponsible.'" (19)
Destroying the reputations of dissidents robs them of credibility, while 
transferring them may deprive them of access to the evidence needed to 
prove the existence of an abuse. The Malek Manual laments the difficulty of
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firing federal bureaucrats - "Political disloyalty and insimpatico relationships 
with the Administration, unfortunately, are not grounds for the removal or 
suspension o f an employee." (20) Therefore, a number of suggestions are 
made for neutralizing the employee, such as the "special assignment 
technique (the traveling salesman)," "the layering technique," and the 
"shifting responsibilities and isolation techniques." The Manual condones 
covert threats to fire, transfer, or demote employees, which may cause 
oppositionists to abandon their project. (21)
Retaliation by the administration is the organizational counterpart of 
punitive sanctions in society at large. Reprisals are social control 
mechanisms used to keep people in line when more pervasive inducements and 
penalties, such as monetary reward, career advancement, social approval, and 
guilt fail to elicit obedience. They are political tactics just as are the 
maneuvers of the dissidents. A comparison of opposition tactics with 
administrative reprisals shows just how many more resources are at the 
disposal of the authorities than are available to their subordinates.
Successful retaliation by the administration against a bureaucratic 
opposition reasserts the organization’s chain of command and is a signal to 
dissenters that future activities will be costly and likely to fail. In many 
cases, then, the consequences of opposition include a lower probability that 
open conflict will break out again. There are many reasons why opposition 
may not be self perpetuating. Most important, unless the authorities are 
irrational in their use of power, they will have learned how to prevent new 
troubles by being alert to their causes. Perhaps they will rectify  the abuse, 
but they may also learn how to cover it up better or devise new work rules 
that monitor employees more closely, deprive them o f access to information, 
or punish dissent more severely. In some cases the budget of a rebellious 
department may be cut or certain of its perquisites revoked, putting the 
members on notice that they are not indispensable and that they no longer 
have high status-honor. The ringleaders o f the opposition may be fired, 
hounded out of the organization, or transferred, removing the potential 
initiators o f future dissent and destroying the solidarity of the struggle group. 
Exemplary punishments may be meted out, showing employees what they can 
expect if they disobey, or certain oppositionists may be coopted, weakening 
the morale of the remaining members.
. Cooptation is a popular tactic for suppressing future conflict because it 
allows the organization to keep an individual with leadership skills and also 
destroys the mutual trust among dissenters necessary to maintain an 
opposition.
There are many ways to coopt incumbents who emerge with views 
inconsistent with existing ones.... conflict may be resolved by 
establishing a small program of the type proposed.... Over time, the 
proposal backers may find that the ideas are less workable than they 
originally thought and the unit may simply be disbanded. Thus, 
cooptation is less dramatic than...overt dismissal, but may well have 
the same e ffec t of resolving the strain without preciptating any type 
o f structural change. (22)
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In addition to any measures directly taken by the authorities, the very 
process of opposition often has a chilling e ffec t on future political activity. 
The costs of opposition in time, peace of mind, congeniality, ability to do 
e ffec tive  work, and, perhaps, even money and health only become apparent 
after the struggle has been initiated. Having suffered such costs, former 
oppositionists may be reluctant ever to challenge organizational authority 
again. The will to resist may be replaced by bitterness (especially if one's 
friends have been fired or punished), cynicism, apathy, or expediency ("If you 
can't beat 'em, join 'em!"). New employees who might initiate action will 
enter a demoralized social context, and will be unable to inspire the zeal to 
resist authority.
The very social relations among oppositionists may further dampen the 
w ill to resist future abuses or to continue resisting abuses that have not been 
corrected. Particularly in protracted oppositions, the members of the group 
w ill differentiate themselves by their willingness to take risks, to support 
their comrades emotionally, and to spend time devising tactics and 
politicking. Jealousies and rivalries may build up based on differential 
contributions to the common effort. Some members may give in to the 
authorities and be branded as traitors, while others may escalate the conflict 
and be branded as hotheads. People will also reveal the weaknesses in their 
characters under stress and may be humiliated in front of their colleagues. 
By the time some protracted oppositions are over, their members will have 
such animosity and distrust towards one another that future collaboration will 
be ruled out. Opposition may sometimes be inspiring but it is rarely pleasant. 
Even when struggle is successful group solidarity may be destroyed:
A group's complete victory over its enemies is thus not always 
fortunate in the sociological sense. Victory lowers the energy which 
guarantees the unity of the group; and the dissolving forces, which are 
always at work, gain hold. (23)
When the authorities are able to suppress an opposition thoroughly, the 
chain o f command will be vindicated but the performance of the organization 
may suffer. Successful reprisals demonstrate the brute power of the 
administration to overcome dissent, but they do not enhance feelings of 
obligation and loyalty to the organization. An opposition may fail and may 
even make future struggles less likely to occur, but organizational functioning 
may become less efficien t. Obedience to organizational rules on the basis of 
fear rather than on the grounds of legitimacy has several interrelated results. 
First, employees will respect only the letter, not the spirit, of the rules. The 
consequence is similar to a greve du zele action. In most bureaucracies the 
rules must be supplemented by common sense and used as flexible guidelines 
rather than cookbook-style instructions. Over-rigid adherence to them 
generally impairs efficiency. The informal practices which normally emerge 
to shore up or complement offic ia l orders are either purposefully neglected 
out o f fear o f reprisals or spite, or are not even considered. Development of 
informal procedures requires both creativity and extra energy, both of which 
are inhibited by fear. Presthus reflects on the effects  of the anxiety to 
please superiors that is caused by fear:
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Since the elite is remote and its will cannot always be definitely 
known, the individual attempts to anticipate its expectations. As a 
result such expectations may seem more compelling than they are 
meant to be. The individual is not inclined in any case to 
underestimate them for fear of impairing his career chances. In this 
way organizational claims may be expanded beyond reason. Here the 
federal government's loyalty-security program is illustrative. The 
going rationale was, "Don't take a chance, kick 'em in the pants." This 
rule of exaggerated response is a major dysfunction of big organi­
zations. (24)
Similarly, fearful or apathetic employees are unlikely to report inefficiencies 
to higher authorities, thus depriving administrators of valuable "feedback."
A second consequence of obedience from fear is a tendency for employees 
to break rules when they believe that they will not be caught ("When the cat's 
away the mice will play."). In a study of boys working under varying 
conditions o f authority, noncompliance increased greatly when the autocratic 
leader le ft the room. (25) The implication of this research is that obedience 
requires constant supervision when it is obtained through fear. When an 
organization gains obedience by implicit or explicit threat, it becomes similar 
to a police state which must continually monitor its citizens and expend 
appreciable resources to do so. The more closely an organization must 
supervise its personnel, the less efficient it will be. Employees will take less 
productive initiative and managerial overhead will increase. Authoritarian 
states may have as their primary aim the assertion of a chain of command. 
Organizational elites must usually seek other goals in addition to maintaining 
control.
A final consequence of obedience obtained through fear, particularly 
obedience to rules or superiors perceived to be abusive, is impairment of the 
mental and/or physical health of the employee.
They'd like to tell o ff their bosses but don't know how to do it. They 
evade and repress their great dislike of the situation because they feel 
powerless to win out over the boss. This often leads to illness, 
frequent absenteeism, regular tardiness, and poor work habits. (26)
Obviously such reactions damage both the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
the organization.
The creation of a climate of fear in the wake of an opposition 
demonstrates the power of the organization's hierarchy but weakens, at least 
temporarily, its legitimate authority. It is difficult to generalize about the 
long-term effects o f the exercise of brute power in organizations. If the 
opposition is isolated and its ring leaders are dismissed or otherwise 
neutralized harsh reprisals will probably strengthen the authority system over 
the long range, because employees will be aware that officials are prepared 
to assert themselves decisively when they are challenged. If, however, 
oppositions are frequent or the organization as a whole is corrupt, inefficient, 
or otherwise abusive, stringent retaliation against a particular group of 
dissidents will feed a cycle of demoralization and inefficiency. Whether such
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a cycle is damaging to the authorities depends upon their commitment to the 
o ffic ia l goals of the organization and the pressure of constituencies and 
governmental agencies on them to achieve those goals.
Oppositions, o f course, are not always e ffective ly  suppressed by organi­
zational authorities. Sometimes they are successful in eliminating the abuses 
that they have fought and sometimes they win concessions from higher 
authorities. When dissidents are successful, believe that they have 
succeeded, or are not dispirited by administrative reprisals, they may create 
a political culture at the workplace, making future oppositions more likely. 
While suppressed dissent generally leads to demoralization, at least in the 
short run, opposition that is not crushed generates the belief among 
employees that they need not obey authorities without question, that they 
have some power over their conditions or even over the policies that they 
execute. A successful opposition within one department of an organization 
may serve as a model for others to emulate, thereby weakening the chain of 
command. If it has been well enough publicized, an opposition may even be 
imitated in other organizations.
Whether or not a bureaucratic opposition has achieved its goal, it may 
help to make future oppositions possible by providing a base o f employees who 
can be mobilized for action. One of the major difficulties in undertaking an 
opposition is finding employees who are willing to act and then forming them 
into a cohesive group. To the extent that the previous opposition group 
remains solidary and politically motivated, the likelihood o f future oppo­
sitions is enhanced. During the first struggle the tactics used may have led to 
a strong camaraderie and trust among the group members that remained after 
the group's combat function was discarded. For example, tactics that involve 
secrecy among the members, such as anonymous informing or making a 
superior appear to be incompetent, often provide a sense of solidarity. This 
result has been noted by those studying secret societies. (27)
Past exploits may lead to the continued coherence of the group, not 
merely because the members share a common experience, but because of the 
negative reaction of their colleagues. It is understandable that a state of 
mutual animosity usually exists between those involved in the opposition and 
those who might have been but refused to take part. Such hostile feelings 
may linger long after the conclusion of the opposition and may serve to 
perpetuate the group, if only because of the enmity they receive from and 
feel towards the "scabs." In such cases the dissolution of the group from its 
internal tensions will be avoided.
From a sociological viewpoint, the broadest generalization that can be 
drawn about the consequences of bureaucratic oppositions is that they tend to 
weaken the legitim ate authority of the organization over at least some of its 
employees. Max Weber, who was primarily concerned with the authority of 
the state, argued that the grounds of legitimacy could be traditional (from 
inherited custom), charismatic (from the personal g ift of a leader), or legal- 
rational (from a set of procedures). Although bureaucracies develop 
traditions and sometimes are taken over by charismatic figures, their major 
basis of authority in the Weberian scheme is legal-rational. Thus, their 
legitimacy can be impaired if their o fficia ls break the rules or if subordinates 
challenge the rules.
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The fundamental proposition that rule infractions weaken bureaucratic 
authority must be modified to account for the consequences of bureaucratic 
oppositions. First, bureaucracies do not depend for their legitimacy only upon 
legal-rational authority. Their rules must not merely be formally consistent 
and explicit, but they must also promote the organization's pursuit of its 
o ffic ia l aims. Thus, bureaucratic authority is both legal-rational and 
instrumental-rational. There may be a conflict between these two grounds 
for legitimacy when there is question about whether the formal rules serve 
the organization's purposes. Some bureaucratic oppositions challenge legal- 
rational authority in order to promote instrumental-rational authority, others 
are aimed against o fficials who violate the rules, and still others are aimed at 
o ffic ia ls who do not apply the rules e ffectively .
For the administrative myth, the rules of the organization are instrumen- 
tally adapted to its goals and the officials apply those rules universally and 
e ffective ly . The conditions for myth to approximate reality include the 
requirement that the goals be clear and consistent. If multiple and 
contradictory aims can be imputed to the organization, its legitimacy may be 
impaired by dissensus over which should be given priority. For example, the 
engineers who exposed the dangers of nuclear reactors believed that General 
Electric should not profit at the expense of public safety. (28) Similarly, the 
whistle blower who informed the District Attorney in Brooklyn that the Good 
Humor Corporation was marketing ice cream with high bacteria counts 
believed that a safe product was more important than high profits. (29) In 
both these cases, the authority of the organization was challenged on the 
grounds of value rationality, not on the grounds of instrumental rationality.
(30) Thus, a second modification of Weber's scheme must include the 
possibility that an organization's legitimacy is rooted in the purposes that it 
pursues as well as in its formal consistency and its efficiency and 
effectiveness. Some employees may be committed to the goals that the 
organization actually achieves, others may mount oppositions when the actual 
goals conflict with the o ffic ia l purposes, and still others may dissent against 
practices that breach moral standards. In the last case it is claimed that a 
moral ideal should be the supreme goal of the organization or that it should at 
least limit the pursuit of its other aims.
Rule infractions, then, only necessarily weaken the organization's authori­
ty when a) there is agreement on the organization's goals, b) the rules are 
instrumentally rational with regard to those goals, and c) o fficia ls pursue 
those goals competently and e ffective ly . If any of these three conditions are 
not met, rule infractions may or may not weaken the organization's 
legitim ate authority, depending upon the specific circumstances. For 
example, the overall authority of an organization may be strengthened when 
employees are permitted to bend or break the rules in order to achieve 
greater efficiency, or when the organization departs from its o ffic ia l goal in 
order to provide more jobs at the sacrifice of efficiency.
Bureaucratic oppositions, then, do not weaken legitim ate organizational 
authority merely because they may break some of the rules, but because they 
challenge the chain of command. Whatever effects oppositions may have that 
strengthen overall authority in the long run, they always impair the principle 
of hierarchy in the short run. They show that the authorities have not been
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wise enough to assure obedience, and, thus, they expose the weakness of the 
structure. Even if an opposition is crushed, it turns the organization into 
more of a power system than it was previously. In essence, bureaucratic 
opposition creates a gap between the maintenance of order and the purposes 
of work, between power and goodness, between ’’project orientation" and 
"object orientation." (31) It politicizes the organization by opening up 
disputes over goals, the means to achieve goals, or the e ffec tive  use of 
means. For as long as the opposition lasts subordinates take a responsibility 
for the organization that is not theirs by formal right.
Opposition, then, reveals that some authorities have not been responsible, 
that they have allowed grounded abuses to exist and that they have created 
conditions in which subordinates can act to try to rectify those abuses. A 
functionalist might argue against the interpretation that successful 
oppositions could increase the legitimacy of the chain of command by 
eliminating incompetent or abusive personnel, by achieving the alteration of 
inefficient practices, or by recommitting the organization to its o ffic ia l 
goals. A ll of these effects may occur and may help to strengthen legitimacy 
in the long run, but they will not eliminate the short-run e ffec t of politicizing 
the organization. The functionalist might reply that the public punishment of 
rule violators, the reasonable alteration of rules, or the rededication to 
o ffic ia l aims may convince subordinates of the essential goodness o f the 
authorities and reinforce normative solidarity. It is difficult to assess the 
strength o f this argument, but it may be noted that public rectification of 
abuses promotes solidarity most in communities whose members share an 
identity of interest and have a "consciousness of kind." In such communities 
public punishment makes the norms conspicuous by singling out isolated 
deviants from the rest of the community, by focusing attention upon the 
"exceptions who prove the rule." Organizations are hierarchies, not 
communities. Admission by officials that oppositionists were right probably 
casts doubt upon their competence more than it creates solidarity. Such 
admission may also reveal that the abuses are not exceptions, but the rule.
If oppositions are made public, they also impair the legitim ate authority 
of the organization in the wider society which may lead to new legal controls 
over it, loss of its effectiveness with clients or customers, or decline in its 
status. Statements by officials that abuses have been or will be corrected 
cannot, in the short run, counterbalance the suspicions created among those 
who are affected by or are dependent on the organization. Further, 
oppositions alert those outside the organization that the chain of command 
has been challenged and that the authorities may not be able to speak for the 
agency competently or carry out their promises. This consequence of 
opposition is probably the basic reason why officials are so concerned that 
dissent be suppressed before it escalates and broadens its range beyond the 
organization. In a competitive environment the organization must speak with 
one voice lest its adversaries sense weakness and take advantage of it.
The belief that opposition might hurt the organization’s public standing 
has even prevented the initiation of some bureaucratic oppositions, because 
the effectiveness of the organization has consequences for the welfare of the 
subordinates. Stanley Weir, in an analysis o f the International Longshore­
man’s Workers Union, concluded that this belief is responsible for
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... the refusal of the working longshoremen to air the problems of their 
union in public. They have fe lt  that the ensuing scandal would create a 
reactionary offensive against the job-hiring process which the ILWU 
controls jointly with the stevedoring companies..« (32)
The vital tension of bureaucratic opposition springs from the fact that in 
all organizations there are wide deviations from the administrative ideal, and 
yet that attempts to correct these deviations from below weaken the chain of 
command and invite disorder. The same sort of tension marks all 
authoritarian systems, because they do not institutionalize opposition. Such 
systems rely on control from above and when that control fails the system 
itself must be disrupted to correct abuses. When abuses become systemic, 
the entire system must be revised or an unjust and stagnant order maintained. 
In democratic systems there are ways of airing grievances, publicizing abuses, 
and altering policies in an orderly fashion, so opposition in them need not 
always threaten legitim ate authority. Organizations, which are predominant­
ly authoritarian systems, are structurally incapable of taking full advantage 
o f the benefits of opposition. Their first concern is to suppress.
POLICY
Bureaucratic oppositions, particularly those that have occurred in public 
agencies, have alerted legislators, constituencies, and the general public to 
organizational abuses. The melioristic impulse is strong in the United States; 
many people believe that the recognition of a problem, an evil, or a lack 
requires self-conscious intervention to set things right. In the view of the 
reformer it should be possible to provide an orderly means of eliminating, 
preventing, or at least lessening the abuses that have been exposed by the 
irregular tactics o f oppositions. The preceding discussion has argued that 
whether or not oppositions are successful, their general e ffe c t  is to weaken 
the organization’s chain o f command. Proposals to provide new agencies to 
perform the functions of oppositions or to make certain oppositions 
legitim ate will have the same e ffec t of weakening the administrative 
hierarchy. The most basic question of policy directed at remediating 
organizational abuses, then, is whether or not it is desirable, or even feasible, 
to diminish the autonomy of contemporary hierarchies. Some insight into the 
dimensions of this question will result from considering how administrative 
autonomy is currently limited.
In addition to the threat of bureaucratic oppositions, administrators in 
complex societies are constrained by a wide variety of factors to eliminate 
sadistic, insecure, or incompetent personnel, to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness, and to refrain from making and implementing illegal, though 
not always immoral, policy. First, bureaucracies are enmeshed in a 
competitive environment. Businesses must normally return a reasonable rate 
o f profit to continue operating, and if they are ’’bailed out" of trouble by 
government they are likely to suffer increased regulation. Colleges and 
hospitals must have adequate enrollments and reasonable rates of occupancy
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or they face diminished contributions or budget cuts. Even governmental 
agencies, which are monopolies, must compete against one another for shares 
of budgets, and must at least appear to achieve a certain standard of 
performance. Competitive controls are minimized for businesses which are 
monopoly suppliers of an important product or service and for governmental 
agencies concerned with security, such as the CIA. In both cases, a veil of 
secrecy inhibits e ffective  oversight.
A second limitation on administrative autonomy is public regulation 
through legislative oversight, independent regulatory agencies, executive 
control, or the court system. Ever since the Progressive era at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, many measures have been taken to correct 
organizational abuses by employing the countervailing power of the public 
sector. The preceding discussion has shown that government controls have 
not prevented abuses that generate bureaucratic oppositions, though it has 
not demonstrated that such controls have failed to lessen the number of 
abuses or their severity. Often organizations have "colonized" regulatory 
authorities with sympathetic personnel or have "captured" them in order to 
use them as tools for their own advantage. Even in such cases, however, 
competing interests have gained some leverage over the administrative 
hierarchy, reducing its autonomy.
A third set of restrictions on bureaucratic autonomy is provided by 
organized interest groups and lateral organizations, such as civil rights 
groups, consumer movements, unions, and professional associations. Whether 
or not limitations on administrative power are written into contracts, as they 
sometimes are when an organization is checked by a union, or into consent 
decrees, as they are when interest groups bring successful suits, hierarchies 
are circumscribed by lateral organizations merely by the threats of decreased 
support or of attempts to seek legislative remedies. The preceding chapters 
have shown that lateral organizations have been no more successful than 
government agencies in preventing abuses but, again, it has not argued that 
such interest groups have been entirely ineffective.
The present study of bureaucratic oppositions has been biased in the 
direction of demonstrating just how ineffective the checks on complex 
organizations have been. However, the conclusion need not be drawn that 
more of the same kinds o f checks would rectify more of the abuses, or that 
there are other kinds of constraints, consistent with the present order, that 
have not yet been tried. Current measures have perhaps not been successful, 
because the condition for effectiveness would be the destruction of the 
organization as an authoritarian system. Those who o ffer policy proposals to 
correct organizational abuses will find that their plans fall into one of two 
categories: either they will merely repeat previous efforts or they w ill alter 
the current authority system so much as to change the hierarchical principle 
radically. If the first is the case, then the organization will still have the 
autonomy to perpetrate and conceal abuses, barring opposition, while if the 
second is the intent the present system itself will be put in question.
A few oppositionists and commentators have been aware of the dilemma 
of reform and have advocated drastic measures. In certain cases there have 
been proposals to eliminate the offending organization altogether. For 
example, the nuclear engineers who resigned from General Electric because
120 BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION
they realized that nuclear safety was not technologically feasible joined 
forces with anti-nuclear groups to urge legislation to ban all atomic plants.
(33) Similarly, a group whose goal is the destruction of the CIA includes some 
former CIA employees, including Philip Agee. Its plans involve the 
establishment o f "a worldwide network o f agents to expose CIA personnel and 
methods of operation.” (34) Such attempts to abolish organizations, of 
course, only apply to special cases and cannot be applied universally, unless 
alternative ways of performing collective tasks are proposed and implement­
ed.
Sometimes oppositionists can create a new organization that is intended 
either to supplant the old one or to compete with it successfully enough to 
spur changes. Such schismatic initiatives are beyond the capabilities of most 
employees, either because of the enormous capital investment required to 
start a new organization or because of the guaranteed monopoly of 
government agencies. There are some organizations where the possibility 
exists, particularly those which are skill rather than capital intensive, such as 
consulting firms, advertising agencies, and especially religious organizations.
Papal authority was critically diminished by Martin Luther's bureaucratic 
opposition. Protestant asceticism makes schisms practicable because an 
ornate church is not required. The abundance of sects now in existence is 
witness to the feasibility o f starting new religious organizations. A group of 
"moderates who believed they had become the victims of an 'ecclesiastical 
tyranny"' within the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod split from the Church's 
Concordia Theological Seminary in St. Louis. (35) A "seminary in exile" was 
established and thousands of church members were reformed into new 
congregations. The leadership of the parent Church then declared the 
opposition group to be a separate church. (36)
Radical and comprehensive change has been suggested by those who 
propose substituting participatory democracy at the workplace for the 
principle of hierarchy. The program of worker self-management involves
... the full and direct participation of every working member in 
decisions which vitally a ffect him. ... It involves the full decision­
making process of discussion and selection of alternatives, coming to 
agreement, implementing, and assessing consequences. (37)
Substituting participation for hierarchical authority attacks the very heart of 
the bureaucracy. Higher administrators would no longer enjoy the secrecy 
necessary to perpetrate many abuses. As Weber noted, "Bureaucratic 
administration always tends to be an administration o f 'secret sessions': 
insofar as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism." (38) 
Democracy in the organization means the institutionalization of opposition. 
It is the only plan that would dissolve the dilemma of authoritarian politics, 
because it would eliminate them.
It is beyond the scope of the present study to assess the practicability or 
the desirability o f worker self-management. The theoretical and empirical 
literature about the subject is large and growing. (39) It is important to note 
here, however, that democratic machinery does not itself insure actual 
democracy, as unions and many local governments illustrate. Employee
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’’culture," the imperatives of technology, and the political and economic 
climate in which an organization is embedded are just some of the factors that 
need to be considered in any discussion about the possibility of democratizing 
orgnaizations. Further, in order to give worker self-management a "fa ir 
chance" it would have to be universalized, which would demand both a 
socialist economy and new forms of citizen-controlled public institutions. 
Such a radical change may be desirable, but it is not currently a "live option," 
at least in the United States.
Most suggestions for eliminating organizational abuses are efforts to work 
within the present system o f controls and constraints. The most popular 
proposals concentrate on rectifying the specific abuses that have been 
exposed by extending the kinds of regulatory mechanisms developed since the 
Progressive era to cover them. For example, instituting a Cabinet 
Department o f Consumer A ffairs or strengthening the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission is a proposed response to revelations about hazardous 
products. Similarly, there have been calls to reform the Civil Service 
Commission to enable administrators to more easily dismiss incompetent 
employees. Such measures have been repeatedly tested for more than 50 
years in a wide variety of contexts. As noted above, their success has been 
limited by the autonomy o f the organization’s administration. Target 
organizations will attempt to colonize or capture regulatory authorities and 
to blunt their effectiveness. If their efforts are unsuccessful some abuses 
may be corrected, but perhaps at the cost of efficiency or effectiveness.
Similar to government regulation and tightened public controls are 
measures that increase the power of lateral organizations over the target 
bureaucracy. For example, various women’s groups, such as the National 
Organization for Women, Working Women United, and the Women’s Equity 
Action League, provide how-to information and legal aid to oppositions 
fighting superiors who sexually harass their female subordinates, or policies 
which discriminate against female employees. Ralph Nader and his associates 
call for the encouragement of bureaucratic oppositionists by professional 
societies and instruct these groups to "reformulate their codes of ethics to 
make them relevant to the employment relationship as well as to the client- 
professional relationship." (40) Professional associations and unions may also 
provide legal aid for members employed in abusive organizations. A self-help 
organization has been formed "to provide assistance to all employees of 
security-related agencies who wish to come forth and expose inefficiency or 
illegality in the outfit they work for. Legal assistance for the new 
organization w ill be provided by the American Civil Liberties Union...." (41) 
The American Chemical Society has proposed the institution of a legal aid 
fund to help oppositionists resist abusive practices. The Society’s president 
argued:
We are aware of many cases in industry, government laboratories and 
even universities where scientists have been retaliated against when 
their professional standards interfered with the interests of their 
employers or funders. (42)
Chemists who opposed their organization's policies in the name of their 
professional standards would be able to fight retaliation from their superiors
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in the courts with the ACS’s aid.
Some bureaucratic oppositions have led to the formation of lateral groups 
to check the offending organization. One such example is the Teamster 
reform group mentioned earlier, PROD. In the main, PROD regularizes the 
informing tactics o f many bureaucratic oppositions. One of its efforts was to 
support Teamster members in a New Jersey local who were being coerced 
into contributing money to the legal defense committee for Anthony 
Provenzano. (43) He had once headed the local, but had been convicted in 
court o f murder and extortion. His victim had been his major rival for 
leadership in the union. Members of the local were far too intimidated to 
oppose the policy themselves but PROD was able to act on their behalf. Its 
tactic was to inform to the Justice Department. A letter was sent to the 
organized crime and racketeering section head by Paul Poulos, PROD's 
organizing director - "  ... Poulos said his group has received calls and letters 
from union members who believe they will face hardships on the job if they do 
not contribute to Provenzano's defense.1 (44)
While the example of PROD shows some of the limitations of unionism, 
the result o f a few bureaucratic oppositions is the formation o f a union to 
provide a regular check on perceived abuses. If a union does emerge from a 
bureaucratic opposition it is likely that the struggle was unsuccessful. Had 
the dissidents achieved their goal they would not have seen the need to 
continue to commit resources to a conflict. Some outsiders, unaware of the 
failed attempt to oust President Silber, could not understand why Boston 
University's faculty chose to unionize. An insider grasped the situation:
"This is the most status-anxious faculty," says one of the Silber's 
deans. "They are more royal than the king, more papal than the pope.
For this faculty to have embraced unionism prior to John Silber was 
unthinkable." (45)
Just as government regulation has a long history, so does the use of 
pressure by lateral organizations. The consequence of such pressure may be 
to lessen certain abuses, but unless the lateral organization shares power with 
the target bureaucracy it will probably not eliminate them. If the target 
bureaucracy is able to coopt the lateral organization it will probably be even 
more difficult than before for subordinates to resist abuses. The same 
conclusion applies to regulatory agencies that are colonized or captured by 
the regulated. If the target bureaucracy is not successful at cooptation then 
it may lost efficiency because of the measures it takes to satisfy organized 
interests. The values promoted and sacrificed by both government regulation 
and intervention by lateral organization will depend on the balance of power 
in each concrete situation. In general, reformers might remember 
Santayana's dictum:
A thousand reforms have le ft  the world as corrupt as ever, for each 
successful reform has founded a new institution, and this institution 
has bred its new and congenial abuses. (46)
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The use of government regulation and lateral groups to check organi­
zational abuses relies upon bringing external power to bear upon the target 
bureaucracy, forestalling the need for spontaneous opposition from within or 
at least giving such opposition leverage outside of the organization. Another 
sort of proposal for change is aimed at modifying the internal structure of the 
organization to provide new channels for reporting abuses or legal protection 
for those who blow the whistle. A law professor has, for example, suggested 
the creation of
full-time, well-staffed in-house probation officers which are either 
appointed by the courts or regulatory agencies, and who are designated 
to receive bad news. (47)
Such an offic ia l, similar to the ombundsman, would be a projection of outside 
agencies into the organization. Depending on the powers assigned to the 
o ffice , the organization’s hierarchy would be more or less impaired. At one 
extreme there would merely be a new conduit for information and at the 
other there would be authority over management, such as is exerted in the 
Soviet Union by Communist Party "control commissions." The same dilemma 
applies to this proposal as to the other, more traditional, measures. If the 
organization coopts the new o ffice, then oppositionists will be more reluctant 
to initiate action, but if the o ffice  is not coopted, the administration will lose 
authority, not necessarily to subordinates, but to an external agency which 
may itself be abusive. In the case of "public directors," there would be 
multiple centers o f authority within the organization, breaking the chain of 
command.
Perhaps the most popular new remedy for organizational abuses is the 
provision of legal protection from reprisals for employees who wish to blow 
the whistle. Basic to this reform is the extension to employees of some 
constitutional rights that now exist only for citizens. Law professor David 
Ewing, in his book Freedom Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil Liberties 
to the Workplace, calls for the following in a j*blll o f rights lor organization 
people" - "freedom to critic ize a company’s social and ethical policies. 
Freedom to object to an immoral or unethical directive." (48) Ewing argues 
that
The First Amendment need not and should not be applied to all forms 
o f employee speech and writing. If it is applied just to questions of 
social responsibility, morality, and ethics, the need is met. Then those 
who know first and most about questionable corporate plans and 
practices would be free to challenge management without losing their 
jobs and chances for promotion. (49)
Bills submitted to the N inety-fifth Congress attempted to provide such 
rights to employees o f the federal government. For example, the 
coordinated Senate bill, S. 3108, sponsored by Senators Leahy, Humphrey, and 
Abourezk would " ... provide for the protection of government employees who 
disclose information of illegal or improper actions within the government" by 
setting up a Merit Systems Protection Board to investigate complaints about
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abuses and to restore "aggrieved” employees to their status prior to improper 
disciplinary action. For private employees, a writer in a management journal 
suggests that the corporation "should develop around a 'constitution* that 
establishes the rights of the individual and the limitation of the power of the 
organization over him." (50)
Except for the suggestion that organizations be made constitutional, 
which would acknowledge them to be political systems and change their 
present form, the proposals to grant and protect employee rights are not 
substantially different from the creation of "public directors." Such rights, to 
be e ffec tive , would have to be enforced by an agency, perhaps a "merit 
systems protection board," which would be able to enter the organization, 
investigate it, and discipline it in certain areas of administration. Short of 
some form of self-management, subordinates who mount oppositions must 
rely on their own wits or on the power of some external agency. A new 
external agency to hear and perhaps redress complaints about abuses would 
probably suffer the same fate as the Inspector General in the Armed Services. 
The ineffectiveness o f the Inspector General, discussed previously, was 
attributed primarily to the impossibility o f maintaining a dual structure of 
authority in a hierarchical organization. Just as in the case of the "public 
director," a merit systems protection board would inhibit opposition if it were 
weak or coopted, or would take control of the organization if it followed the 
Soviet model of control commissions. Under present conditions in the United 
States the former alternative would be the more likely outcome.
A ll o f the proposed reforms of bureaucratic abuses which work within the 
present system confront a basic dilemma. The ground of hierarchical 
administrative authority is that a specific group of officials should be held 
responsible for the conduct and performance of the organization. The chain 
o f command is a way o f localizing and fixing responsibility. The presence of 
abuses within organizations shows that in many cases the officia ls cannot or 
w ill not behave responsibly, or that their interpretation of responsible 
behavior differs from that of other groups or individuals. Reform of abuses 
concentrates on making officia ls accountable to other agencies. Such 
accountability, however, weakens their autonomy or, in the case of cooption, 
allows them to be even more abusive and less accountable than they were 
before. Reform , then, diffuses responsibility and gives officials excuses for 
their failures. They may actually become so hedged by regulations and 
pressures that they cannot act e ffective ly , or they may be able to blame 
other agencies for their own misdeeds. Meanwhile there is no guarantee that 
subordinates and publics will suffer any less abuse. Yet the call for reform 
responds to a situation in which the competitive controls which supposedly 
undergird organizational society have failed. It is, indeed, a vicious circle.
The choice seems to be between abusive organizations which maintain 
their chains o f command, and irresponsible organizations in which authority is 
fragmented and diffused among plural agencies and groups - either "decen­
tralized totalitarianism" or "hyper-pluralism." Much of the reason for this 
prospect lies in the deep social conflicts in contemporary societies over the 
purposes that organizations should serve. Within this atmosphere o f division 
no consistent "public" policy for rectifying abuses can be formulated. Each 
measure will help some groups and hinder others. Those who disapprove of
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the aims of current organizational elites will welcome the fragmentation of 
their power, while those who approve of those aims will deplore it. Probably 
nothing will stop the abuses, or the spontaneous oppositions against them.
In the light of the policy alternatives, bureaucratic oppositions take on a 
more favorable appearance. They respond to specific situations flexibly, 
show people that at least for a moment they can resist, sometimes create 
systems of shared power, and keep elites aware that their employees are 
persons, not "cheerful robots." Bureaucratic oppositions fu lfill more closely 
than any other contemporary social phenomena the Jeffersonian ideal of 
human beings freely and periodically asserting their liberty against tyrannical 
structures. To attempt to regularize them would deprive them of their 
essence and deliver them to dependence upon other hierarchies. To "manage" 
them into submission would be to take another long step towards the one­
dimensional society, the "crystal palace." To give them friendly encourage­
ment, with a dash of realism, has been the purpose of this book.
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